Auditing Symposium IV: Proceedings of the 1978 Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems by University of Kansas, School of Business & Stettler, Howard
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium
on Auditing Problems Deloitte Collection
1978
Auditing Symposium IV: Proceedings of the 1978
Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on
Auditing Problems
University of Kansas, School of Business
Howard Stettler
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings
Part of the Accounting Commons
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please
contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
University of Kansas, School of Business and Stettler, Howard, "Auditing Symposium IV: Proceedings of the 1978 Touche Ross/
University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems" (1978). Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing
Problems. 4.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings/4
auditing 
symposium iv 
Proceedings of the 
1978 Touche Ross 
University of Kansas 
Symposium on 
Auditing Problems 
HOWARD F. STETTLER, EDITOR 
Auditing Symposium IV 
Proceedings of the 1978 Touche Ross/ 
University of Kansas Symposium 
on Auditing Problems 
Edited by 
Howard F. Stettler 
May 25 and 26, 1978 
School of Business 
University of Kansas 
Lawrence, Kansas 66045 
These contents have not been copyrighted, and permission is hereby granted to 
reproduce or quote from material included herein in whole or in part, provided 
that full credit is given to 1) the author of the material, and 2) this source: 
AUDITING SYMPOSIUM IV; Proceedings of the 1978 Touche Ross/University of 
Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems. 
Published by 
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045 
Distributed by 
STUDENT U N I O N BOOKSTORE, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045 
Price $6.00 prepaid 
PRINTED BY 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS PRINTING SERVICE 
Preface 
The 1978 Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on Audi t ing 
Problems is the fourth of this biennial series of symposia designed to bring 
practitioners and educators in the field of auditing together to study matters of 
mutual interest and concern. Once again Touche Ross Foundation has provided 
the financial support that has made the Symposium and the printing of these 
Proceedings possible, and the broad support for this series by Touche Ross & C o . 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
A s before, a balance has been sought between practitioners and educators 
in the preparation of papers, with the discussant for a paper usually chosen from 
the other group, and with a similar balance in the invited participants. A l l papers, 
except for the traditional evening address on a more general topic, were distributed 
in advance, making it possible for the preparer to l imit comments to summary 
remarks or observations about the paper, and with more than an hour available 
for the discussant's remarks and the ensuing open discussion. Although no 
attempt has been made to summarize the informal discussions, both the preparers 
and the designated discussants were afforded the opportunity to modify their 
papers and remarks to reflect matters that arose during the general discussion. 
The paper "Internal A u d i t i n g — A Historical Perspective and Future D i ­
rections" by V i c Brink represents the observations of "one who was there" from 
the very beginning of the formal organization of the members of that profession, 
and thus offers a solid base for the projections for the future that are also con­
tained in the paper. The inclusion of the historical paper on internal auditing 
extends my endeavor to assemble a series of papers that are expected to eventually 
provide a comprehensive dissertation of the development and heritage of the 
auditing segment of the accounting discipline. The other papers i n this volume 
reflect a unifying theme only i n that they were chosen i n terms of what was 
perceived as being likely to be of current interest to the participants and to the 
readers of this volume of collected papers. 
A s has been true for each of these symposia, I take fu l l responsibility for 
the selection of topics for both the invited and the submitted papers, but the 
views expressed in the papers are those of the preparers, and, of course, not 
necessarily those of the sponsors of the symposium or of the organizations with 
which the preparers are affiliated. 
W i t h the exception of the first symposium in the series, which is out of 
print, the proceedings of each symposium may be purchased from: 
STUDENT U N I O N BOOKSTORE 
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66045 
1974 C O N T E M P O R A R Y A U D I T I N G P R O B L E M S 
1976 A U D I T I N G S Y M P O S I U M III 
1978 A U D I T I N G S Y M P O S I U M I V 
$5.00 
$5.00 
$6.00 
In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge the gracious personal support and 
assistance of Jerry Jackson, partner i n charge of the Kansas City office of 
Touche Ross & C o . 
HOWARD F . STETTLER 
February, 1979 
University of Kansas 
Lawrence, Kansas 
The dates, tides, and prepaid purchase price of each of the available Proceedings 
volumes are as follows: 
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Internal Auditing—A Historical Perspective and 
Future Directions 
Victor Z. Brink 
Columbia University, Professor Emeritus 
A n inquiry into the history and forward directions of internal auditing can 
best begin with a definition. In the new Standards for the Practice of Internal 
A u d i t i n g just issued by The Institute of Internal Auditors, internal auditing is 
defined as " . . . an independent appraisal function established within an or­
ganization to examine and evaluate its activities as a service to the organization." 
The Standards then go on to say that "The objective of internal auditing is to 
assist members of the organization in the effective discharge of their responsi­
bilities. T o this end, internal auditing furnishes them with analyses, appraisals, 
recommendations, counsel, and information concerning the activities reviewed. 
The members of the organization assisted by internal auditing include those in 
management and the board of directors. Internal auditors owe a responsibility 
to both, providing them with information about the adequacy and effectiveness 
of the organization's system of internal control and the quality of performance." 
The reference to internal control is further clarified in the Statement of Responsi­
bilities issued by the same Institute where internal auditing is described as 
" . . . a managerial control which functions i n measuring and evaluating the 
effectiveness of other controls." A l l of these statements confirm the broad con­
structive nature of internal auditing. 
The fact that the term "internal audit ing" includes the word "audit ing," 
and the fact that the work of the external auditor—the independent public ac­
countant—also has to do with "audit ing," suggests that the only difference be­
tween the two professional activities is whether the individual is an employee 
of the organization or is engaged as an outside professional on a contractual basis. 
The fallacy of that oversimplified view can be shown by comparing the respective 
missions of internal and external auditors. In the latter case—if we exclude the 
wide range of special consulting services—the primary mission of the external 
auditor is to examine the annual financial statements of the organization i n such 
depth as to make possible the expression of an opinion as to their fairness in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. That opinion i n part 
is sought by the board of directors and corporate management for their own 
use, but even more for the outside parties who rely on the financial statements— 
creditors, investors, government, and the like. In carrying out this extended 
mission, the external auditor functions as an independent agent for a negotiated 
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fee, and hence has a certain degree of independence inherent i n that detached 
status. 
The internal auditor, on the other hand, is an employee of the organization 
wi th a major mission of serving that organization i n a variety of ways. The 
services rendered pertain to the effectiveness of both internal procedures and 
the related operations. The service has to do w i t h al l kinds of internal activities 
and interprets effectiveness to include both efficiency and profitability. The in ­
ternal auditor has no direct responsibility to third parties such as creditors, in­
vestors, or government. Moreover, being an employee of the organization un­
avoidably restricts the level of independence as compared to that enjoyed by the 
external auditor. A t the same time, however, it should be recognized that the 
two missions are not isolated from each other. Instead, as each audit group 
carries out its primary mission, there are intermediate and secondary concerns 
which involve common interests. In both cases there is an underlying need for 
sound internal control and the related policies, procedures, and day to day 
activities. Likewise i n both cases, that internal control is viewed as a means to 
the end of carrying out the primary mission. 
Historical Development 
If we wish to adequately understand contemporary issues, it is always helpful 
to look back at historical developments and to review the manner i n which the 
currently existing situation emerged. It, therefore, seems appropriate that we 
follow that approach for internal auditing. In doing this, we recognize that how 
far one goes back into history is bound to be arbitrary. Moreover, the applicability 
of the study of history always has its limitations because of changing environ­
mental conditions. W e also recognize that all organizations and all internal 
audit groups are different and that each situation involves a response to its own 
environment i n a distinctive manner. Nevertheless, it can still be useful to 
review the past to assist i n understanding the present and for projecting what 
may lie ahead. 
In the case of internal auditing, we know that internal auditing as a concept 
has existed as early as there have been substantive human relationships. 
Conscientious people have always been concerned with the extent of com­
pliance with instructions, the reliability of information, and the effectiveness of 
results—whether carried out as a part of regular operational responsibilities or 
by various subordinates, however they might be designated. W e select 1941, 
however, as our first historical reference point. W e do this on the personal side 
because this was the year that the author completed his doctoral research under 
Professor Roy B. Kester at Columbia University covering the nature and scope 
of internal auditing, and which became the basis for the first major book i n the 
field, Internal A u d i t i n g , Principles and Practice, which was published by The 
Ronald Press Company. The year 1941 is, however, more noteworthy because it 
was the year in which The Institute of Internal Auditors was founded—an event 
i n which the author was privileged to be an active participant. 
In 1941 there were a number of internal auditing departments, but they 
existed only i n a small proportion of the organizations that had need for such 
services. These internal audit groups concentrated on compliance with lower 
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level accounting and operational procedures, protection of assets, and detection 
of fraud. There was at that time, however, an increasing awareness of the 
growing size and complexity of all kinds of operations by business, government, 
and other types of organizations. The external auditor was also becoming in ­
creasingly concerned with those same problems, and especially how they im­
pinged upon the responsibilities of that profession. There was i n total a growing 
recognition that internal auditing departments could make an important contribu­
tion to coping wi th the emerging complexities. 
The response to the foregoing was a new wave of strengthening existing 
internal auditing departments and creating new internal auditing departments 
when such audit groups did not already exist. External auditors i n many cases 
were the parties recommending new internal auditing departments and/or 
being called in to help work out the needed expansion of audit effort i n their 
client companies. In many situations, the internal audit personnel were supplied 
or recruited by external auditors, and then trained and guided by them. It was 
inevitable, therefore, that internal auditing efforts would be very supportive of 
external auditor needs and relatively closely coordinated to assure the greater 
reliability of financial statements. This meant that internal auditing efforts were 
especially directed to accounting procedures and related lower level compliance, 
as previously indicated, rather than to broader improvement, operational effec­
tiveness, and greater profitability. The existing internal auditing departments 
also typically reported to one of the lower ranking financial executives—more 
often to the officer responsible for accounting activities. This was the typical 
situation, although the writer's research preceding the completion of the afore­
mentioned book showed that some business corporations had very progressive 
and sophisticated internal auditing departments. 
Formation of The Institute of Internal Auditors 
A s previously mentioned, 1941 was also the year when a group of forward-
looking internal auditors became discontented with the orientation of existing 
professional associations and decided that a new professional organization should 
be established and devoted exclusively to the professional interests of internal 
auditors. This decision marked the creation of The Institute of Internal Auditors 
with twenty-four charter members. John B. Thurston, the head of the internal 
auditing department at N o r t h American Company—a large public utility—was 
the moving force, and he became the new Institute's first president. Later, 
Thurston also wrote a book on internal auditing: Basic Internal Auditing 
Principles and Techniques, published by International Textbook Company. 
D u r i n g the years following 1941—and especially following W o r l d W a r II—a 
number of interrelated forces were at work. There was first of all a continuing 
expansion of the size and complexity of organizations—business corporations, 
governmental bodies, and philanthropic organizations. Business corporations 
were also becoming increasingly diversified and extended geographically—in­
cluding more and more international operations. A s a result, there were addi­
tional concerns of both management and external auditors and a related effort 
to further expand and upgrade internal auditing groups. Also management be­
came increasingly aware of the desirability of getting more benefits from the 
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very substantial amounts of money expended to maintain internal auditors, and 
therefore, was motivated to use them in connection with broader operational prob­
lems to which these internal auditors were concurrently being exposed. 
Operational Auditing Introduced 
A t the same time, internal auditors were increasingly aware of the further 
opportunities to go beyond the narrower protective role and to make more sub­
stantial and dynamic contributions to management welfare. A n d when manage­
ment responded favorably to the extension of the services rendered there was 
all the more incentive for internal auditors to move even more aggressively. This 
new emphasis of internal auditors, over and above their more traditional financial 
auditing role, came to be known as "operational auditing." A s a result, internal 
auditing broadened i n professional scope and attracted individuals of greater 
capabilities. The higher level contribution of internal auditors also brought with 
it new visibility with management, resulting i n better organizational status and 
higher monetary rewards. 
In most situations, the expansion into operational auditing was built on 
and integrated with the so-called more traditional financial auditing. In other 
situations the enthusiasm for the more dynamic operational auditing resulted in 
some reduction or contraction of the earlier financial auditing. In the latter cases, 
there was some weakening of the ties to the external auditors and a resulting 
reduction in the reliance placed on internal audit work. Whi le again there were 
all types of situations, on average internal auditing came to focus on organiza­
tional effectiveness i n terms of improved operational results and greater profitabil­
ity. A n understanding of this expanded role of the internal auditor is very i m ­
portant as we appraise the contemporary scene, with its new pressures, and the 
resulting alternative directions in which internal auditing may move. 
Other Developments 
The developments over the years since 1941 have also included some situa­
tions where the services provided by the internal audit department have been 
expanded to go beyond the needs of officers of the operating organization and 
to also be directed toward the needs of the board of directors. In some cases, 
there were new dotted-line-type organizational relationships to the board of 
directors and, in a few cases, solid-line-type reporting responsibility. (Dotted 
line describes those situations where there are partial responsibilities and solid 
line refers to situations where there is primary administrative responsibility.) 
The latter situation has more often come to pass in the banking and insurance 
industries where the handling of cash and negotiable securities, wi th the related 
higher level of risk exposure, has resulted in increased concerns of boards of di ­
rectors. Industry wide, however, the relationship of the internal audit group to 
the board has been less structured and often not clearly defined. 
A final significant aspect of the thirty-five plus years which have elapsed 
since 1941 pertains to the growth of the professional association founded i n that 
earlier year. This association—The Institute of Internal Auditors—over the en­
suing years has grown from its initial charter group of 24 to an international 
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organization with over 16,000 members, with over 130 chapters, and with a 
headquarters staff of some 55 persons. The activities of The Institute have 
come to include a substantial research program, the development and administra­
tion of educational seminars, the publication of a professional journal and major 
books and monographs, the development of an effective interface with other 
parties interested i n internal auditing, formulation of professional standards, a 
certification program (Certified Internal Audi tor ) , and a wide range of other 
membership services. The composite result has been an integral part of the 
expanding professional status of internal auditing.* 
The Contemporary Scene 
The internal auditing profession has developed in more recent years to a 
level where it serves a wide range of organizational needs. The services rendered, 
as we have seen, typically cover both the financial and operational dimensions 
of organizational activities. The services rendered can, as we also have seen, be 
viewed as covering both protective needs and all kinds of improvement. This 
total range is outlined more specifically in the earlier mentioned Statement of 
Responsibilities of Internal Auditors, as follows: 
The objective of internal auditing is to assist all members of manage­
ment i n the effective discharge of their responsibilities by furnishing 
them with analyses, appraisals, recommendations and pertinent com­
ments concerning the activities reviewed. Internal auditors are con­
cerned with any phase of business activity in which they may be of 
service to management. This involves going beyond the accounting 
and financial records to obtain a ful l understanding of the operations 
under review. The attainment of this overall objective involves such 
activities as: 
• Reviewing and appraising the soundness, adequacy, and application 
of accounting, financial, and other operating controls, and promoting 
effective control at reasonable cost 
• Ascertaining the extent of compliance with established policies, plans, 
and procedures 
• Ascertaining the extent to which company assets are accounted for and 
safeguarded from losses of all kinds 
• Ascertaining the reliability of management data developed within the 
organization 
• Appraising the quality of performance in carrying out assigned 
responsibilities 
• Recommending operating improvements. 
The above portion of the Statement of Responsibilities is a helpful elabora­
tion of the internal auditor's role in several ways. In the first sentence it de­
scribes very concisely how the internal auditor discharges his or her responsi-
* The history of the Institute of Internal Auditors is presented in further detail in 
"Foundations for Unlimited Horizons—The Institute of Internal Auditors 1941-1976" written 
by the author of this paper, and published by The Institute of Internal Auditors. 
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bilities through providing analysis, appraisals, recommendations and pertinent 
comments covering the activities reviewed. 
The six types of activities cited are also helpful because of the more precise 
identification of those that are primarily protective i n nature (the second, third, 
and fourth) and those that are primarily directed to further improvement (the 
first, fifth, and sixth). In actual practice, the recommendations for improvement 
are developed to a major extent by building upon the more routine protective 
type activities. Both types of service are very important but it is the development 
of improvements that has demonstrated the most dynamic professional potentials 
for internal auditors. 
In the previously mentioned Standards, the work of the internal auditor is 
covered by standards and guidelines i n five areas as follows: 
1. The independence of the internal auditing department from the 
activities audited, and the objectivity of internal auditors. 
2. The proficiency of internal auditors and the professional care they 
should exercise. 
3. The scope of internal auditing work. 
4. The performance of internal auditing assignments. 
5. The management of the internal auditing department. 
Of special interest for educators is the portion of the second area of the 
Standards that deals w i t h the knowledge, skills, and disciplines needed by in ­
ternal auditors. Included here are the statements that: 
• Proficiency i n accounting principles and techniques is required of 
auditors who work extensively with financial records and reports. 
• A n understanding of management principles is required to recognize 
and evaluate materiality and significance of deviations from good 
business practice. 
• A n appreciation is required of the fundamentals of such subjects as 
accounting, economics, commercial law, taxation, finance, quantitative 
methods, and computerized information systems. 
This broad coverage of required qualifications springs from the fact that 
the internal auditor is reviewing all types of organizational activities. It does, 
however, complicate the problem of where i n the undergraduate and graduate 
business schools the responsibility for education of internal auditors should be 
centered. 
The Changing Contemporary Situation 
In more recent years, there have been a number of important developments 
which impact directly and indirectly on both business organizations and the 
independent public accountants who serve them. In the case of the business 
organization, the impact bears on both the management group responsible for 
operations and the board of directors to whom the operational group is responsi­
ble. These impacts i n turn flow through to a considerable extent to the internal 
auditors in those same organizations. The underlying developments have cre-
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ated new pressures which bear importantly on the continuing roles and responsi­
bilities of all of the aforementioned parties of interest. 
The new developments can be viewed i n the most general terms as due to 
new expectations of the total society pertaining to the quality of life. In more 
specific terms, the new expectations run to the protection of the physical en­
vironment, the conservation of natural resources, elimination of poverty, pro­
viding greater equal opportunity to people, the satisfaction of higher level human 
needs, and higher standards of morality. These expectations have always existed 
over time, but the current situation is characterized by an acceleration of these 
expectations, with a related demand for more immediate and more substantive 
corrective action. These new expectations have increasingly focused on business 
corporations, because of their relatively greater visibility, resources, and power. 
A t the same time, individual instances of deficiencies of corporate conduct i n 
various areas of corporate activity have fanned the flames of the new demands 
for corrective action. 
A l l of these pressures have combined to cause a rising dissatisfaction with 
business organizations and those responsible for their operations, plus a sub­
stantial loss of confidence in the integrity and trustworthiness of business leaders. 
The pressures have been exerted i n a number of ways. In the case of corporate 
management, there is the new emphasis on adhering to higher standards of 
conduct, better accounting policies, and for more comprehensive and more 
effective systems of internal control. For boards of directors there are pressures 
for greater involvement i n corporate affairs, a deeper sense of both shareholder 
and social responsibility, and a greater use of audit committees. A n d i n the 
public accounting area, there are pressures for greater independence and a 
higher and more definitive level of responsibility. The aroused public opinion 
has been expressed principally through demands for new legislation and greater 
governmental regulation and control. 
The result of all of the various new pressures just described is to some extent 
to further involve the internal auditor. W i t h the internal auditor's traditional 
focus on compliance and internal control, it is natural that all parties of interest 
tend to see the internal auditing group as a useful contributor to the solution 
of existing problems, and more specifically as a helpful ally i n the accomplish­
ment of their own particular objectives. The question thereby posed for the 
internal auditor is how to respond to the new greater needs, and wi th a further 
question as to what the priorities should be i n serving the particular needs of 
the various parties of interest. The latter question may of course be taken out of 
the internal auditor's hands by the decisions of higher authority, including spe­
cific legislation. A t the same time, however, internal auditors are endeavoring 
to make their own appraisals of what is best in terms of their own self-interest 
and the needs of the larger society. This requires reconciliation and resolution 
of any existing conflicts, and then help i n a constructive way to shape the 
evolving pressures and demands by higher authority. A l l of this raises questions 
of what is the best ongoing role and what are the related responsibilities for 
the internal auditor now and i n the years ahead? What are the alternatives and 
how do they impinge both upon the responsibilities of the other parties of 
interest and the total social welfare? A n d then, in the light of those choices, 
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what should be the nature and scope of internal auditing practice for imple­
menting the selected role over the foreseeable future? 
Whither Internal Auditing 
There are many ways that internal auditors might respond to the new 
pressures on business organizations and independent public accountants. In al l 
of the various alternatives there is, however, a central issue of what priorities 
should be given to services to corporate management versus services to the board 
of directors. In this connection there are various sets of arrangements which 
could i n some way separate or integrate these priorities. These alternative ar­
rangements extend from the extreme of solely serving corporate management to 
that of solely serving the board, with various types of intermediate combinations. 
W e propose to evaluate the two extreme alternatives and then to appraise the 
merits of various types of combined orientation. In that way we can best under­
stand the trade-offs involved as one moves from one extreme to the other, and 
perhaps be in a better position to find the proper balance. 
Let us begin with the possibility that the internal audit group is to be 
exclusively dedicated to the service of the operational organization and its cor­
porate management. The merits of such an arrangement are that the corporate 
management can then use the internal audit group to fully serve its own man­
agerial needs, free from any outside restrictions. Presumably, under such condi­
tions the emphasis of internal auditing would be primarily on operational audit­
ing, but plus whatever financial auditing activities the corporate management 
believes appropriate i n discharging its own responsibilities to the board. One 
could perhaps argue that this arrangement would best exploit the already proven 
capabilities of internal auditors to achieve maximum profitability of the operating 
organization. The internal auditor would at the same time f ind life a bit 
simpler in that reporting allegiance would be only to the corporate management. 
Under this arrangement, however, the board of directors and its audit committee 
would presumably have to depend more on the independent public accountant 
to take care of their own needs, or alternatively create a new audit group to 
provide some of the needed services. 
N o w let us take the other extreme and assume that the existing internal 
audit group is exclusively responsible to the board of directors—most likely via 
its audit committee. N o w the internal audit department would emphasize pro­
tecting the responsibilities of the board and would presumably concentrate on 
the more traditional objectives of compliance, protection, and integrity. T o the 
extent that the board extended its operational involvement, it would also have 
the seasoned internal audit group to assist it in those endeavors. Under this 
arrangement, however, the role of the internal auditor would appear more likely 
to identify with that of the external auditor. There might also be some conflict 
between the work of the internal auditor and the operating organization because 
the internal auditor, to a considerable extent, would be checking on corporate 
management for the account of the audit committee. Presumably the internal 
auditor would take on a more powerful protective role, but that could be directly 
or indirectly undermining, or even giving up, the present major stake in opera­
tional auditing. It is also most l ikely—if not inevitable—that corporate manage-
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merit would seek to obtain operational auditing type services from another or­
ganizational component, or that it would create an entirely new group to do 
the in-house operationally oriented internal auditing. That new audit group 
would likely move into the vacuum created by the partial or complete with­
drawal of internal auditors from the operational area. 
Exploring the Middle Ground 
In between the two alternatives of exclusive service to corporate officers or 
the audit committee is a spectrum of intermediate possibilities. W e w i l l , how­
ever, focus only on three alternatives: one of primary responsibility to the cor­
porate management with a defined secondary responsibility to the audit com­
mittee; one of primary responsibility to the audit committee with a defined 
secondary responsibility to corporate management; and a third one involving 
equal responsibility to the two users of audit services. In this range of alterna­
tives, we use primary responsibility in terms of the conventional solid-line type 
of relationship, and secondary responsibility as the conventional dotted-line rela­
tionship. The solid line then indicates administrative control, but subject to 
dotted-line types of responsibility to others that should be specifically defined. 
W h e n there are two solid lines, we have the unusual organizational arrange­
ment where responsibility and administrative direction are shared equally by 
the two recipients on a partnership basis. 
What are the merits and disadvantages of these three types of organiza­
tional arrangements? Under the first named alternative—the solid line to cor­
porate management and the dotted line to the audit committee—the internal 
audit role to corporate management would stay much the same as now presently 
exists. The dotted line responsibility to the audit committee would presumably 
include periodic reporting—both i n writ ing and i n person—and immediate 
access for each party to the other as deemed necessary. The responsibilities as 
defined would probably state particular types and levels of required disclosure. 
The advantages are that each party of interest might be able to gain satisfaction 
of its needs for service without restricting the control needed by corporate man­
agement for achieving effective operations. The disadvantages are that there 
might be some conflict of interest between the management and the board, and 
that the board might then feel that it was not getting enough protective service 
from the internal audit group to satisfy its expanding needs. 
The reverse type of organizational arrangement—a solid line to the board 
and a dotted line to corporate management—would of course put the audit 
committee i n the position of top control and thus more fully satisfy governmental 
pressures for very strong safeguards. It would, however, have the disadvantage 
of tending to restrict corporate management i n its now existing use of internal 
auditors in the areas of operational auditing. There could also be some hostility 
generated between the corporate management and the board. The benefits to 
the internal auditor would, of course, be retention of ties to both client groups, 
and therefore a total service role, but it would at the same time pose questions as 
to whether both audit roles would be adequately fulfilled. Again , corporate 
management might feel the need for a new audit group which it could more 
effectively control. 
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The third alternative—the solid line to both parties of interest—appears on 
the surface to be attractive because it asserts ful l service of the internal auditor 
to both parties of interest. The major problem here, however, is whether such 
a type of organizational arrangement is sound, or even realistic. C a n an internal 
auditing group function under two administrators? Admittedly, there are some 
situations where this has been tried with reasonable success. The project team, 
with the dual responsibilities of the member to the project manager and to the 
department from which the member has been assigned, is one example. However, 
i n such a situation there is a higher level organizational authority which is 
available to directly or indirectly resolve any major conflict. It is doubtful 
whether such higher level arbiter exists as between corporate management and 
the board i n any really practical sense. Hence, even though the idea of equal 
joint responsibility may sound like a good solution, there is considerable doubt 
whether it is satisfactory for the parties of interest, including the internal auditor. 
W e reach this conclusion even though such equal responsibility may have been 
made to work i n isolated situations through an extraordinarily cordial relation­
ship between the chief executive officer and the chairman of the board. 
Is there an Answer? 
What is the answer? Quite clearly, we have a number of trade-offs which 
can never be resolved i n a manner that w i l l be fully satisfactory to all 
parties of interest. There is also the continuing question of how the respective 
roles and responsibilities of corporate management and the board of directors 
are going to evolve in the future. O n balance, it would appear—at least to this 
author—that boards of directors cannot effectively take over the role of corporate 
management. If they do, they w i l l need full-time people of the caliber of the 
now existing corporate management. In such a situation it could well be that 
the present top level corporate officers would become the board members and 
simply have new titles. In that case, however, we would then need a new group 
to monitor the board in the discharge of their greater operational responsibilities 
—that is, a k i n d of super board—in which case, we would be back about where 
we had started. Possibly at this point, government might somehow take on the 
super board role, but based on historical performance, greater governmental 
control has brought with it new problems which tend to be even more difficult 
to solve than those previously existing. Hence, that does not seem to be a 
good answer. 
If the relationships stay much as they are now, but with more enlightened 
roles on the part of both corporate management and boards of directors, we 
would, i n this writer's opinion, tend toward the internal audit department hav­
ing a solid line responsibility to corporate management and a defined dotted 
line to the board of directors—via the audit committee. In the case of corporate 
management, it would then seem to be essential for the internal auditor to have 
vice president status to demonstrate management commitment and to assure 
needed independence i n carrying out an effective internal auditing role. The 
internal auditor would then ideally report to the chief executive officer ( C E O ) . 
However, the C E O might not have adequate time to provide the needed direc­
tion to the internal auditor, and i n such a situation the reporting responsibility 
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might well run to a senior vice president reporting directly to the C E O . Under 
either of these reporting arrangements, the internal auditor should work closely 
with the external auditor, and together they should work closely wi th the audit 
committee. In these circumstances, there would necessarily be a close partnership 
relationship between the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer, the 
chairman of the audit committee, and the chairman of the board. 
The advocacy of the arrangement just described i n no way denies that there 
are serious obstacles to making this arrangement work satisfactorily. It assumes, 
first of all , that the cooperative effort outlined above could be generated and 
sustained. The case for it is that there is, i n fact, a basic common interest on 
the part of all participants for a well run, effective and profitable corporate enter­
prise. W h e n this common interest is sufficiently well understood, there can be 
a sound basis for agreement and cooperative effort. The advocacy of the above-
mentioned reporting arrangement also carries with it the major assumption that 
the internal auditor has, or can develop, the needed capabilities to adequately 
serve all the parties of interest. Proper organizational status is, of course, i m ­
portant, but needed also is a sufficiently high level of technical competence, an 
understanding of the high level management and related policy issues which 
are involved, and last but not least, the personal qualifications to be able to work 
effectively with high ranking persons. T o develop these greater capabilities is 
indeed an awesome challenge to internal auditors, although the record thus far 
engenders confidence that it can be done. However, internal auditors w i l l have 
to make proper plans and then implement them effectively. 
Future Practice Directions 
If the organizational arrangement for the internal auditor just described 
is accepted—that is, primary responsibility to corporate management and de­
fined secondary responsibility to the board of directors—what w i l l the impact 
be on the nature and scope of internal auditing practice as internal auditors 
strive to effectively discharge this combined service role? F r o m the author's 
own perspective, the professional internal auditing practice w i l l involve four 
key areas. First, the internal auditor w i l l continue to be the leader i n the 
appraisal of the adequacy and effectiveness of systems of internal control cover­
ing al l areas of corporate activity. These systems of internal control must now, 
however, be broader i n scope to cover the areas of social concern earlier described. 
T h e internal auditor w i l l , at the same time, properly play an active role i n the 
required documentation of the adequacy of internal control to comply wi th vari­
ous types of new legislation. This "control" role of the internal auditor is, i n 
essence, an expanded and enriched version of the role which has i n recent years 
been one of the major areas of service. 
Secondly, the internal auditor w i l l continue to build upon the basic control 
role to provide supplementary "operational audit ing" services pertaining to 
managerial effectiveness and corporate profitability. The exposure to operations 
provided through the analysis and appraisal of control is, as it has always been, 
a most useful foundation for understanding and evaluating effective operational 
performance. A n d quite clearly, the previously described expanded control role 
w i l l provide the basis for a similarly expanded contribution i n the area of pro-
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moting operational effectiveness. This particular service is especially important 
when one considers that the current major emphasis by government and society 
on protection tends to inhibit managerial risk taking and related entrepreneurial 
operational actions upon which increased productivity and the welfare of society 
ultimately depend. 
Thirdly , the internal auditor w i l l certainly move into a new, higher level 
of truly effective service to boards of directors via their audit committees. It is 
assumed—based upon the previous analysis—that boards of directors and audit 
committees continue to involve the part-time services of qualified and dedicated 
persons. Under these conditions, audit committees may have small staffs, but i n 
carrying out their roles, w i l l depend primarily on their interface with corporate 
management and information obtained from both the internal and external 
audit groups. Here, as previously noted, they w i l l need to get certain periodic 
reports and have the opportunity to supplement these reports with questions 
and face to face discussions. A u d i t committees w i l l not necessarily administer 
internal audit groups, but they need to be cognizant of how to support them and 
how to best assure receiving adequate information about corporate operations. 
This needed information then becomes the basis for best assuring effective and 
profitable results in accordance with proper legal and moral standards. T o help 
provide that k i n d of service would surely be a newly expanded role of internal 
auditors. 
Fourthly, it seems to be inevitable that there w i l l be a still more effective 
partnership relationship of the internal auditor with the external auditor. Here 
the often older relationship of superior and subordinate w i l l be replaced in­
creasingly by a new partnership of professional equals with mutual respect for 
professional competence and a common interest i n service to the larger corporate 
and social welfare. Clearly, the different primary mission of the external auditor 
w i l l still require the right of supplementary review and appraisal of the work 
of the internal auditor. But the two audit groups can at the same time exploit 
their legitimate common interests by advance planning, which can then be 
backed up by day-to-day liaison and cooperation to better insure the most effec­
tive, as well as the most economical, total audit effort. A forthcoming research 
study by The Institute of Internal Auditors covering the relations of the internal 
and external auditor w i l l examine i n further detail these cooperative efforts. 
But we can here recognize the indicated partnership directions and the major 
potentials for serving the needs of all parties of interest—corporate management, 
boards of directors, government, and the larger total society. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In some forty years we have seen internal auditing emerge from a relatively 
underdeveloped professional status to one of major importance i n terms of its 
size and level of contribution. It has broadened its role from that of predomi­
nantly compliance and narrower financial auditing to include a major commit­
ment to operational auditing. D u r i n g this period of time, a professional asso­
ciation was formed and reached substantial stature. A t the same time, a 
comprehensive literature has been developed supported by sound research. Whi le 
internal auditing activities have always been, to some extent, related to those 
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of the external auditor, these relationships have been weakened partially by the 
movement of internal auditors into the broader operational auditing. But over 
the years, internal auditing departments have grown and have commanded in­
creasing strength and support by corporate management, external auditors, and 
by boards of directors. 
The new developments of our contemporary age, emerging principally 
from the accelerated new expectations of society, have put new pressures on 
corporate organizations, their boards of directors, and the independent external 
auditors. There is a general demand for higher standards of integrity and 
responsibility for socially oriented action. There is, at the same time, the focus 
on the need for more effective systems of internal control. Since the internal 
auditor is importantly concerned with the latter area, there is a new interest i n 
the internal auditor's role in helping to satisfy the newly expanded needs. These 
developments have created special problems for the internal auditor i n deter­
mining how best to provide internal audit services, and with what priorities. 
A t the same time these problems, as is true for all problems, bring with them 
great opportunities. 
A s society proceeds to seek ways and means of better assuring the accom­
plishment of its newly expanding objectives, principally through legislation or 
other types of governmental action, there is the ever critical need to move in 
such a way as best utilizes the capabilities of the various parties of interest—cor­
porate management, boards of directors, the independent public accountants, 
and last but not least, the internal auditors. It is important to avoid panic type 
actions which could take the form of hasty legislation and related restrictions on 
key participants, which would then prevent them from making needed contribu­
tions. It is especially important not to penalize the majority by actions to get 
protection from the relatively few offenders. Important also is the need to avoid 
restrictions which could choke enterpreneurial risk taking and managerial 
motivation which are such a basic requirement for the productivity of business 
and the ultimate contribution to social welfare. It is, indeed, a time for thoughtful 
and soundly determined action. 
In the situation just described, internal auditors stand i n a particularly 
strategic position. Possessing, as they do, special technical competence i n the 
basic areas of internal control, and having been further indoctrinated i n the 
broader areas of effective managerial results, they are especially well equipped 
to make a major contribution. The danger, however, is that their role might 
be too narrowly defined to serve exclusively the needs of groups which seek 
protection as their key objective. There is a need for all parties of interest to 
better understand the breadth of the services which can be provided by internal 
auditors and to assure broader utilization of those services. In this connection, 
internal auditors also have a responsibility to help develop that needed under­
standing—both i n their own self-interest and in the broader social interest. A t 
the same time, internal auditors must take major steps to prepare themselves to 
adequately discharge the greater range and higher levels of service which ap­
pear to be potentially probable. 
In total, this means new major opportunities for internal auditors i n the 
way of further professional growth and development. It has been said that the 
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time for the internal auditor has come. A n d others have said that internal audit­
i n g w i l l be a major growth area of the eighties. If, then, the time has come for 
internal auditors, it is hoped that they w i l l do everything possible to develop 
further capabilities to take advantage of the expanding opportunities. In al l of 
their endeavors, the internal auditors have a sound foundation i n history on 
which to build, but they w i l l need the understanding and support of a l l parties 
of interest. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Internal Auditing—A Historical Perspective and 
Future Directions 
Lawrence B. Sawyer 
Consultant—Education and Management 
V i c Brink's recollections of internal auditing past reach back to the begin­
ning of a discipline which I like to think of as management-oriented internal 
auditing. H e was there. H e was i n attendance when it crawled out of the 
cocoon of financial t icking and totting and first spread its wings. T h e discipline 
may have had its origin i n the ancient verification of financial transactions. But 
it started to mature when V i c and a few others brought forth The Institute of 
Internal Auditors. 
Vic 's comments on those beginnings need no discussion. N o one knows 
them better than he. A n d since we feel the same about internal auditing—what 
it is and what it should be—I have no quarrel w i t h his concepts. Yet in seeking 
to put so much on the canvas, he had to omit some of the details. Th is com­
mentary, therefore, w i l l seek to amplify several of those details and fill i n some 
of the gaps, particularly: 
• The early history of internal auditing 
• The definition of internal auditing 
• Internal auditing as a unique discipline 
• The internal auditor's responsibility to management and the board 
• The internal auditor and the external auditor. 
The Early History of Internal Auditing 
V i c began his historical perspective wi th the birth of T h e Institute of 
Internal Auditors. It would be useful, however, to go back further—to the 
very beginnings. 
A u d i t i n g as an aid to management control has its roots i n antiquity. In the 
Mesopotamian civilization, about 3000 B .C. , scribes prepared summaries of lists 
of transactions. These were then checked against the original lists prepared by 
others. Evidence of such checking, unearthed by archaeologists, shows tiny dots, 
ticks, and circles on the sides of figures. Apparently this was the beginning of 
two control devices: division of duties and systematic checking. 1 
Similar provisions appear i n early Egyptian, Persian, and Hebrew records. 
The Egyptians required the audit of one official's records by another and the 
actual witnessing of corn brought to warehouses, along wi th certification of receipt. 
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The Greeks, and the Romans after them, had an abiding interest i n the 
audit of public finances. The suspicious Greeks preferred slaves to freemen as 
auditors. They believed, with brutally direct logic, that the statements of a slave 
under torture were more trustworthy than those of a freeman under oath. 
The word "control" comes from the Lat in contrarotulus, meaning "against 
a roll"—the comparison of one " r o l l " of accounts with another which had been 
prepared independently. D u r i n g the Roman empire, an official known as a 
quaestor, "one who inquires," would examine the accounts of provincial 
governors. 
D u r i n g the Dark Ages, rulers demanded assurance of revenues due them. 
Barons and justices made the first audits of the records of amounts due and 
received. Later the audits were made by specially appointed officials. 
The auditing function, as we know it now, started during the industrial 
revolution. Many commercial and industrial organizations employed expert ac­
countants to examine and certify the validity of accounts. Even Columbus in 
1492 was accompanied to America by an auditor representing Queen Isabella. 
In more recent times, the railroad companies were probably among the first 
to meet the needs for internal verification. The far-flung activities of the railroads 
made it necessary to use internal auditors to examine and coordinate widely 
scattered operations. 
Fol lowing 1933, internal auditing made important strides. Under the 
Securities Ac t of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, cor­
porate management was made responsible for the accuracy of financial statements 
filed with the S E C . A s a consequence, corporations hired accountants from the 
outside to make more detailed verifications of accounts than the public ac­
countants could. 
But the outside auditors controlled those on the inside. The internal auditors 
were a shadow or echo of public accounting. They were a simulacrum, with 
none of the prestige of the external auditors. Internal auditing, as a separate, 
distinctive discipline, did not emerge until 1941 when The Institute of Internal 
Auditors was formed. Then it began to range beyond the books of account. 
Then it began to assume a new posture. 
Internal Auditing Defined 
The varied definitions of internal auditing are mileposts i n its history as 
well as indicators of how it is regarded. They also bespeak its changes and 
its expansion. 
Webster's defines it as " 1 : a usually continuous examination and verifica­
tion of books of account conducted by employees of a business—contrasted with 
independent audit; 2: a review of systems of internal check and internal control 
of a business." The Encyclopaedia Britannica says that "Internal auditors try 
to determine whether the requirements of an accounting system are being met 
effectively and also whether the system itself is adequate for management needs." 
Both definitions have a purely financial flavor and pedestrian posture. There is 
no hint of the current management-oriented approach adopted by many internal 
auditing practitioners. 
The Institute of Internal Auditor's original 1947 Statement of Responsibilities 
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of the Internal Auditor was not much better. It gave a grudging nod to the 
internal auditor's involvement with other than financial activities when it said 
that internal auditing " . . . deals primarily with accounting matters but may 
properly deal with matters of an operating nature." 
The 1957 Statement, somewhat more expansive, defined internal auditing 
as providing for " . . . the review of accounting, financial, and other operations." 
But i n 1971 the Statement cut the umbilical cord to the books of account 
from which internal auditors first drew their life support, by describing internal 
auditing quite simply as " . . . the review of operations as a service to manage­
ment." Yet even this definition is too narrow. Standards for the Professional 
Practice of Internal Auditing expands "service to management" to read "service 
to the organization." Thus it encompasses both management and the board 
of directors. 
I see modern internal auditing, practiced now in many organizations around 
the world, as going beyond even this expanded definition. I see it as doing 
what the president of an organization would do in appraising the operations of 
the organization, if only he had the time to do so. In other words, to be of 
service to management, the internal auditor should be an extension of manage­
ment, authorized to review all operations and seeing those operations through 
the eyes of the people in the highest echelons i n the organization. Based on these 
ideas, my personal definition of internal auditing is: 
Internal auditing is the independent appraisal of the various operations 
and systems of control within an organization to determine whether 
acceptable policies and procedures are followed, established standards 
are met, resources are used efficiently and economically, planned mis­
sions are accomplished effectively, and the organization's objectives are 
being achieved. 
This definition addresses the internal auditor's opportunities as well as the 
internal auditor's responsibilities. It underscores, also, the view from the top: 
management-oriented internal auditing. Specifically: 
• Independent appraisals suggests complete objectivity during the per­
formance of audits and a position within the organization which 
provides assurance that the internal auditor's findings and recom­
mendations w i l l receive adequate consideration and become the basis 
for needed corrective action. 
• The various operations and systems of control imply access to all 
records, properties, and personnel relevant to the subject reviewed. 
These also imply that the auditor is concerned with performance as 
well as control. 
• Acceptable policies and procedures indicate the internal auditor's re­
sponsibility for seeing that prescribed rules, systems, and controls are 
workable and are congruent with organizational objectives; i n short, 
that they make sense under current conditions and in the light of the 
entity's aims. 
• Established standards being met connotes reviewing for compliance 
with laws, regulations and established policies to determine whether 
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operations are properly conducted and whether reports—both operating 
and financial—are accurate, timely, and useful. 
• The economical and efficient use of resources embraces the appraisal 
of the management of people, money, facilities, and materials, and 
the search for causes of any inefficient or uneconomical practices so 
that managers can correct them. 
• Planned missions aims at the evaluation of program and activity results 
to determine whether desired benefits are being obtained. 
• Objectives being achieved raises the internal auditor's sights to that 
of the manager's—of managers at all levels of the enterprise; for the 
achievement of organizational objectives is the lodestar to guide al l 
those who direct the destinies of the organization. 
Internal Auditing as a Unique Discipline 
Internal auditing w i l l be hard put to achieve its own goals until it is recog­
nized as a unique discipline with distinctive objectives. It is not a younger 
brother or sister of other disciplines. A s V i c pointed out, both the internal 
auditor and the external auditor perform audits; but their purposes and scope 
are different, and their desired outcomes are different. 
Internal auditors have a different statement of responsibilities. They have 
a different code of ethics. They have a different common body of knowledge. 
They have different standards of professional practice. They have a different 
professional certification examination, and those who pass all four parts of that 
examination and can show that they have obtained the required experience i n 
internal auditing have a different designation: Certified Internal Auditor . 
T h e examination bespeaks the difference. First, it is international. Second, 
its reach is dissimilar. 
The first two parts of the examination cover the principles and the practices 
of internal auditing, wi th heavy emphasis on reviews of al l operations within 
an entity—from marketing and research to accounts payable and the cashier's 
cage. The third part encompasses principles of management. The fourth part 
is made up of six sections: accounting, finance, economics, law and taxes, 
quantitative methods, and information systems. 
Lest external auditors become apprehensive about the limited weight given 
to accounting, they must understand that the new standards for internal auditing 
consider that point. The standards state that the internal audit staff should 
collectively possess the knowledge and the skills essential to the practice of their 
discipline: i.e., accounting, economics, statistics, data processing, engineering, 
taxation, and law. Each member of the staff need not be qualified in al l these 
disciplines. But high proficiency i n accounting principles and practices is re­
quired of internal auditors who deal extensively with financial records and 
reports. 
Although internal auditing is functioning now as a distinctive discipline, 
it is an emerging profession. It w i l l be recognized as a full-blown profession 
when well defined courses of university study lead to a degree in internal 
auditing. A n experiment i n Australia is now addressing the subject. Australia's 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, in its School of Business, devised a 
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course of study leading to a graduate Diploma in Internal Audi t ing . I am in­
formed that the first session of the course w i l l be held i n 1979 i n Sydney, 
Australia. 
It is a two-year, part-time course. Prerequisites are a degree from a college 
of advanced education or equivalent qualification with at least four units of 
accountancy. The course covers 350 hours of study or a little over eight of our 
semester-hour equivalents. The subjects include such matters as internal auditing, 
internal control, administering both the internal auditing department and the 
internal audit assignment, interal audits of various functions of industry, com­
merce, and government, quantitative methods, management, forecasting, social 
conscience, leadership, assessment of profit opportunities and risks, and there is 
heavy emphasis on computers. 
When internal auditing is recognized as a distinctive profession, its partner­
ship with the external auditors w i l l be al l the more profitable for both. 
The Internal Auditor's Responsibility to Management and the Board 
A s V i c pointed out, internal auditors have a dual responsibility: to man­
agement and to the board. This calls for walking a tightrope. But professional 
internal auditors have walked similar tightropes before without plunging into 
the net. For example, many internal auditors have espoused participative audit­
ing—working with auditees as partners instead of as adversaries. Yet those 
auditors also maintain the required objectivity. W h e n the time comes for ex­
pressing an opinion on the adequacy of control and the effectiveness of per­
formance, they can still state their case without bias i n either direction. Par­
ticipative auditing does not have to equate with whitewash. 
The responsibility to the board of directors, usually through the audit 
committee, is to discuss audit goals and plans and the adequacy of internal audit 
staffing and independence, to evaluate internal controls, and to submit sum­
maries of audit findings and recommendations. 
Primarily, the responsibility is to provide some measure of assurance to an 
increasingly nervous group of board members that systems of control are ade­
quate and are functioning as intended and that policies and procedures are still 
valid and are actually being followed. Where such assurances cannot be given, 
then the internal auditor owes the board members the duty to inform them of the 
action that is being taken or should be taken to correct discovered defects. 
Board members need help. They need independent, objective information, 
because the courts are turning deaf ears to the claims of board members that 
" W e didn't k n o w . " The courts are responding unsympathetically that " Y o u 
should have k n o w n . " A s a consequence, board members are facing increased 
difficulty i n obtaining directors and officers ( D & O ) insurance. The July 12, 1976 
Wall Street Journal reports that average payments to successful claimants under 
D & O policies rose to $865,000 in 1975 from $770,000 in 1974. The Journal says 
that D & O coverage is tough to get at any price. Lockheed reported that it was 
able to get only $25 mil l ion in D & O coverage after its $35 mil l ion coverage ran 
out. The problem seems to be getting more serious all the time. But the 
knowledgeable, objective, broad-ranging internal auditor should be able to help. 
After all , fire insurance premiums are reduced when adequate sprinkler systems 
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are installed. The professional internal auditor should function as the board's 
sprinkler system. 
Executive management needs summary information on audit results. It needs 
to know whether deficiencies detected are being corrected. It needs to know of 
dangers, present or incipient, which require top management attention. A n d it 
makes use of internal auditors to carry out management studies to assist in the 
solution of problems that elude ready answers. 
Operating management needs fair, objective appraisals of its operations, re­
ports which are accurate and unbiased and which put audit findings in proper 
perspective, audit opinions which take into account both the good and the bad, 
and recommendations which are both reasonable and cost effective. 
Internal auditors owe top management the responsibility of reporting con­
ditions precisely as they see them. They owe operating management the duty of 
leaving every place they audit a little better than they found it. 
More and more, management and the board are looking to the internal 
auditor for information on the various activities within the organization. But 
i n all cases that information must be objective. Otherwise the internal auditor 
is an advocate instead of an unbiased observer. A n d objectivity flourishes only 
i n a climate of independence. Clearly, no organism can be completely inde­
pendent of the body it inhabits. Internal auditors can not be utterly independent 
of those who fund their work. But they must be independent of the activities 
they audit so that there can be no question about their appraisals being impartial 
and for the greater good of the entire enterprise. Independence, in this context, 
results primarily from status in the organization. Thus, where the internal 
auditor is organizationally responsible to the chief accountant, for example, the 
objectivity with which audits of the accounting department are performed may 
reasonably be open to question. H e who is on his knees cannot stamp his foot. 
In recent years, therefore, there has been an upward movement i n the levels 
i n the organization to which the internal auditor is responsible. The reporting 
relationship is trending to the k i n d V i c advocates: a solid line to the chief 
executive officer or senior vice president and a dotted line to the board of di ­
rectors. Certainly, internal auditors w i l l still be under the general supervision 
of the officer or group which pays their salaries. But the possibility of undue 
pressures may be avoided if the decision to appoint or remove the director of 
internal auditing is subject to the approval of the board of directors. 
The responsibilities to management are expanding beyond examining and 
verifying. The reason lies in the expressed needs of managers themselves. These 
managers require more from their internal auditors than appraisals. They also 
look for guidance. The literature supports the concept that besides being an 
evaluator and reporter of deficient conditions, the internal auditor should be a 
counselor, a teacher, and a problem-solving partner. T o buttress this view, here 
are the comments of some highly placed executives about their internal audit 
functions: 
Counselor: W a r d Burns, Controller for J. P . Stevens Company, Inc., 
said that the internal auditor should be available for consultation on 
matters of techniques and controls. 2 
Teacher: Dudley Stewart, vice president and controller of Industrial 
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Acceptance Corporation Limited, Group of Companies, said: "The 
internal auditor must function as an integral part of the management 
team . . . The chief internal auditor w i l l become more and more a 
creative executive. The more effective he becomes, the more he w i l l 
f ind that a great deal of his time is spent on teaching those who report 
to h i m and teaching very subtly those on whose work he is reporting." 3 
Problem-solving partner: Charles R. Goll ihar, Jr., vice president—finance 
and treasurer for Douglas Aircraft Company of Canada Limited, said: 
" I n the area of management audits, the auditor can and should be an 
integral part of the final problem-solving team . . . roll up his sleeves 
and jointly with other managers report to management—'we fixed it. ' " 4 
The Internal Auditor and the External Auditor 
The internal auditor and the external auditor need each other. Each must 
recognize the other's role and make use of the other's strengths. 
The pressures placed upon external auditors build up. The Moss subcom­
mittee in the House of Representatives has urged the S E C to use its powers to 
prescribe rules for accounting, auditing, and professional behavior. A n d while 
the current stance of the S E C is to let the public accounting profession set its 
own rules, the S E C w i l l continue to watch from the sidelines. T h e Senate's 
Metcalf Committee has blistered the public accountants and is bent on proving a 
conspiracy among auditors, clients, and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board. 
The pressures mount. But however they escalate they still cannot force 
two quarts of l iquid into a one-quart container. They cannot make possible 
what is impossible or economically infeasible. The costs of assuming responsi­
bility for detecting all manner of illegality are unsupportable for either the ex­
ternal or the internal auditor. Besides, no amount of auditing w i l l detect every 
arcane impropriety hatched in the brain of an unscrupulous genius or perpetrated 
by wily conspirators. A s the learned Judge Lopes said i n England before the 
turn of the century, "The auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound." 5 
Yet the hue and cry w i l l continue. A n d external auditors w i l l have to rely 
on people within client organizations who they can trust and whose work, in 
appraising systems of control throughout the entire enterprise, evidences pro­
fessionalism, and can be relied on implicitly. The internal auditors should be 
those people. 
There have been some justifiable complaints by external auditors about the 
work of internal auditors. 6 For example, many internal auditing groups do not 
establish a formal plan of operations for one year, to say nothing of three or 
five years. Also, many internal audits are performed without a written program. 
A n d , worst of all , working papers of internal auditors sometimes leave much 
to be desired. A reviewer of such papers may need clairvoyance as well as 
analytical skil l to determine what the internal auditor did , why it was done, and 
how thoroughly the assignment was carried out. 
The recently published statement of standards for internal auditors, how­
ever, sets criteria of quality for both the administration and the conduct of the 
internal audit work. Compliance with those criteria is to be tested periodically 
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by peer evaluations and by examinations by external auditors, if the internal 
auditing organization wishes to lay claim to meeting the new standards. 
A s internal auditors strive to measure up to their own high standards, and 
as both internal and external auditors gain a clearer understanding of each 
others' needs, the cementing of the partnership between these two auditing 
disciplines w i l l provide an increased measure of assurance to the external auditors. 
A n d that brings up a significant point. The assurance of which I speak 
w i l l be i n direct relationship to the degree of independence enjoyed by the in­
ternal auditor—a matter on which the external auditor can exercise considerable 
influence. External auditors meet regularly wi th boards of directors. They have 
the board's ear and, one would hope, the board's respect for their opinions and 
recommendations. External auditors should be ready to point out the need for 
the internal auditor's independence of the activities audited, the conflicts of 
interest that arise when internal auditors are made responsible for developing 
systems or for carrying out line functions or nonaudit work, and the reduced 
reliance by external auditors on the work of internal auditors when independence 
can seriously be questioned. 7 
The independence of internal auditors is extremely important to external 
auditors and should be promoted so that the partnership stands on a f irm founda­
tion and so that the internal auditor's work can be accepted without fear that un­
warranted pressures have influenced the internal auditor's objectivity. 
Conclusions 
A s our review of the past has shown us, until recently internal auditing 
was a weak little shoot struggling to rise through inhospitable soil and f ind its 
place i n the sun. That place is being found. I can see the signs today. A n d I 
foresee the possibilities that lie ahead. V i c has talked of some of these possi­
bilities. I would like to expand upon them, because I can see at least ten de­
velopments over the horizon for internal auditing. Some are almost here. Some 
w i l l not come for a while. But come they w i l l because there is a need for them: 
1. A definitive course of study leading either to a degree i n internal 
auditing or to an M B A with a major i n management-oriented 
auditing. Australia is showing us the way. 
2. A certification program that is world wide and increasingly demand­
ing. The beginnings are already here. 
3. Requirements for continuing education to maintain expertness i n a 
field that i n common wi th many others is expanding by geometric 
progression. Internal auditing cannot remain aloof from similar 
requirements set by kindred professions. 
4. Recognition by all concerned that internal auditing is a profession 
ready to take its place one day among the learned professions. 
5. Recognition by the public that internal auditing is a new and ex­
citing form of endeavor with responsibility not only to the organiza­
tion for which the professional internal auditor works but also to 
society. 
6. Realization among students and academicians that here is a vital, 
needed profession waiting with a kaleidoscope of exciting experiences 
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for competent, intelligent, adventuresome applicants. W i t h the 
growth of courses and literature, and with additional promotion of 
internal auditing and the attractive salaries already available, this 
realization should be assured. 
7. A n increase i n participative auditing where operating managers and 
internal auditors work together to appraise operations and correct 
defects. 
8. A fu l l partnership between internal and external auditors, founded 
on mutual respect and maintained by an appreciation of their inter­
dependence. The partnership is here i n many organizations. It needs 
to be extended to others. 
9. Acceptance of internal auditing by members of management and 
the board of directors as a source of needed, impeccable information 
and of counsel and guidance on matters of good business practice. 
That consummation has come about i n many organizations, and 
recognition of the benefits obtainable w i l l make it spread to others. 
10. Finally, membership i n the highest councils of the enterprise, enjoying 
the same status as the vice president—controller and the chief legal 
counsel. Directors of internal auditing are vice presidents in a num­
ber of companies and the need for management-oriented internal 
auditing is making membership i n the top management team i n 
other organizations come closer and closer. 
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Analytical Auditing: A Status Report 
Rodney J. Anderson 
Clarkson, Gordon & C o . 
The purpose of this paper is to provide: a) a brief overview of the historical 
development of "Analytical A u d i t i n g , " b) the reasons which underlay that de­
velopment, c) the purpose of certain modifications introduced i n subsequent 
years, and d) an evaluation of the use of analytical auditing i n practice today. 
Analytical auditing is a systems-oriented approach to that portion of the 
auditor's annual audit which involves the study and evaluation of internal control. 
It is based on flow chart analysis supported by appropriate additional compliance 
verification procedures. It is not the purpose of this paper to explain the ap­
proach in detail, for it has already been comprehensively documented i n the 
literature. 1 Rather, the purpose is to comment on past and present trends and 
to cast an eye to the future. 
Where Does Analytical Auditing Fit in? 
Generally accepted auditing standards 2 imply a division of the program for 
the recurring annual audit into a) a review and evaluation of internal control 
together with testing of transactions and b) a gathering of other evidence to 
support the audit opinion. I shall refer to the first stage as the "interim audit" 
(various practitioners use various names). I take the objectives of the interim 
audit to be the following: 
1) T o determine the accuracy and reliability of the accounting records 
and the appropriateness of the accounting methods followed i n order 
to provide a basis for planning the t iming, nature, and extent of the 
substantive procedures necessary to support an opinion on the finan­
cial statements through a) Review and evaluation of the accounting 
system and other relevant internal controls, and b) Compliance 
verification of the existence, effectiveness and continuity of operation 
of those controls on which reliance is to be placed, or substantive 
verification of internal evidence. 
2) T o perform those substantive procedures which can most usefully 
be commenced at an interim date. (Ref. h ) , V o l . 1, p. 297.) 
There are various strategies by which one can accomplish this interim 
audit objective. The two principal strategies may be referred to as the systems-
oriented approach and the data-oriented approach. The former places its primary 
emphasis on auditing " through" the system and understanding how the system 
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works. The latter places its primary emphasis on testing the results of the sys­
tem and establishing the degree of accuracy of those results. Of course, these 
oversimplifications are extremes and i n practice any systems-oriented approach 
w i l l include important tests of data and any data-oriented approach w i l l include 
important analysis of systems. The difference is one of emphasis. 3 
If one were to opt for the systems-oriented approach to the interim audit 
there are again various ways i n which one could proceed to study the system, 
document one's study, analyze that documentation in order to evaluate internal 
control, etc. One of these ways is the "analytical audit ing" approach. A n y 
interim audit approach must contain review techniques (finding out what the 
system is) and evaluation techniques (deciding whether the system is any good). 4 
Analytical audit ing 5 uses a) a combination of flow charting and limited tests of 
transactions as review techniques, b) a combination of flow chart analysis and 
internal control evaluation guides as evaluation techniques, and c) appropriate 
additional compliance and substantive verification procedures. 
Reasons for the Initial Experiment 
W i t h i n Clarkson, Gordon & C o . 6 the experimentation which led to analytical 
auditing began i n 1960, but about the same time others were also experimenting 
with possible flow charting approaches (see Refs. a) and c) ) . 
What were the reasons for this experimentation? I can only speak from 
my own personal viewpoint, but perhaps others had similar experiences. A 
major factor was the frustration of trying to relate the quantities of detailed 
checking we had all customarily been doing to our stated objectives of designing 
audit tests related to our evaluation of internal control. A t this point it may be 
helpful to point out that the profession in Canada had grown out of a slightly 
different background than in the United States. In Canada, auditing had origi­
nally been founded on the concept of a detailed checking of all transactions. 
W h e n it became clearly impractical to check an entire year's transactions, 
Canadian auditors began to check one month per quarter, and eventually this 
was reduced to one month per year. When I was training as a junior, the nor­
mal practice was to check one month i n its entirety—the month to be tested 
being selected randomly each year (although there was on occasion a certain 
sameness i n the month selected—May one year, June the next, May the next, 
and so on) . 
In contrast, I sense that the development of auditing i n the United States 
was more from the starting point of creditor-oriented "balance sheet" audits 
which later came to be supplemented by tests of transactions. Thus, our two 
countries may have approached the testing of transactions question from the 
opposite extremes.7 
In any case, in Canada, with the memories of 12-month detailed testing 
still fresh i n the minds of the partners who were overseeing us, we rationalized 
checking less than the entire year on the grounds that we were placing reliance 
on internal control (statistical sampling ideas were not yet widely i n vogue). 
W e all knew that we were supposed to test more if internal control was poor 
and less if internal control was good. However, the fact is that we often filled 
out the internal control questionnaires as the last step i n the audit (on the bus 
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ride back to the office). After all , before conducting the various tests we just 
did not know enough about the details to be able to answer the questionnaire 
anyway. In any case, whether the answers to the questionnaire were good or 
bad, we usually ended up testing one month of transactions. In short, we all 
paid l ip service to relating the design of tests to our evaluation of control but 
none of us knew very well how to put this concept into practice. That certainly 
was one of the frustrations. 
Another one was the sheer problem of knowing enough to be able to test 
the transactions intelligently. I can remember sitting down with a stack of 300 
invoices and being told to vouch them. I d id not have a thorough understanding 
of how the business operated, nor of what sort of expenditures one could rea­
sonably expect to be made, and therefore what criteria one should use i n deciding 
whether the documentary support for such expenditures was reasonable. A n y ­
way, there was not much time to worry about this sort of question if one was 
going to get through the 300 invoices in a reasonable length of time. One just 
started looking at the pieces of paper hoping that after a while some sort of 
pattern would emerge and that at least the last few would be audited more 
intelligently than the first. 
O f course, I am overstating the case. I do not mean to imply that auditors 
were myopic until analytical auditing came along or that those who use different 
approaches today do not do thoughtful and conscientious work. I am merely 
trying to describe some of the frustrations with what at that time was our 
transaction-oriented approach. These frustrations (together with fee pressures 
from our clients) led us to experiment with alternative techniques. 
W e felt there had to be a better way of focusing on an understanding of 
the system and relating that understanding in a more direct manner to the choice 
of what we tested. 
Historical Overview 
D u r i n g the next two years (1960 to 1962) we experimented with a number 
of different methods for studying systems and for documenting our study. In 
some audits we produced whole libraries of systems notes which had to be 
typed if anyone was going to hope to read them. T h e problem was that a 
third of these notes would be obsolete the following year and patchwork re­
visions were not very intelligible. O n other audits we tried various flow charting 
approaches, but i n many cases our flow charting was completely undisciplined 
with every staff member having an individual style, that was often unde­
cipherable to anyone else. After two years of experimentation we decided that 
it was essential to settle on a standard style of flow charting and we picked one 
with a horizontal layout for reasons which I w i l l mention in a minute. 
In 1962 the prototype of the analytical audit approach was field-tested on 
72 audits across the country. The technique was still nameless and the few of 
us working on the experiment came to be k n o w n snidely as the U-2 squad—an 
allusion to the bad publicity which had recently been attracted by the ultra-high 
U-2 flights which President Eisenhower had been sending over Russia. W e d i d 
not think that "U-2 audit ing" would have much sales appeal and finally settled 
on the name "analytical audit ing" to refer to the emphasis on systems analysis. 
27 
W i t h a new name, and a few minor revisions suggested from our field 
tests (the introduction of "outline charts" was one of them—see Ref. e), p. 39), 
we began an extensive period of staff training. In the same year, the approach 
was documented i n an article i n The Canadian Chartered Accountant (Ref. b ) . 
In 1964 we saw the beginning of our full-scale conversion to analytical 
auditing (for audits over a certain minimal size) across the firm and i n that 
year we also began analytical auditing courses for internal auditors of our clients. 
Staff training was significantly expanded i n 1965 and comprehensive in-house 
manuals were developed for our staff. Some of the material from these manuals 
and from our staff training courses was incorporated into the book, Analytical 
Auditing, published i n 1966 (Ref. e). 
Throughout this period the development of E D P systems was accelerating. 
Analytical Auditing had given an introduction to the use of this approach i n 
E D P systems (Ref. e) Chapter 9) but it was soon apparent that more guidance 
was needed i n this complex area. In 1967 the analytical auditing techniques 
were incorporated into our video-taped computer auditing course—which was 
for a number of years to form part of the computer auditing courses offered by 
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. In 1968 the Canadian Institute 
began giving its own separate analytical auditing courses and these have con­
tinued for the past decade. 
For the next seven years the approach was continued without major re­
vision. N o doubt various annual revisions of forms were made, most of which 
I no longer remember, and other modifications were made as we continued to 
gain experience with the application of the approach to computerized systems; 
however, the basic outline continued the same. F r o m time to time there were 
public discussions of the approach. 8 Then, i n 1975 we concluded it was time 
to make some significant modifications with the introduction of the by-then 
current concept of compliance verification. I w i l l discuss the significance of 
these modifications shortly. The resulting revised format was incorporated in 
our textbook, The External Audit (Ref. h ) , published last year. 9 
The Initial Analytical A u d i t i n g Format 
In the initial format, as described i n the first article and i n Analytical 
Auditing, the basic approach was as follows. The accounting system as a whole 
was divided into logical component systems—usually sales-receivables-receipts, 
purchases-payables-payments, salaries and wages, cost records, and general. Th is 
division we still use. W i t h i n each section the systems, or those portions of the 
systems, relating to important control points were summarized on flow charts, 
the flow charts merely being updated in succeeding years. T o make sure we 
were not wasting time documenting the blueprint of a system which in fact 
had never been i n force, we tested our understanding of the system by "walk ing 
through" four or five transactions along each path of the charted system from 
cradle to grave, checking related books, documents, and records and confirming 
procedures with the employees involved along the way. This walk-through audit 
can be conveniently summarized on the flow charts as well . 
A t that point, the flow charts were then analyzed. W e have found that 
the flow charts themselves facilitate the detection of control weaknesses and 
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systems inefficiencies. Studying a flow chart and asking yourself what would 
happen if this shipping document were misplaced or if that entry were recorded 
incorrectly and then searching for the possible consequences (such as a check 
of serial continuity of shipping numbers that would fail or some control account 
reconciliation that would be out of balance) is one of the best ways of detecting 
the presence or absence of key controls. Moreover, the horizontal charting format 
employed, wherein each column represents an individual department or em­
ployee, helps to focus on controls related to the division of duties. 1 0 
The analysis of the flow charts led to two results: the identification of 
potentially weak areas and the identification of areas where efficiency could be 
improved. A "weakness investigation" was then designed to determine whether 
a material error had occurred because of the control weakness. Just because 
there is a hole i n the net does not mean that any fish swam through it, but it is 
worthwhile checking to see. A n d if I have only a l imited amount of audit time 
to deploy (and in the economic world this is always so) it w i l l be more useful 
if I concentrate a lot of it on those discovered holes i n the net and spend corre­
spondingly less time in the checking of other areas where the net seems strong. 
This , then, was the main answer to the early frustration of having no 
organized way of relating testing work to control conclusions. The flow chart 
analysis and walk-through audit flagged the apparently weak areas, and testing 
work (or other auditing procedures) was then concentrated on those apparent 
weaknesses. 
But we went one step further. W e argued that there should be some cyclical 
testing of those areas where control appeared strong. After all , i n our walk­
through audit we had tested only four or five items. I do not pretend that the 
four or five is significantly different from one (the Stettler "sample of one" idea). 
The only reason for picking four or five was to have some added opportunity to 
avoid mistaking the particular for the general. 
But were four or five enough? W e l l , it must be remembered that this was 
not just four or five transactions i n total but rather four or five transactions 
along every path of the system—that is, four or five transactions of each type 
which would be handled i n a different way. Moreover, a system with good 
internal control has a self-policing nature which w i l l tend to catch most errors 
more efficiently than does the external audit. A useful audit objective was 
therefore to prove that the self-policing system was there, not to do the policing 
over again (you don't hire a dog and then do the barking for i t ) . The transac­
tions tested were combined with observations of the employee procedures in 
practice, discussions with those employees, review of open files, etc. T o assume 
that all the different employees with whom we talked were i n a conspiracy to 
deceive us, that the files were reviewed happened accidentally to support that 
conspiracy, and that the four or five documents we tested happened also to 
wrongly confirm the misleading story, seemed a pretty far fetched risk. In short, 
we believed that our primary assurance was obtained from the discussions, the 
observations, and the walk-through procedures. 
Nonetheless, we realized that there was a danger i n never conducting any 
more extended tests. Accordingly, for supplementary insurance, the original 
version of analytical auditing called for "supplementary tests" to be carried out 
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on a cyclical basis over a number of years. In any one year a number of key 
points i n each systems component would be tested extensively, but not every 
point would be tested each year. Better to test a few and test them well than 
to test them all but poorly. It was l ike dri l l ing for o i l . One didn't have to send 
a hole down on every square inch of the field. But for those holes which one 
selected to dr i l l , the hole had to go at least deep enough to catch the oi l if it 
were really there. 
This , then, was the original version of analytical auditing—thorough systems 
analysis and selective, carefully placed testing. The approach seemed to gain 
reasonable acceptance among many practitioners. Over the years its use has 
spread considerably and the original book has since been translated into French, 
Portuguese, Danish, and two versions of Spanish. 
The Changes i n 1975 
There were two principal changes made i n 1975. One was the introduction 
of the concept of compliance verification. The other was a modification with 
respect to the application to computerized systems. 
I w i l l comment first on compliance verification. Although we felt that the 
logic of the cyclical supplementary tests was defensible, we decided to opt for 
annual compliance verification for three reasons. First of al l , the general literature 
of the profession was moving solidly i n this direction and we were beginning to 
feel a little lonely espousing the idea of very limited cyclical tests. Secondly, we 
found that i n practice the supplementary tests were often badly executed by our 
staff. Perhaps because they were called supplementary, they were taken to be 
an after-thought which d id not really need to be done wel l . In any case, we 
concluded that i f more attention was not focused on compliance procedures it 
was unlikely that our staff would give the tests the attention they deserved. 
Thi rd ly , the adoption of the substantive/compliance framework (which 
was first set out i n the A I C P A ' s Statement on A u d i t i n g Procedures N o . 54) 
permitted us to resolve one of the dilemmas we had been facing for a number 
of years. D u r i n g the early 1970's we had been working with a statistical sampling 
approach. W e felt we knew a logical way to apply this statistical sampling to 
the year end audit work (statistical samples of accounts receivable, etc.) but we 
could not figure out a logical manner to apply it to the interim audit. W e knew 
that statistical sampling should presumably be applied to our "supplementary 
tests" but we could not produce an obvious rationale for how one picked con­
fidence and precision parameters without arriving at sample sizes which in­
tuitively appeared unreasonably large (i.e., samples as large as would have been 
required for a substantive test had no reliance been placed on control). W i t h 
the adoption of the compliance verification framework we were able to develop 
what we felt was a logical relationship between compliance testing and sub­
stantive testing based on the analogy of smoke detection versus fire detection. 1 1 
While this latter point is perhaps not directly related to the basic idea of analytical 
auditing, it nonetheless was for us an outgrowth of this particular modification 
i n our analytical auditing approach. 
T h e other principal change i n 1975 was the dividing of the computer-
related review into two stages: a general computer environment review followed 
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by a specific application review for each particular computer system. T h e reason 
for this change was the realization that environment controls (pre-installation 
controls, organizational controls, development controls, operations controls, and 
documentation controls) tend to be common for all computer systems and can 
best be reviewed and evaluated at one time whereas processing controls (for 
example, input/output controls in a payroll system, programmed controls i n a 
bil l ing system) vary with each system and are best reviewed as an integral part 
of the evaluation of the individual system. 1 2 
Inevitably there have been many refinements i n the organizing of the audit 
steps, the wording of the evaluation guides, and so on, but apart from the two 
modifications just mentioned, the changes have not been major i n principle. 
The Current Format of Analytical Auditing 
In its present format, the analytical interim audit as we employ it is divided 
into six stages: 1) review of systems and preliminary compliance verification 
(including preparation or updating of flow charts and the walk-through of four 
or five transactions of each type), 2) evaluation of systems (based on an analysis 
of the flow charts wi th the help of internal control evaluation guides), 3) further 
compliance verification (depending on whether or not considerable reliance is 
to be placed on a given control area), 4) substantive (dual purpose) verification, 
5) evaluation of compliance, and 6) issuance of an internal control/manage-
ment letter. 1 3 
T h e emphasis on flow charting as an analytical tool is still present. The 
emphasis on auditing " through" the system is still present. A t the same time, 
the analytical auditing approach has been fully integrated w i t h sampling theory 
both as applied to substantive verification 1 4 and as applied to compliance verifica­
t i o n . 1 5 This has led us to focus considerable attention on the nature of compli­
ance verification objectives. W e seek positive evidence that a key control has 
functioned; the mere absence of monetary error i n the transaction examined 
does not constitute such evidence. 1 6 
Use and Evaluation within Clarkson, Gordon & Co. 
W e do not employ analytical auditing on all our interim audits. Where 
internal control is hopelessly weak throughout, where it is uneconomic to place 
any reliance on internal control, or where the enterprise is exceedingly small, it 
is often not efficient to employ analytical auditing techniques. 1 7 However, we 
do employ analytical auditing i n much more than half of our audit work i n 
terms of hours. Some recent statistics indicate that slightly over 50% by number 
of our audits between 100 and 1,500 annual hours are done on an analytical 
auditing basis. Probably most of those under 100 hours would not be done as 
analytical audits while, on the other hand, virtually all of those over 1,500 hours 
are done as analytical audits. If the results were weighted by hours I would 
guess that more than 80% of our interim audit work is done on an analytical 
basis. 
What have been the results? W e have been generally pleased. W e have 
found the advantages of analytical auditing to be the fol lowing: 
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1. It leads to a better understanding of the client's business and of the 
accounting system. 
2. It leads to a more comprehensive appreciation of the system of in­
ternal control. 
3. It helps to avoid the risk of perfunctory and unimaginative treatment 
that long procedural questionnaires and audit lists may invite. 
4. It leads to many more valuable and more realistic recommendations 
on both internal control and systems efficiency. 
5. It leads to greater use of initiative on the part of the audit staff i n 
the field. 
6. It leads to a more rational allocation of audit time over those areas 
of the accounts requiring attention. 
7. It leads to greater productivity of audit time through the better 
briefing of audit staff. 1 8 
There are, however, some costs. There tends to be an investment in the 
first year when flow charts are being prepared for the first time (although when 
this work can be coordinated with internal audit the cost can be dramatically 
reduced). In any case, i n later years there are compensating time reductions. 
Secondly, like any sophisticated technique, it is open to abuse. If poorly 
trained or poorly directed, audit staff can waste time charting unnecessary detail. 
U n t i l about a year ago, we felt we still had too frequent instances of what our 
quality control reviewers judged to be excessive flow charting. O u r statistics 
indicate that such inefficiencies now occur on less than 7% of the engagements. 
O f course, there is still scope for improvement, but the problem is not of 
serious proportions. 
In the early years we had a serious problem in getting staff to design the 
weakness investigations appropriately. This seems to have been less of a prob­
lem i n recent years, perhaps because the quality control program kept hammer­
ing away at it. 
Designing appropriate compliance procedures continues to be a problem in 
more engagements than we would l ike. This seems to us to be a problem in 
learning to apply the general concept of compliance verification itself rather 
than anything to do wi th the analytical auditing technique per se. The compli­
ance framework is still relatively new. Our smoke/fire rationale requires that 
a compliance procedure look for positive evidence of the operation of the control 
(not merely evidence that the transaction itself was free of monetary error). 
This still seems to be a difficult viewpoint to get across. 
Ironically, the analysis of statistics is one of the segments of the interim 
audit which we seem to do the worst. This procedure was referred to as 
"statistics analysis" i n the original book. 2 0 The term has since been replaced 
with the current term, "analytical review." 2 1 Whatever its name we do not do 
it as well as we would l ike. Whether a more formal use of regression analysis 
w i l l prove to be the necessary discipline to improve the performance in this 
area remains to be seen. 
Use by Others 
Obviously, I can only talk with any certainty about the use of analytical 
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auditing within our own f i rm. However, from conversations wi th other col­
leagues I expect that the following summary is not too inaccurate. In Canada, 
there seems to be fairly widespread use of the comprehensive horizontal flow 
charting approach i n Touche Ross, Peat Marwick, Thorne Riddel l , Winspear 
Higgins, Ar thur Andersen, and Ernst & Ernst. Often the flow charts are 
supplemented by detailed questionnaires. A number of smaller firms use the 
analytical auditing approach as well . A s mentioned earlier, the Canadian Institute 
has been offering members courses in analytical auditing for the past decade. 
Coopers & Lybrand use a detailed questionnaire supplemented by comprehensive 
"vertical" flow charting (different mechanics but similar i n principle). T h e 
internal audit departments of a number of major Canadian corporations employ 
analytical auditing in their work. A t the government level, the Auditor General 
of Canada, with a staff of 400, and the A u d i t Services Bureau for Canada, with 
a staff of about 600, make extensive use of analytical auditing. The Provincial 
Auditors of three or four provinces make extensive use of analytical auditing 
while those of a couple of provinces (including Ontario and British Columbia) 
appear to make limited use of it. I do not want to suggest that all these users 
employ exactly the analytical auditing approach that we do. Some do. But 
many inevitably w i l l have their own modifications and, no doubt, improvements. 
However, the general approach would appear to be reasonably common. 
O n the other hand, Price Waterhouse relies primarily on detailed internal 
control evaluation questionnaires, decision charts, and narrative systems descrip­
tions and does not generally make use of a flow charting approach to systems 
analysis. Haskins and Sells relies on detailed questionnaires and extensive testing 
of transaction streams without generally making use of flow charting. 
I am less familiar with the use of flow charting approaches i n the United 
States. I do know that our associates i n Arthur Young use the same walk­
through audit approach as we do i n the preliminary stage of gathering systems 
information and urge the use of basically the same horizontal flow charting tech­
nique as the preferred method for documenting the information obtained during 
this walk-through. 
A Look to the Future 
The use of analytical auditing in the future is likely to depend on the 
direction i n which computer systems develop i n the years to come. In one sense 
computerization may favor a systems-oriented approach such as analytical audit­
ing, for the computer generally requires a more formal, r igid and reliable system. 
The auditor can place considerable reliance on this more rigid system if the new 
types of computer controls have been properly analyzed and evaluated. In an­
other sense, computerization may favor the data-oriented approach, for com­
puterized files may permit more extensive selection, analysis, comparison, and 
editing of data (especially with computer-assisted audit techniques) than possible 
before. U p to now we have felt that the circumstances in most computerized 
systems favor the systems-oriented approach. However, when computerized 
systems get extremely complex, the cost of comprehensive systems analysis may 
not be worth its payback. When a simple system generates quantities of data, it 
stands to reason that it is more efficient to check the system than the data. But 
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when the complexities of software housekeeping routines swamp the output of 
data, the pendulum may start to swing the other way. As we move into data 
base systems, the way i n which data is handled may dramatically change the 
methods which auditors use. I don't think any of us really know how to audit 
data-base systems yet. T i m e is running out for us to learn. O n the other hand, 
the explosive growth of m i n i computers and distributed processing may change 
the audit in other directions. I imagine that there w i l l be a number of significant 
revolutions i n audit approach as we feel our way into the next generation of 
computer systems. Whether the systems-oriented approach of analytical auditing 
w i l l have a place i n this brave new world it is premature to say. It w i l l be in ­
teresting and challenging to find out. 
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20. See Ref. e) pp. 78 and 79. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Analytical Auditing: A Status Report 
Donald R. Nichols 
University of Kansas 
I have been an admirer of Rod Anderson's work in analytical auditing and 
statistical sampling i n auditing for quite some time. The current paper has not 
affected that view. The explicit purposes for the paper were to provide: a) a 
historical overview of the development of "Analytical A u d i t i n g , " b) reasons for 
the initial experimentation, c) the nature and purpose of subsequent modifica­
tions and d) a current evaluation of its success in practice. Each of these topics 
was considered i n the paper, and as a result, we now have considerable insight 
into how and why analytical auditing was developed and also information about 
its current status. Anderson has done an admirable job in achieving the ob­
jectives set forth for the paper. 
M y comments are primarily directed toward providing 1) an historical 
perspective on "analytical" and "conventional" auditing to identify the former's 
contribution to auditing thought and 2) a comparison of current analytical and 
conventional auditing to identify remaining differences. 
T w o Basic Contentions 
T w o basic contentions stated in my paper are that 1) analytical auditing, 
when originally introduced, was an innovative and important contribution to 
auditing thought and practice and 2) that the concepts and procedures of ana­
lytical auditing and conventional auditing have evolved so that, i n most respects, 
they are currently virtually identical. 
In order to support the first contention, the concept of analytical auditing 
w i l l be compared and contrasted with apparent prevailing conventional auditing 
concepts and principles existing at the time of its introduction. Sources for this 
comparison are the Skinner and Anderson book of 19661 and several Anderson 
articles 2 for analytical auditing. Since a single, complete description of the pre­
vailing conventional auditing concepts and principles i n the early 1960's does 
not exist, this concept was derived from A u d i t i n g Standards and Procedures, 3 
which was codified i n 1963, and a summary review of journal articles and 
auditing textbooks available during the early to m i d sixties, supplemented by 
my own limited experience during those years. The possibility of errors in 
description of the concepts and principles exists for both auditing approaches, 
and major differences i n application undoubtedly exist both between and within 
specific firms. Thus, the descriptions are generalities, not necessarily accurate 
for any specific firm or auditor. Each approach w i l l be discussed in the context 
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of the "normal" audit engagement which has the objective of expression of 
opinion on the financial statements. Finally, each approach produces informa­
tion on the internal control system which may be reported to management 
and/or outsiders; however, this aspect w i l l be ignored. 
A s correctly pointed out by Anderson, the concepts and procedures of 
analytical auditing encompass only a portion of the total audit process roughly 
equivalent to that process i n conventional auditing referred to as the study and 
evaluation of internal control. 
The major features of analytical auditing and primary areas of contribution 
at the time of its introduction were: 
a. A reorientation of the emphasis i n the audit process from the detailed 
checking of transactions to a formal recognition of reliance on the 
accounting system, with minimal substantive testing as an equal al­
ternative approach to verification of account balances. 
b. Emphasis on the exclusive utilization of flowcharting as a means of 
documenting the system and as a basis for analysis, bringing more 
attention and emphasis to the review of internal control than it had 
been given previously. 
c. A logical verbal and pictorial description of the review and evaluation 
part of the audit process and its integration into the overall evidence 
collection process. 
Origins and System Orientation 
W i t h respect to the reasons for the origin of analytical auditing, Anderson 
notes possible differences i n the development of auditing in the U . S . and Canada. 
Audi t ing in Canada in the late 1950's is viewed by h i m as emphasizing tests of 
transactions while auditing at the same time in the U.S . is viewed as emphasizing 
"balance sheet" tests. Several problems of theory and application of the Canadian 
approach are noted by Anderson which initiated the experimentation that re­
sulted in analytical auditing. 
The primary objective of analytical auditing as described i n 1966 was: 
T o determine, through an analysis of the accounting system and the 
internal controls, the accuracy and reliability of his [the auditor's] 
client's accounting records and thus to provide a basis for planning the 
balance sheet audit steps necessary to support an opinion on the financial 
statements.4 
This objective is similar to the aspect of the conventional auditing process re­
ferred to as the study and evaluation of the system of internal control and which, 
since the early 1960's, has been required by the second standard of field work 
of generally accepted auditing standards: 
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal 
control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the 
resultant extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be 
restricted. 5 
Despite the second standard of field work, it would probably be fair to 
say that auditing in the U.S . in the late 1950's and early sixties was not "system 
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oriented" but was "end result oriented." Certainly, i n today's terms, the U . S . 
audit would appear to have been substantive-testing oriented rather than system-
reliance oriented. 
This allegation is difficult to substantiate; however, some evidence is 
available. The discussion of the evaluation of internal control in Statement on 
A u d i t i n g Procedure N o . 296 was five and one-half pages in length, of which 
four and one-half pages were devoted to terminology and discussion of general 
control elements. By contrast, the discussion of the study and evaluation of in­
ternal control in the 1972 Statement on A u d i t i n g Procedure N o . 54 was 41 pages 
in length. 7 The auditing texts of the early sixties generally contained a chapter 
on internal control, much of which was devoted to descriptions of the general 
control elements. In addition, the individual chapters on the audit of specific 
account balances and types of transactions often contained a short discussion of 
appropriate specific control features; however, discussion of the evaluation of 
these control elements and the integration of the results in audit planning was 
minimal . The primary orientation appeared to be on balance sheet testing 
(analytical review w i l l be assumed to be a form of balance sheet testing through­
out the remainder of the paper) and on substantive testing aspects of transactions 
tests. Finally, as discussed later, tests of the functioning of controls (compliance 
tests) were not emphasized and were apparently minimal i n extent at that time. 
The analytical auditing approach reversed, or at least balanced, the emphasis 
on the system and the controls in the system, although the importance of sub­
stantive tests was retained i n areas of weak internal control. This is an important 
contribution of the analytical auditing concept. Figure 1, based on the Skinner 
and Anderson book, has been modified to omit management recommendation 
aspects. A s shown, analytical auditing recognized two main avenues of verifica­
tion of financial statement amounts. O n the left, reliance was placed on the 
system and the controls to produce reliable balances, with m i n i m u m balance 
sheet testing, and on the right, substantive tests of transactions and/or balances 
were relied on where the control system had apparent weaknesses. O f major 
importance, the ability of reliance on the system and controls to produce reliable 
information with m i n i m u m substantive testing was recognized and documented. 
Thus, analytical auditing was an early, clear voice on the importance of the 
study and evaluation of internal control relative to the total audit, and on the 
possibility of strong reliance on the system with minimal substantive testing as 
an equally acceptable, if not preferable, alternative to the conventional substantive-
testing-oriented approach to obtaining sufficient evidence to support an account 
balance. 
The preceding description of conventional auditing may be misstated. 
Clearly, conventional auditing was undergoing a transition i n objectives and 
techniques as described by B r o w n . 8 Reliance on the system was formally recog­
nized; however, the documentation and discussion of the nature of the evalua­
tion and the reliance was minimal , and it would appear that emphasis was pri­
marily on substantive testing. Internal control was often viewed as justification 
for less than 100 percent testing and as the basis for responsibility for fraud pre­
vention and detection, as espoused by Byrne 9 and L e v y . 1 0 
The study and evaluation aspect was becoming increasingly important i n 
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Unsatisfactory 
the auditing literature of the 1960's, and some examples of this follow. B r o w n 1 1 
presented an approach to make the internal control evaluation more objective. 
Mautz and M i n i 1 2 investigated the relationship between internal control evalua­
tion and audit program modification. In 1967, Stettler perceived a need for an 
alternative textbook titled Systems Based Independent A u d i t s 1 3 to at least comple­
ment his earlier (by inference, "nonsystems based") A u d i t i n g Principles . 1 4 
Other researchers investigated various aspects of internal control and its evaluation 
and importance. In 1972, the A I C P A issued Statement on A u d i t i n g Procedure 
No. 54, which provides the official discussion of the current conventional auditing 
view of the study and evaluation process. This pronouncement sets forth along 
with substantive procedures the basis for reliance on the system as the two 
means of verifying account balances in current conventional auditing, providing 
a convergence of analytical and conventional auditing in this area. 
The convergence of analytical auditing and conventional auditing involving 
a balancing of the reliance on the system (with minimal substantive tests) and 
the substantive-testing-oriented approaches in conventional auditing is evidenced 
by official pronouncements, particularly S A P No. 54 i n 1972. The overall audit 
risk is clearly segmented 1 5 into "system" risk and "examination" risk, and the 
alternative of auditor reliance on the system to reduce the former is explicitly 
documented. The continuing increase i n importance of the system of internal 
control is manifested in academic research, i n major internal control develop­
ments wi th in public accounting firms (e.g., Peat Marwick & M i t c h e l l , 1 6 and 
Arthur Andersen 1 7 ) and in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 
A s evidenced i n part by the previously mentioned works, current conven­
tional auditing practice and analytical auditing now appear to be practically 
identical in the balance between reliance on the system with m i n i m u m sub­
stantive testing and substantive testing without substantial reliance as coequal 
alternatives for the accumulation of evidence to provide an opinion on the 
financial statements. 
Compliance Testing 
Compliance testing, as it is now known, does not appear to be an important 
or well defined element of analytical or conventional auditing in the early sixties. 
By contrast, S A P No. 54 and the latest versions of analytical auditing as evi­
denced by Rod Anderson's paper and his recent book 1 8 incorporate annual com­
pliance testing, and the two approaches would appear to be i n agreement on 
this point. 
Analytical auditing originally placed little emphasis on procedural tests, 
which are analogous to compliance testing, i n areas where controls were deter­
mined to be satisfactory. Thus, the process i n Figure 1 of the analytical auditing 
flow chart captioned "Supplementary Procedural Tests," is analogous to the 
compliance testing process. The purpose of the supplementary procedural tests 
" . . . is to confirm, by reference to objective data, the auditor's evaluation of 
internal c o n t r o l " ; 1 9 however, these tests were not required each year. Supple­
mentary procedural testing was considered sufficient if done on a cyclical basis 
so that all key areas judged to have satisfactory internal control would be tested 
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every fourth or fifth year. 2 0 Thus, the controls relied on in a given area were 
not tested for compliance each year, but only every four or five years. 
In addition, it appears that the supplementary procedural testing, even i n 
the year selected for testing, was not extensive. Thus, the auditor should " . . . in ­
clude a jew (original italics) supplementary tests i n those areas where control is 
believed satisfactory . . . , " and these were recommended for application on a 
cyclical basis. "It is unnecessary for h i m to confirm each point each year or to 
spend extensive time on his supplementary program . . . " 2 1 and "Since the tests 
are only a supplementary confirmation of the auditor's initial evaluation, only a 
small portion of the total audit time should be devoted to this section." 2 2 
Compliance testing i n the conventional audit of the early sixties would not 
have appeared to be particularly different from the above description of supple­
mentary procedural testing. Each approach recognized the importance of some 
testing the functioning of the controls; however, neither seemed to require that 
the tests of the controls be extensive or on an annual basis. Both seem to rely 
i n large part on the tracing of a few transactions, verification of a few examples 
of a control feature's functioning, or the results of substantive tests to provide 
sufficient evidence of compliance. Stettler 2 3 argued, at one time, that a sample 
of one was sufficient; however, Carmichael 2 4 disagreed that a sample of one was 
sufficient for "dual purpose" tests. Nevertheless, Carmichael's description of 
the use of dual purpose tests in both weakness areas and i n areas of apparently 
satisfactory internal control ( including testing on a cyclical basis) paralleled the 
description of the analytical auditing process very closely. The notion of cyclical 
rotation of tests in areas of internal control which appeared from the review to be 
satisfactory was apparently an acceptable practice prior to SAP N o . 54. 
The distinction between compliance and substantive testing and the im­
portance of annual and extensive compliance testing where substantial reliance 
is placed on the system became documented in conventional auditing i n SAP 
N o . 54 in 1972. That pronouncement requires that tests of compliance be per­
formed each year i n areas where substantial reliance is placed on controls, and 
furthermore the testing is to be applied to the functioning of the controls during 
the entire year. Thus, for those controls which leave an "audit trail of docu­
mentary evidence," tests of compliance " . . . should be applied to transactions 
executed throughout the period under audit . . . " although where tests of com­
pliance are performed on an interim basis near year end, the results of substantive 
tests may be used to indicate the degree of compliance during the remaining 
per iod. 2 5 For those controls that do not leave an audit trail, tests of compliance 
" . . . should relate to the entire period under audit . . . , " however, observations 
can only be made during the auditor's visits to the clients' premises. 2 6 Thus, it 
is clear that the auditor i n current conventional auditing is required to test 
(through compliance tests) the effectiveness of the functioning, during the 
entire period being audited, of those controls on which substantial reliance is 
to be placed. These views are supported and discussed in more detail in 
Loebbecke. 2 7 
Annual compliance testing previously represented a distinct divergence be­
tween analytical auditing and conventional auditing; however, again the two 
auditing approaches have converged. The latest documentation of analytical 
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audi t ing , 2 8 including R o d Anderson's paper, sets forth a requirement of annual 
compliance testing over the ful l year being audited in areas where substantial 
reliance is placed on internal control. A s he states in his paper, the change was 
influenced by conventional practice, and he documents the reasons for the change. 
The 1975 Changes 
Anderson indicates in his paper that two major changes resulted from the 
1975 revision of analytical auditing. The first, the transition from cyclical sup­
plementary testing to annual compliance testing has been discussed in the pre­
vious section. The second major change was the formal distinction and separate 
review and evaluation of "general" controls and "application" controls i n a 
computerized environment. This distinction and approach is completely con­
sistent w i t h current, conventional generally accepted auditing standards as 
documented i n S A S No. 3. 2 9 
Documentation of the System 
Analytical auditing, i n addition to its emphasis on the system, contained, 
at the outset and currently, a requirement for the use of flowcharts of the system 
and controls as the basic documentation. Flowcharts were used because they 
allegedly provided the auditor with a concise picture and a better appreciation 
of the item of interest—the system and its controls. The use of flowcharts al­
legedly reduced the risk of perfunctory or unimaginative investigation of the 
internal controls, that other approaches might allow. 
Conventional auditing practice of the early sixties was apparently internal 
control questionnaire oriented. N o recommendation for the means of system 
documentation was provided by A u d i t i n g Standards and Procedures. Most of 
the auditing texts at that time spent little time on the review and documentation 
of the system, and most of the discussion was centered on internal control ques­
tionnaires. Although there is still no single, accepted documentation approach 
for the review of the system, it is probably fair to say that flowcharts are in­
creasingly being used i n current conventional auditing practice. S A P No. 54 
contains no recommended method of documentation, but flowcharts are identified 
as one possible approach. Current auditing texts also discuss flowcharts as a 
possible means of documentation, but generally provide no preference. Increas­
ing use of flowchart documentation probably has occurred in practice in part 
because of the increasing system documentation, including flowcharts, that re­
sults from computer usage. In addition, increasing acceptance of flowcharting 
i n practice is evidenced, for example, by the virtual requirement by a number of 
public accounting firms for flowchart documentation where substantial reliance 
on the system is anticipated. 
Description of the Review and Evaluation Process 
The last contribution of analytical auditing that I would like to mention 
was that it provided a more complete and definitive description of the review and 
evaluation process than had previously existed. The picture presented in Figure 1 
describing analytical auditing was relatively complete and definitive. Further-
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more, there has been little or no substantive change i n descriptions of the process 
i n analytical or conventional auditing since the 1966 publication of Analytical 
A u d i t i n g . A s evidence of the lack of significant change i n the description of the 
review and evaluation process, several current conventional auditing t e x t s , 3 0 , 3 1 
contain flowchart descriptions of the process that are remarkably similar to the 
original analytical auditing flowchart description. Finally, Figure 2 flowcharts 
my understanding of the study and evaluation segment of current conventional 
audit processes and the current version of analytical auditing. The minor dif­
ferences shown or discussed below indicate that there is very little substantive 
difference i n the two approaches at this time. 
Comparison of Figures 1 and 2 may provide a means of summarization. 
Where substantial reliance on the accounting system is considered, both auditing 
approaches require a review of the system. In the second box, analytical auditing 
requires a "walk through" of several examples of each type of transaction to 
verify the auditor's understanding of the system. Such a "walk-through" is 
mentioned, but not required, i n S A P No. 54. Documentation of the system 
may differ, as has been previously discussed, with analytical auditing requiring 
flowchart documentation, while conventional auditing may utilize one of several 
approaches, including a flowchart. Each requires an analysis of the system and 
a tentative evaluation of whether apparent weaknesses exist or not. Even i n 
areas with apparent satisfactory controls, Figure 2 shows that the auditor may 
decide not to place substantial reliance on internal controls. The possibility of 
nonreliance on apparent satisfactory controls was mentioned i n Skinner and 
Anderson's book, but not included i n the flowchart, and the possibility of non-
reliance is documented i n Anderson's current book. Also, as previously men­
tioned, the original description of analytical auditing required only supplementary 
procedural tests on a cyclical basis as shown i n Figure 1; however, this has been 
modified to be the same as the box "Tests of Compliance" i n Figure 2. The 
remainder of the diagram where controls appear satisfactory does not appear to 
be particularly different from the original. 
The right-hand sides of the two figures, where apparent weaknesses exist, 
are also very similar with but small differences i n terminology. The weakness 
investigation of the original analytical audit is roughly equivalent to choice of 
emphasis on tests of transactions or balance sheet tests to verify the account 
balance. Alternatively, i n either approach, tests of balances may be emphasized, 
and finally some combination of the two may be chosen. 
Thus, the conclusion is that the current version of analytical auditing and 
current conventional auditing, with potential differences i n documentation and 
application, are virtually the same. 
Summary 
The paper by Anderson on the current status of analytical auditing was 
informative and thorough, and as a result, few if any direct comments are 
necessary. I do present, however, two assertions. The first was supported by 
the identification of three main contributions of analytical auditing when it 
was originally introduced. The second contention was that the concepts of 
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Documentation & 
Preliminary Evaluation 
analytical and conventional auditing have evolved so that, i n most respects, they 
are currently virtually identical. 
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Sampling Risk vs. Nonsampling Risk in the 
Auditor's Logic Process 
William L. Felix, Jr. 
University of Washington 
Most of the larger auditing practice units i n this country can be described 
as either making considerable use of statistical methods i n current practice or 
engaging i n research and development that i n the near future w i l l encourage the 
use of statistical methods whenever they are appropriate. W h i l e the level and 
nature of the use of these methods varies considerably across these auditing 
firms, frequently a pervasive deficiency appears to exist i n the documented in ­
corporation of the results of such procedures i n the audit logic process. In the 
following paper an examination of this problem is presented, followed by an 
analysis of the role of sampling evidence i n the auditor's logic process. The paper 
concludes with some recommendations for action. 
A n Interpretation Problem 
The use of statistical sampling methods as a structure for applying auditing 
procedures results i n a confidence interval or an accept/reject decision depending 
on whether the auditor is using an estimation or a testing approach. (Al though 
only an estimation approach is discussed i n this paper, the comments apply wi th 
equal force to both approaches.) A s an example of the estimation approach, an 
auditor might specify a 9 5 % confidence interval of $6,934,000 plus or minus 
$141,700 i n sending out positive confirmations of customer accounts receivable 
and use a mean-per-unit or an auxiliary estimation method to construct the re­
sulting confidence interval. In documenting the results of such an application 
i n the auditor's working papers, a conclusion similar to the following is 
often found: 
"Based on the above tests, I am 95% confident that the accounts 
receivable balance of $7,037,000 at 6/30/X7 is fairly stated." 
W h i l e there are a number of issues i n this conclusion that could be argued, 
the major concern of this paper is that the conclusion implies that the risk of a 
non-representative sample (the risk of sampling error) is the only audit risk of 
concern i n the confirmation of a sample of accounts receivable. This implication 
is never correct. O f equal or possibly even greater significance i n evaluating the 
results of the auditing procedure are the auditor's perceptions of (1) how well 
assistants executed the procedures and computations, (2) the ex post appropriate-
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ness of audit procedures used, and (3) the nature of the errors and other facts 
identified by applying the audit procedures to the sample items. 
Based on discussions with a number of staff and supervisory audit personnel 
in several different practice units, the implication apparent in the above con­
clusion is a real problem. W h e n questioned about the nature of audit evidence 
such as a sample of positive confirmations, these auditors were able to effectively 
discuss all the aspects of the evidence mentioned above, but when they were 
presented with a confidence interval, the auditors seemed to suffer from a 
"number fixation" and talk as i f the confidence interval had somehow captured 
all aspects of the audit evidence. In order to explore with some care the nature 
of this problem and to propose action, the following section analyzes the role of 
statistical evidence in more detail. 
A n Intuitive Analysis 
T h e logic process used by auditors to reach an opinion can be viewed as a 
process of collecting sufficient, competent evidence to drive the risk of undis­
covered material errors or omissions i n the financial statements to an acceptably 
low level. However, in order to identify properly the role of statistical methods 
i n a particular audit procedure, a decomposition of this overall audit risk that 
is consistent with the auditor's professional standards for an examination is 
needed. 
Whi le extensive decomposition of overall audit risk does not seem to exist 
i n the literature, a first level of decomposition is included i n AICPA Professional 
Standards, A U Sec. 320B.29. Here, i n discussing overall risk, two separate risks 
are introduced. T h e first is the risk that the accounting system w i l l generate a 
material error and the second is the risk that the auditor's examination w i l l not 
discover a material error given that one has occurred. These two risks are 
stated i n terms of an overall audit risk, i.e., the risk of undiscovered errors that 
aggregate to at least a material error. The risk of a client accounting system 
generating an error (or errors) is an assessment problem. Th is assessment ac­
tivity is carried out i n large part through the process of learning the client's in ­
dustry, operations and personnel and through the required study and evaluation 
of internal controls i n each transaction cycle component of the accounting system. 
The risk of an error not being discovered by the auditor's examination is 
then minimized by designing and executing a set of audit procedures. These 
procedures typically include a combination of systems reliability tests (compliance 
tests) and tests of balances (substantive tests) that w i l l drive the auditor's per­
ception of the risk of undiscovered errors to an acceptably low level. This process 
i n risk terms is susceptible to decision theoretic modeling, as discussed i n footnotes 
1, 2, and 4. 
Identifying the Role of Statistical Sampling 
In order to identify the role of statistical sampling methods i n auditing, 
further decomposition is necessary. A decision theory approach to this analysis 
is possible and w i l l be explored in another paper. In the interests of simplicity 
a less ambitious approach is presented here. In addressing both the assessment 
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problem and the design and execution problem the auditor performs specific 
procedures that comprise an interrelated evidence collection and evaluation 
process. These procedures are chosen i n both problems to provide cost-effective 
reduction i n overall audit risk. The expected contribution to risk reduction by 
each procedure could be analyzed by a decomposition of the overall audit risk 
among the various transactions cycles and balances. However, this analysis is 
not necessary i n this paper other than to observe that it occurs and that each 
audit procedure used is expected to contribute to the reduction of overall audit 
risk, not just to a subclassification of overall risk. 
Specific audit procedures used i n either the assessment problem or the 
design and execution problem may or may not include the use of statistical 
sampling methods. In those situations where statistical sampling methods are 
used, a further two part decomposition of overall audit risk is made explicit. 
The risk that the sample is not representative of the evidence population being 
tested is the rather well known risk of sampling error. Using a confidence in ­
terval or estimation approach to sampling, this risk is one minus the confidence 
level. For example, a 6% achieved upper error l imit at 9 5 % confidence implies 
a 5 % risk of sampling error. The other part of this level of evidence decomposi­
tion for a specific audit procedure is the risk of nonsampling error. 
Nonsampling error can be defined by exclusion; that is, al l sources of risk 
of audit estimation or decision error other than the risk of sampling error. 
However, some analysis of the types of error involved is worthwhile. A t least 
two major sources of nonsampling risk can be identified. They are 1) the risk 
of error i n choosing and/or using the statistical sampling methodology (or other 
methodology to obtain sample items and relate them back to the evidence popu­
lation) and 2) the risk of error i n choosing and/or using an audit evidence 
procedure on the basic items in the sample. A n example of an error under the 
first source would be the choice of an inappropriate statistical methodology such 
as the use of unstratified mean-per-unit estimation on a highly skewed popula­
tion. Another example of this first source of error would be making computa­
tional errors in obtaining the confidence interval. A n example of the second 
source of error would be the use of an ineffective audit procedure such as the 
use of negative confirmations of accounts receivable for top stratum accounts of 
a heterogeneous population or in a situation where fraud may be present as a 
consequence of weak internal control. Another example of this second type of 
error would be any type of human error or misperception by the auditor such as 
omitting an audit procedure on one of the sample elements. 
A t this point the contribution of statistical methods to the audit process 
can be summarized. By using statistical methods as a framework for planning 
and evaluating the results of specific audit procedures, the auditor is able to 
control the risk of sampling error or the risk that the sample is not representative 
of the population for the audit application. Th is contribution is directly bene­
ficial to the auditor i n that a possible source of estimation or decision error is 
explicitly documented and evaluated. More indirect benefits are also likely 
because statistical sampling methods require that some of the judgmental param­
eters of the testing process be stated specifically. This necessary increase i n 
specification should result in more careful planning and documentation and 
49 
improved chances that subsequent review w i l l identify nonsampling errors. 
The contribution to risk reduction implicit i n these additional elements is, of 
course, due to a reduction i n the risk of nonsampling error. 
A Case Illustration 
T h e following case w i l l illustrate some of the issues regarding sampling and 
nonsampling risk described above. The auditor's actions are described first, fol­
lowed by a discussion of the risks of sampling and nonsampling error. 
A Description of the Audit 
O n May, 19X8, Ohio-Indiana Uti l i ty company ( O I U ) , a medium size m i d -
western regional utility company converted to a new E D P system for customer 
accounts. Because of a lack of controls and poor conversion procedures, a large 
number of errors i n new and discontinued accounts as well as continuing accounts 
occurred through the end of the year. In addition, the accounts receivable file 
did not reconcile with the general ledger and it was not clear what problems 
would arise i n attempting a reconciliation. 
In planning the year-end audit of O I U , it was decided that extensive re­
liance on accounts receivable confirmations would be necessary i n order to obtain 
sufficient competent evidence on accounts receivable and sales and that positive 
confirmation requests should be used. The accounts receivable included approxi­
mately 526,000 customers of which about 467,000 are residential and 59,000 are 
commercial, industrial, and other types of customers. The accounts receivable 
balance was expected to total approximately $13,400,000. 
In order to be as explicit as possible about the planning process and to 
control the risk of sampling error, statistical methods were to be used i n carrying 
out the confirmation procedure. In this application a relatively precise, two-
sided estimate was considered necessary because of the expected weakness of 
corroborative evidence and the possibility of proposing an upward or downward 
Mean-per-unit estimation ( M P U / S ) wi th stratification was chosen as the 
statistical framework for the confirmation procedure to achieve this objective. 
adjustment based on the statistically augmented audit procedure. 
Other Audit Decisions 
OIU's accounts receivable population included a number of possible sub-
classifications for audit purposes. Since the objective of the receivables confirma­
tion procedure was to provide extraordinary substantive evidence i n view of the 
k n o w n internal control problems and still stay within reasonable audit costs, 
some care i n deciding how to treat the possible subpopulations was appropriate. 
The first level subclassification was residential vs. non-residential customers. 
Residential customers were viewed as very numerous (467,000), with smaller 
balances (few accounts over $200), and as not being particularly sophisticated 
i n understanding the confirmation request. The non-residential customers were 
fewer i n number (59,000), w i t h larger balances (some balances over $10,000), 
and as more likely to understand the confirmation request. Given these differ­
ences, a judgmental decision was made to treat the two subpopulations separately. 
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In addition, wi th in both the residential and the non-residential subpopula-
tions there were some negative balances and a large number of zero balances as 
well as the usual debit balances. It was decided that the zero and negative 
balance subpopulations would also be tested but evaluated separately because 
their characteristics for auditing purposes differed from the debit balances. The 
tests of these accounts are not described here. 
The subpopulations subjected to the M P U / S positive confirmation procedure 
were the debit balance residential and non-residential accounts. Based on the 
evidence needs i n this application, it was judgmentally determined that a 95% 
confidence level and a precision of plus or minus $130,000 would be used i n each 
subpopulation. T h e precision is one half of the amount believed to be material 
for each test. T h e relatively high confidence level of 95% (low sampling risk) 
was specified because of the lack of alternative evidence and the possibility of 
proposing an adjustment. The materiality amount of $260,000 was chosen 
based on the decision that approximately 10% of the expected net income of 
$5,000,000 would be material to the financial statements as a whole and that 
slightly over one half of this amount could be tolerated i n these specific tests of 
accounts receivable. 
In order to perform the M P U / S estimation each of the two subpopulations 
was stratified. 
A t O I U it was decided to use 4 strata plus a 100% stratum for residential 
accounts and 5 strata plus a 100% stratum for non-residential accounts. The 
cum f method was used to locate the stratum boundaries. The number of 
strata were chosen based on recommendations i n the statistical literature that 5 
to 10 strata w i l l usually be a good choice. The cum f method of locating 
boundaries is used by dividing the population into a large number of cells. The 
stratum boundaries are then located by allocating approximately equal sums of 
the square root of the cell width times the cell frequency to each of the strata. 
This process is illustrated for the four sampled strata i n the residential accounts 
i n Table 1. 
After the stratum boundaries were located for the O I U application, a gen­
eralized audit software package was used to draw preliminary random samples 
of 50 accounts from each stratum. These preliminary samples were used to 
compute the estimated standard deviation of the book values i n each stratum 
which i n turn were used to estimate the required samples size for each stratum. 
The results are summarized i n Table 2. 
Because the sample sizes are based on the book values of the preliminary 
samples from each strata, it is very possible that the estimated standard deviation 
computed from the audited sample values w i l l be larger than those estimated 
above. This w i l l be particularly true if the errors move the audit values across 
stratum boundaries. For this reason it is good practice to increase the preliminary 
sample sizes by about 10% to provide some protection against this event. The 
result of the larger standard deviations without increased sample sizes would 
be a resulting confidence interval that is too wide implying that the audit evi­
dence is insufficient. 
The results of positively confirming the selected accounts receivable and 
performing alternative procedures on the non-responses are summarized in 
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Table 1 
Residential Accounts 
Class W i d t h of Number of 
Number Class Accounts WiNi ΣWiNi 
1 10 27,806 527 527 
2 10 74,062 866 1,388 
3 10 58,744 766 2,154 
4 10 33,794 581 2,736 
5 10 17,781 422 3,157 
6 10 9,471 308 3,465 
7 10 6,190 249 3,714 
8 10 3,801 195 3,909 
9 10 2,546 160 4,069 
10 10 1,637 128 4,196 
11 50 2,968 385 4,582 
12 50 650 180 4,762 
13 50 205 101 4,863 
14 50 96 69 4,932 
15 50 75 61 4,994 
16 50 51 50 5,044 
17 50 30 39 5,083 
18 50 30 39 5,122 
2. 2(1280) =2560 
3. 3(1280) = 3840 
Table 3. The client book values reported on this table are different from the 
totals originally used for planning as noted above, because a number of errors 
in the population were corrected by the client prior to this evaluation. The sub-
population book values were obtained from the client's book control accounts, 
which at the date of the evaluation were reconciled with the detail. Errors on 
confirmation returns that had been corrected by the client prior to the confirma­
tion return were not considered errors for audit puposes. 
The resulting confidence interval statements were as follows: 
1. Residential Accounts: Based on a point estimate of $6,944,389 and 
a precision of $138,383, the 95% confidence interval is ($6,806,006, 
$7,082,772). 
2. Non-residential Accounts: Based on a point estimate of $5,428,905 
and a precision of $133,873, the 95% confidence interval is 
($5,295,032, $5,562,778). 
Using this evidence the audit staff wrote the following conclusion: 
52 
1. 5122 
4 
= 1280 
Table 2 
Stratum 
Residential 
Dollar 
Interval 
Stratum 
Size 
Estimated 
Standard 
Deviation 
Estimated 
Sample Size 
1 0-19.99 101,868 4.12 147 
2 20-39.99 92,538 5.18 167 
3 40-79.99 37,243 9.46 123 
4 80-499.99 8,288 35.01 101 
5 500 and up 51 - 51 
240,238 589 
Residential 
1 0-74.99 20,286 22.98 167 
2 75-149.99 4,398 21.24 33 
3 150-499.99 4,590 110.24 181 
4 500-1,499.99 1,389 297.15 148 
5 1,500-3,499.99 367 554.17 73 
6 3,500 and up 217 - 217 
31,247 819 
Table 3 
Audited Results 
Residential 
Standard 
Stratum Number Sample Mean Deviation 
1 101,868 160 12.15 4.89 
2 92,538 190 29.04 4.90 
3 37,243 140 55.89 10.33 
4 8,288 110 111.95 45.99 
5 Audited value of $26,198 
The book value of this subpopulation is $6,955,542 
Non-Residential 
1 20,286 190 30.16 20.54 
2 4,398 40 119.33 37.22 
3 4,590 200 245.99 127.56 
4 1,389 160 813.77 316.23 
5 367 80 2,104.39 544.21 
6 Audited value of $1,260,534 
The book value of this subpopulation is $5,446,510 
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"Based on the satisfactory results of our audit procedured described at 
(Index), we are 9 5 % confident that the accounts receivable balance is 
fairly stated as at 12/31/X8." 
Discussion of the Sampling Risks 
In this circumstance the auditor planned to accept a risk of sampling error 
up to 5 % . The achieved sampling risk may be viewed i n a variety of ways, but 
we w i l l follow our estimation approach and consider each subpopulation. 
The residential accounts book value of $6,955,542 is within the achieved 
95% confidence interval, but the precision is somewhat larger than the planned 
$130,000. Most practice units using the estimation approach would accept the 
results because the confidence limits are less than a material amount of $260,000 
from the book value. T h e achieved sampling risk may be viewed as one minus 
the auditor's confidence that the book value is not materially ($260,000) i n error 
or approximately .0001%. That this achieved risk is far less than the planned 
5 % is due of course to the extremely conservative approach of setting planned 
precision equal to one-half a material error rather than explicitly controlling the 
β risk and to drawing a sample point estimate very close to the book value. 
The result for the nonresidential accounts is similar. 
Some would argue that the two subpopulations should be combined for 
evaluation purposes. Combining would result i n a point estimate of $12,373,294 
(the sum of the separate point estimates) plus or minus an achieved precision 
of $192,540 (obtained by combining the standard deviations using the square 
root of the sum of the squares approach). This combination is acceptable for 
the evaluation of sampling risk on a combined basis, but should be viewed w i t h 
some caution i n the evaluation of other (nonsampling) risks. T o the extent 
that the two subpopulations were divided for reasons other than statistical 
methodology, the evaluation of the results for these other objectives should be 
separate. A n example of another objective would be to separately evaluate the 
perceived ability of the two classes of customers to respond to the confirmations 
correctly. 
A Discussion of the Nonsampling Risks 
The risk of nonsampling error in this illustration can be approached using 
the framework outlined i n the previous section. First consider the choice of 
auditing procedures (positive confirmations) and the quality of execution of 
the procedures. The auditor's working paper documentation should include 
the essence of the narrative i n the case illustration. In addition, i n arriving at 
conclusions about accounts receivable, consideration should be given to whether 
or not the confirmation procedure was effective and whether or not the audit 
personnel performed the procedure effectively. Specific issues that would have 
to be considered regarding the effectiveness of the confirmation procedure include: 
1. Were the anticipated rate and type of errors found i n the sample and 
if not, why not? (If the anticipated errors were not found, is it 
possible that the confirmation procedure could not find them? Also, 
was evidence uncovered to explain the reconciliation problem?) 
2. Does the nature of the errors found i n the sample indicate any prob-
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lem i n using confirmation results as evidence or indicate other un­
anticipated problems affecting the acceptability of the debit balances? 
3. Were the subclassifications of the accounts receivable population 
effective? 
4. Should other audit procedures be added as a supplement to or a 
replacement for the confirmations? (Note that i n this case it is pos­
sible to argue that overreliance on the confirmations is very likely.) 
5. Was the combination of confirmation evidence and "alternative pro­
cedures" evidence appropriate? 
The quality of the execution of the audit procedures is usually evaluated through 
discussions wi th the staff and by careful review of their working papers. 
The second part of the evaluation of the risk of nonsampling error is to 
assess the risk that the statistical methodology or its execution might lead to 
audit decision errors. T h e choice of sampling methodology is controversial. 
The method used i n this illustration as well as any other sampling method is 
not suitable i n al l audit circumstances. Either through reliance on practice unit 
policy or published evidence, the reasonableness of the specific method should 
be evaluated. T h e stratified mean per unit method is discussed i n a number of 
sources such as the A I C P A ' s Audit Research Monograph, No. 2 by Neter and 
Loebbecke, and such references should be consulted i n evaluating its use. The 
robustness of the M P U / S method documented by Neter and Loebbecke i n con­
junction with highly skewed populations would support the use of the method 
i n this case. 
T h e evaluation of the quality of the execution of the sampling procedure 
should be an integral part of evaluating the performance of the audit staff on 
al l audit procedures. However, a conclusion such as that illustrated above 
indicates the importance of careful review by knowledgeable auditors to be 
sure that both i n fact and appearance the statistically oriented evidence is 
properly integrated into the audit process. 
Th is brief discussion of sampling and nonsampling risks i n a specific ap­
plication is meant to be illustrative. A n exhaustive analysis may wel l be worth­
while, but is not critical to the intent of this paper. 
A n improved form of the auditor's conclusion could take at least two ap­
proaches. Either the conclusion should express the auditor's degree of satisfaction 
with overall risk, or the conclusion should specifically address both sampling 
risk and nonsampling risk. In any case both the auditor's understanding and 
his/her documentation should reflect careful evaluation of the impact of the 
evidence. 
Future Action 
First, the current emphasis i n statistical methodology training for auditors 
on alternative methods and their appropriate use needs to be expanded. By 
using both conceptual arguments and case illustrations, the significance of the 
risk of sampling error on the audit process should be clarified. T h i s expansion 
should, of course, be consistent with the practice unit's audit philosophy. In 
addition, the expanded training should include analysis of and training i n 
wri t ing audit conclusions where statistical evidence is a part of the material 
being evaluated. 
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Second, professional standards for auditors should be expanded to identify 
explicitly the role of statistical evidence i n the auditor's logic process and to 
consider the appropriate form of an audit conclusion that responds i n part to 
statistical evidence. Documentation that is not consistent with the actual use of 
the evidence, such as the conclusions illustrated i n this paper, reflects poorly on 
the profession. Auditors are encouraged to use statistical methods i n both the 
professional literature and standards. T o the extent possible, that literature 
and those standards should be clear regarding the role of sampling evidence in 
the auditor's opinion formulation process. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Sampling Risk vs. Nonsampling Risk in the 
Auditor's Logic Process 
Robert K. Elliott 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & C o . 
Professor Fe l ix ' paper is ostensibly a statistical sampling paper. However, 
statistical and nonstatistical sampling are essentially identical, except that sampling 
error is quantified i n the former but not the latter: 
• the concepts of sampling error and nonsampling error apply equally, 
• any inference must be confined to the population subject to sampling, 
• if the test objective is substantive, stratification must be employed 
(at a m i n i m u m , al l individually significant items must be audited), 
• al l selected items must be audited (the only rigorous alternative— 
"supplementary sampling"—being impractical i n auditing), 
• the sample findings must be projected to the population sampled, and 
• sampling is highly effective against overstatement, relatively weak 
against understatement. 
The only apparent way that statistical sampling is relevant to the paper hinges 
on the author's allegation that "based on discussions wi th a number of staff and 
supervisory personnel" the mere fact of quantifying the sampling error causes 
auditors to overlook other sources of audit risk. (Fel ix ' sampling methods to 
reach this conclusion were apparently informal, but the conclusion is plausible.) 
Misinterpretation of Sampling Conclusions 
The possible misinterpretation of sampling conclusions that Fel ix is con­
cerned with was anticipated by the A I C P A Statistical Sampling Committee in 
its 1964 Statement (Journal of Accountancy, July, 1964; now included as Section 
320A of Statement on A u d i t i n g Standards No. 1): 
The competence of evidential matter as referred to in the third standard 
of field work is solely a matter of auditing judgment that is not 
comprehended i n the statistical design and evaluation of an audit 
sample. In a strict sense, the statistical evaluation relates only to the 
probability that items having certain characteristics i n terms of monetary 
amounts, quantities, errors, or other features of interest w i l l be included 
i n the sample—not the auditor's treatment of such items. Consequently, 
the use of statistical sampling does not directly affect the auditor's de­
cisions as to the auditing procedures to be performed, the acceptability 
of the evidential matter obtained with respect to individual items i n the 
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sample, or the action which might be taken i n the light of the nature 
and cause of particular errors. 
A Pilot Test of Statistical Sampling 
The risk of nonsampling error is real. T o illustrate, I w i l l describe a 
statistical sampling pilot test conducted by our firm i n 1968-69. Twenty-five 
randomly selected audit partners were instructed to have their staffs study the 
A I C P A programmed instruction texts on statistical sampling, use sampling on 
their audit engagements, and document the results. Approximately ninety ap­
plications were performed and documented. U p o n analysis, I noted that roughly 
two-thirds of them had included nonsampling errors of various types, such as: 
• computation errors 
• statistical techniques inappropriate to audit objectives (e.g., attribute 
sampling for a substantive test) 
• misunderstanding of terminology 
• use of wrong formulas or tables 
• unwarranted substitution of sample items 
• misappraisal of sample items 
• misinterpretation of results 
In one sense, the pilot test was a failure ( in that the statistical results were of 
unacceptable quality). But i n another sense, it was a success, i n that we were 
able to identify the most common errors likely i n audit sampling. W e then set 
out to eliminate these sources of error: 
• computation and mathematical errors were eliminated by relegating 
the math to the computer (which also eliminates the use of formulas 
and tables). 
• terminology problems were eliminated by switching from statistical 
estimation to hypothesis testing (confidence and precision were re­
placed by auditor specification of the degree of reliance on internal 
control and other substantive audit procedures and a measure of 
audit materiality; the confidence interval conclusion was replaced by 
a decision to accept the account balance as materially correct or adjust 
it to a balance that would be materially correct). 
However, three basic sources of error could not be designed out by these methods: 
• selection of a statistical method not suited to test objective (design 
error) 
• misappraisal of sample items 
• misinterpretation of results 
W e therefore designed quality control procedures to eliminate these sources of 
error, and trained a group of Statistical A u d i t Specialists (SASs) to administer 
these controls. 
A Quality Control Program 
SASs are selected from our professional audit staff based upon the following 
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criteria: candidates must be C P A ' s , have reached the supervising senior level 
(effectively at least three years of audit experience), have taken at least three 
courses in mathematics or statistics at the university level, and be rated as out­
standing auditors. These individuals are then trained in statistical auditing in 
a course taking 200 hours (100 hours advance preparation plus 100 hours i n 
the classroom). U p o n completion of this training, SASs are charged wi th imple­
menting and controlling the quality of statistical sampling applications. Each 
statistical application (both attribute and variables) must be approved by an 
S A S before it is executed (to guard against design error and assure that the 
planned test w i l l be efficient) and again after it has been completed (to evaluate 
the appraisal of sample data and to assure that the statistical conclusion is con­
sistent with the audit opinion). 
The combination of computerized statistical tools plus S A S review and ap­
proval has enabled us to virtually eliminate all types of error identified in our 
pilot testing efforts. Engagement post-inspection confirms that the incidence of 
nonsampling error on statistical tests is negligible. 
A l l auditing is required to be done under adequate supervision and review, 
and the application of quality controls should ameliorate the problem Felix 
describes. 
Concluding Comments 
Although statistical sampling may induce the behavioral problem noted by 
Felix, it must be remembered that statistical sampling may help overcome some 
other well known behavioral problems i n audit sampling. Persons familiar with 
the human information processing literature know that humans are not gen­
erally good as intuitive statisticians. First, they are not sensitive to the way i n 
which information content of a sample is related to sample size. Second, they 
tend to be conservative i n their revision of priors upon the arrival of sample 
information (i.e., they underreact to sample findings). Formal statistical models 
are explicit on these points and help the auditor avoid these information 
processing errors. 
Those responsible for audit policy invariably note yet another way i n which 
statistical sampling improves audit quality. The auditor who wishes to use 
statistical sampling invariably thinks more carefully about test objectives and 
usually designs a more efficient, effective test. 
In summary, Felix has noted one negative behavioral effect of statistical 
sampling. However, it must be remembered that there are several positive 
effects also, and the negative effect can and should be eliminated by adequate 
quality control. 
I w i l l refrain from commenting on the long case study i n Felix's paper be­
cause (1) it is of dubious relevance to the paper and (2) most practice today is 
considerably more sophisticated than that reflected i n the case study. 
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4 
Third Party Confirmation Requests: A New Approach 
Utilizing an Expanded Field 
Horton L. Sorkin* 
University of Kansas 
This study is concerned with modifying the confirmation format i n such 
a way that the probability of an error being detected by an external party and 
then being reported to the auditor is increased. O n the basis of five field studies 
of confirmation reliability, " . . . it is clear that the (confirmation) technique is 
far from perfect." 1 The unreliability associated with confirmations results in 
part from the tendency of recipients of confirmation requests to agree wi th the 
information contained in the request even when the information is erroneous. 
In this study, this tendency is defined as Type II error or say yes behavior. 
The main purpose of the study was directed at recipient error detection 
and reporting improvement, accomplished by restricting an external party's 
ability to concur wi th the information on a confirmation request when the 
audited organization's books are i n error. If say yes behavior is decreased and 
the recipient responds to the auditor's request, the detection rate of errors i n an 
entity's books should increase with the use of the confirmation format modifica­
tion that has been developed. 
Importance of the Study 
Since the auditor relies upon evidence to evaluate the accuracy of an entity's 
books, the auditor is necessarily concerned with the reliability of the evidence 
evaluated. The auditor is effective only if audit objectives are achieved. The 
auditor is efficient if the audit objectives are achieved with as little effort (cost) 
as possible. This study is concerned wi th the improvement of an auditing 
technique by increasing the reliability of the technique. If reliability can be 
increased, then the auditor w i l l be able to perform the audit task more effectively 
and efficiently. 2 
* This paper is based on a 1976 study for which primary financial support was furnished 
by the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Foundation and Northwest Bancorporation and a 1977 study 
for which primary funding came from Northwest Bancorporation. Both studies were also 
supported by the Twin Cities Chapter of the Institute of Internal Auditors, the International 
Institute of Internal Auditors, and the University of Minnesota. Individuals actively involved 
include Michael J. Barrett and Jack Gray of the University of Minnesota, Roger Carolus, 
Eugene Jackels, Charles Petry and, especially, Kenneth Meuwissen of Northwest Bancorpora-
tion. Virginia Sorkin's aid in data processing and analysis is acknowledged. 
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Reliability is defined as the degree to which audit evidence corresponds to 
an entity's books under the condition of accurate entity bookkeeping. If the 
entity's books are inaccurate, then reliable audit evidence should result i n the 
auditor becoming aware of the inaccuracy. For example, if the instrument that 
the auditor uses to collect evidence is 100 percent reliable and the auditor is 
totally competent, then the auditor w i l l be aware of all errors existing within the 
sample population. If, however, the instrument is only 20 percent reliable, the 
competent auditor would, on the average, be aware of only one-fifth of the 
errors within the sample population. 
The Expanded Fie ld 
A n y modification of the confirmation format that reduces the respondent's 
ability and eagerness to say yes should increase the confirmation technique's 
reliability i n the detection of discrepancies. There are two rationales suggesting 
that reliability w i l l increase. First, a respondent is encouraged to perform the 
comparison component of the task, detect errors, and note the discrepancy on 
the confirmation. Thus, the detection rate increases. Second, the say yes re­
cipient may decline to respond. In this case, the net detection rate w i l l increase 
by definition.* The positive confirmation request is unambiguous if a recipient 
desires to say yes because there is only one amount to be confirmed. By not 
taking exception, the say yes respondent indicates that the amount shown on 
the request is correct. One way to prevent say yes behavior is to make the con­
firmation ambiguous with respect to the account balance i n the audited entity's 
books. 
Exhibit 1 represents a confirmation format with added ambiguity. The 
current practice of including correct information i n the request may be main­
tained wi th this format. (Correct information is that which agrees with the 
entity's books.) One of the amounts on the request may be correct information. 
Those recipients who would say yes to a positive confirmation have a limited 
number of behaviors available when faced wi th a request such as that shown i n 
Exhibit 1. 
T h e recipients may refuse to respond, i n which case the Type II error for 
these recipients is reduced to zero if errors exist i n the entity's books. The zero 
error results since a Type II error only occurs i f the recipients confirm accounts 
that are incorrect, and by not responding they do not confirm. 
The recipients may correctly perform the task and their personal records 
may be correct. In this case, the Type II error is again reduced to zero because 
they would detect and notify the auditor if any discrepancy existed. A s a result, 
the net detection rate increases since the rate is a function of the number of 
detections. 
*Net detection rate is a function of detections divided by responses. If the number of 
say yes respondents become nonrespondents, mathematically the detection rate must increase 
if four conditions hold. The four conditions are that errors exist in the entity's books, that 
some recipients' records are correct, that some recipients have performed the task associated 
without error, and that some respondents advised the auditor of errors. The appendix to this 
paper describes measures (rates) used. 
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Exhibit 1 
E X P A N D E D F I E L D F O R M A T U S E D BY S T U D Y 
1. Compare the information shown below with your records for 
the date indicated. 
2. If none of the amounts agree with your records, please indicate 
the balance shown by your records. 
3. Please sign, date, and return this form directly to the auditor. 
A self addressed envelope has been provided for your convenience. 
* * * * T H I S IS N O T A R E Q U E S T F O R P A Y M E N T * * * * 
Comments: 
Account Number 00123456789 
Current balance as of Nov. 5, 1978 
*** circle the correct amount *** 
$3,763.82 $3,961.92 $4,160.02 
Another behavior is for the recipients to incorrectly perform the task and 
take exception due to poor task ability or their own inaccurate records. If the 
entity's books are correct, there is an increase i n Type I errors because a Type I 
error is an exception to a correct request. If the entity's books are incorrect, this 
behavior may result i n a reduced Type II error when the auditor uses alternative 
procedures to determine if the exception is proper. Enough evidence may be 
present i n either the reply or the entity's books for the auditor to conclude that an 
error exists. 
Yet another possibility is that recipients may guess and circle an amount, 
or purposefully circle an amount they consider to be favorable. If the entity's 
books are correct, this behavior results in an increase in Type I errors by definition. 
If the entity's books are incorrect and the amount that reflects the entity's incor­
rect books is randomly assigned to a position on the request (Exhibit 1), there 
is a probability that one-third of the time a Type II error w i l l occur since the 
respondent i n guessing may circle the amount that the auditor believes to be 
correct. 
By the very nature of Exhibit 1, the probability of randomly choosing the 
correct amount from the three choices is only one-third. If a recipient circles an 
amount other than the amount the auditor believes to be correct, whether the 
auditor is able to determine i f the entity's books are incorrect depends upon the 
effectiveness of the auditor's alternative procedures i n detecting errors. There­
fore, for this final case, the reduction of Type II errors is not determinant. For 
all these behavioral patterns of say yes confirmation recipients who are confronted 
with Exhibit 1, Type II errors are either reduced or at worst the same Type II 
error rate would prevail as would be expected with the use of the traditional 
positive confirmation request. 
The Exhibi t 1 format, which has been developed by the author, is called 
the expanded field confirmation, or expanded field, i n the remainder of this 
paper. The term expanded field is derived from the fact that the recipient has 
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a field of alternatives from which to choose.* For the positive or negative con­
firmation request there is only one signal (one amount) i n the recipient's de­
cision field, and the requested response is true/false or dichotomous. Compared 
to the positive or negative, the expanded field confirmation is a limited expansion 
of the number of signals (three) in the recipient's decision field. The requested 
response is polychotomous as the recipient may either agree with one of the 
three amounts or take exception to all three of the amounts by conceptually 
responding as if to a multiple choice test with the comments space as a fourth 
choice and representing "none of the below" (is correct). The term "expanded 
field" refers to this expansion of the number of signals in a confirmation request 
compared to the single signal of the traditional positive or negative form. 
The analysis of the recipient's response behavior is l imited. T h e question 
of the recipient's motivation and perception of confirmations has not been 
completely analyzed. W h y anyone responds correctly to a confirmation is com­
plex. Likewise, why anyone refuses to respond or why anyone performs the 
task erroneously is open to conjecture. The desirability of the expanded field 
is dependent, i n part, upon the validity of the assumption that say yes behavior 
exists, and also upon the validity of the assumption that say yes behavior can 
be converted into proper task performance behavior if the expanded field format 
is used. 
Experimental Methodology and Design 
The purpose of this study, as stated, has been to determine whether Type II 
error rates are reduced, and hence if confirmation reliability is increased when 
the expanded field confirmations are used by the auditor instead of positives or 
negatives. A Type II error can occur only when an entity's books are incorrect. 
T o test for Type II error, erroneous entity bookkeeping may be simulated by 
mail ing confirmations with misstated information. The recipient of such a 
confirmation request receives information believed to have been generated d i ­
rectly from the entity's books, and hence even if the entity's books are correct, 
an appearance of erroneous entity bookkeeping is transmitted to the recipient. 
Therefore, the methodology appropriate to experimentally measure the Type II 
error rates for various confirmation formats requires an organization to mail 
confirmations with deliberately misstated information, and then to analyze the 
responses.3 This is the methodology that was used i n this study. 
Table 1 is a summary of the experimental design used in the study com­
mencing with the mailing of 2,280 positive, negative, and expanded field con­
firmation requests on November 9, 1976, to debtors with installment loan ac­
counts with a large metropolitan bank. Prior to the printing of the requests, 
the total account population was randomized using a computer algorithm fur­
nished by James K . Loebbecke of Touche Ross and Company. Subsequent 
analyses of the accounts did not reject the hypothesis that the accounts were 
randomized. Thus, statistical analyses could be run that assumed randomization. 
* I would like to thank Professor Gordon B. Davis, of the University of Minnesota, who 
helped me provide the name by pointing out that I had "expanded the respondent's decision 
field." 
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Table 1 
E X P E R I M E N T A L D E S I G N 1 
Confirmation 
Type E r r o r 2 % Spread 3 
C e l l Sample 
Size 4 
Positive None 120 
Positive Small high .... 120 
Positive Large high .... 120 
Positive Small low .... 120 
Positive Large low .... 120 
Negative Small high .... 120 
Negative Large high .... 120 
Negative Small low .... 120 
Negative Large low .... 120 
Expanded field None 5 % 120 
Expanded field None 10% 120 
Expanded field Small high 5 % 120 
Expanded field Large high 5 % 120 
Expanded field Small low 5 % 120 
Expanded field Large low 5 % 120 
Expanded field Small high 10% 120 
Expanded field Large high 10% 120 
Expanded field Small low 10% 120 
Expanded field Large low 10% 120 
Total 2280 
1On all expanded field confirmation requests, the accounts are partitioned uniformly 
among the three decision points. 
2Small error is the smaller of 2% of the correct balance or $4.87. Large error is the 
smaller of 6% of the correct balance or $154.63. 
3% Spread is the distance between the amounts in the expanded decision field. For 
example, if the correct account balance was $100.00, the error was Large high, and the % 
Spread was 10%, the amounts in the expanded field confirmation would be either 
($100 X 6% = $106.00): $ 84.80 $ 95.40 $106.00 
or $ 95.40 $106.00 $116.60 
or $106.00 $116.60 $127.20 
4 Sample size is predicated upon a response rate of approximately 75%. Some uneven 
shrinkage of cell sizes occurs since duplicate accounts are not eliminated until the analysis 
stage of the study. 
A total of 1,917 accounts were suitable for the analysis of the results. The 
elimination of 363 accounts was due to 281 duplicate loans to the same person 
or household, 52 due to telephoned inquiries by recipients to the bank, and 30 
because of mai l delivery delays. 
Table 2 is the distribution of the outstanding loan balances of the accounts 
used in the study. The average balance was $3,565. 
A n average large error of $110.97 was included with 805 of the requests, and 
the remaining 811 discrepant requests were misstated by an average $4.80. The 
remaining 301 requests i n the study contained correct information. 
Because the major emphasis of the study was an attempt to determine if 
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Table 2 
DISTRIBUTION O F A C C O U N T B A L A N C E S 
Category Percent 
T o $200.00 2.2 
F r o m $200.01 to $500.00 7.5 
F r o m $500.01 to $1,000.00 12.9 
F r o m $1,000.01 to $2,000.00 22.6 
F r o m $2,000.01 to $5,000.00 36.6 
F r o m $5,000.01 to $10,000.00 12.1 
F r o m $10,000.01 to $20,000.00 5.0 
Over $20,000.01 1.1 
Total 100.00 
the error detection reliability of currently used confirmation formats could be 
improved, the field study attempted to follow currently used procedures. This 
consideration of current practice caused the study to follow a time sequence 
of a normal confirmation effort, and to use typical confirmation text material on 
the requests. Few restrictions were imposed on the study, and a complete cross 
section of normal installment loans was included except for a small group of 
commercial leasing accounts. 
Results 
Table 3 is the frequency data matrix for all formats, error treatments, and 
responses. Table 4 is the percentage rate data matrix derived from Table 3 
using the measures described i n the appendix to this paper. The statistical 
methodologies used included chi-square tests and hierarchical log-linear model­
ings of statistical significance. 4 It can be seen from Table 4 that gross and net 
Type II error rates are lower for expanded fields than for either positives or 
negatives. 
Gross Detection Rates. The gross detection rate is calculated by dividing the 
number of detections by the number of requests mailed. This rate is used to 
compare the three formats because it is generally assumed that negatives have a 
100 percent response rate and the negative nonresponders have verified the in ­
formation on the request. 
The most significant variable in the explanation of the differences in gross 
detection rates for the various experimental treatments i n Table 4 is the con­
firmation form. The expanded field is markedly superior to the positive, and 
the negative is the inferior format for error detection. 
T w o other variables are significant in the explanation of the gross detection 
rates. First, detection increases if a large rather than a small error is present, 
regardless of other variables, as is apparent in Table 4. A detection rate increase 
occurred for two of the three confirmation forms when a large rather than a 
small error was present. 
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The most important conclusion based on the results is that detection rate 
increases are explained by both the type of confirmation request and the direc­
tion of the error. W i t h reference to Table 4, this conclusion is primarily the 
result of the large increase in detection rates for the positive format when the 
direction of the error was high rather than low, regardless of the magnitude 
of the error. 
Net Detection Rates. The net detection rate is calculated by dividing the num­
ber of detections by the number of responses received. This rate is appropriate 
only for the comparison of the expanded field and positive formats because only 
these provide the auditor with response rates. 
Aga in , the most significant variable in explaining the results is the detection 
superiority of the expanded field compared to the positive. 
T w o other variables, however, are notable in the explanation of the data. 
First, regardless of the format, detection is affected by both the direction and 
magnitude of the error. For example, when the error is large high, the detection 
rate is expected to be larger for either format. Second, regardless of the direc­
tion of the error, the large error and the choice of the format affect detection. 
This result is largely due to large percentage increases i n detection wi th the 
positive when the error is large, although this is also true of the expanded field 
to a lesser extent. 
Response Rates. Response rates are important to the auditor. W h e n recipients 
of a positive or expanded field do not respond, the auditor may be forced to 
use costly alternative procedures to ascertain the accuracy of material non-
responder account balances and to increase sample size in other situations. If a 
significant difference in the response rates exists between two formats, ceteris 
paribus, then the format that results in a lower response rate is more expensive 
for the auditor to use. 
A s a result of statistical tests, the nul l hypothesis could not be rejected 
that there is no difference i n the response rates between the positive and expanded 
field formats. The major factor i n a descriptive sense was the high 84.4 percent 
response rate associated with the positive format for the large high error treat­
ment. Although statistically an 84.4 percent rate is not unexpected, it would 
be useful to determine whether the higher response rate for this treatment would 
recur in a replication of this study. 
Expanded Field Spread. A s explained in footnote 3 of Table 1, two different 
degrees of spread between the signals in the expanded field were included i n 
the study to ascertain the effect of varying the spread. The spread treatment 
created no significant difference in response or detection rates with the ex­
panded field. 
A Replication. Currently, data is being analyzed from a 1977 study run with 
an installment loan population i n a bank located several hundred miles from 
the site of the 1976 study discussed i n this paper. Tentative results from this 
current study support all the 1976 results. Addit ional variables are also being 
tested i n this new study. Table 5 summarizes the comparison of the two studies, 
experimental populations—a typical problem with empirical research. Whether 
69 
Table 5 
C O M P A R I S O N O F T W O S T U D I E S 
(Net detection rates) 
Expanded Fie ld Positive 
89% 4 5 % 
94% 43% 
Negative 
1976 
1977 
18% 
17% 
Conclusions 
The results of this field study should not be generalized beyond the specific 
these results w i l l hold for different populations is conjecture. This uncertainty 
points to the need for replications of the study. 
A t this time, the conceptual motivation for and the use of the expanded 
field format is unique to this study. A question exists as to whether results 
achieved i n this study are due to the novelty of the format, or whether the 
observed results w i l l persist over time. 
T o promote internal validity, the scope of the experimental treatments was 
limited. Perhaps the use of different levels of error treatments, format modifica­
tions, and different sequencing of events would lead to different results. 
Al though the appropriateness of statistical methodologies is usually subject 
to question i n a study of this type, the methodology used did not l imit the con­
clusions presented. The size of the experiment and the size of the differences 
that existed in the original analysis data matrix for various treatments would 
have resulted in the same conclusions with the use of almost any other statistical 
methodology. 
The results of this study indicate that the expanded field format is sig­
nificantly more reliable than either the positive or the negative format. T h e 
Type II error rates, whether gross or net, associated with the expanded field 
were a small fraction of the rates experienced with the use of the other two 
formats. ( O n the average, the gross Type II error rate for the expanded field 
was 19.3 percent of the positive rate and 9.7 percent of the negative rate. The 
average net Type II error rate was 20.1 percent of the positive rate and 12.9 
percent of the negative rate.) The detection ability of the expanded field was 
also superior to either the negative or the positive, regardless of the amount or 
direction of the error treatment. Even without the use of second requests, the 
expanded field was a significantly more reliable confirmation format than either 
of the other two formats. 
Possible Implications 
If the results of these two studies persist over other account populations in 
which the auditor uses confirmations to ascertain account balance accuracy, the 
following recommendations are offered: 
1. Because the cost structures of the positive and expanded field 
are similar, use of positives is discouraged. Even though the slightly 
higher Type I error rate experienced with expanded fields implies greater 
cost, this should be offset by the smaller sample sizes implied by the 
increased reliability of the expanded field format. 
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2. N o recommendations are offered concerning the negative con­
firmation form. The radically different cost structure of the negative 
vis-à-vis the expanded field imply the desirability of performing a 
benefit/cost study to resolve this issue. However, the results of these 
two studies and previous studies on confirmation reliability might bring 
into question the legal defensibility of evidence derived from the use 
of negatives.5 
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Appendix—Measures 
Measures are developed below to describe the study's results and to quantify 
those errors that may occur with the use of the confirmation technique. Exhibit 
A is used to derive these measures. The assumption is made that the information 
on the confirmation request sent to the recipient agrees wi th the entity's books 
since this is common auditing practice. However, as this study deliberately 
introduced errors into the requests, an entity wi th incorrect books is presumed 
to be simulated i n the study and therefore the results expected under such cir­
cumstances can be projected by the auditor. 
Exhibit A 
D E R I V A T I O N O F M E A S U R E S 
R E C I P I E N T B E H A V I O R 
E N T I T Y ' S B O O K S A R E 
C O R R E C T | I N C O R R E C T 
Does not respond A E 
Responds & refuses task B F 
Agrees with confirmation C G 
Correct about exception N o t possible H 
Incorrect about exception* D J 
* A recipient may take exception to a confirmation and the auditor may still conclude 
that the entity's books are not in error. For instance, a recipient may protest a penalty charge 
for a late payment on a loan and the charge is justified. 
Types of Errors w i t h the Expanded F ie ld . Three types of errors were found 
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to be possible with the introduction and use of the expanded field format. First, 
the information on the request may be correct, but the respondent may circle a 
wrong amount. If the entity's books are correct, the auditor, by the use of 
alternative procedures, may conclude that the entity is correct and the respondent 
i n error. Th is respondent behavior is defined as a Type I error i n Table 4 and 
may occur with any form of confirmation. 
Second, an error occurs when the information on the expanded field request 
and the entity's books are erroneous and the respondent circles the amount 
which is shown on the entity's books. This is defined as a verification, and is, 
therefore, a Type II error. This behavior is essentially the same as the behavior 
when a positive form is sent and the respondent "confirms" an incorrect amount. 
A unique type of error that may result from the expanded field format 
occurs when the entity's books are incorrect and the respondent circles one of 
the two amounts that the auditor knows does not reflect the entity's booked 
amount for the account. For purposes of this analysis, this circling of the wrong 
signal or amount is classified as a detection. The rationale for this classification 
is an assumption that the auditor w i l l , by alternative procedures, discover that 
the account is erroneously booked and hence detect the erroneous account. 
For positives and the expanded fields, the following measures are used for 
the analysis of Exhibit A : 
Response rate = ( C + D ) / ( A + C + D ) or 
( G + H + J )/(E + G + H + J) 
Gross Type I error rate = ( D ) / ( A + C + D ) 
Net Type I error rate = ( D ) / ( C + D ) 
Gross detection rate = ( H ) / ( E + G + H + J) 
Net Type II error rate = ( G + J ) / ( G + H + J) 
Gross detection rate = ( H ) / ( E + G + H + J) 
N e t detection rate = ( H ) / ( G + H + J) 
Task refusal rate = ( B ) / ( B + C + D ) or ( F ) / ( F + G + H + J) 
Since the response rate for negatives is assumed to be 100 percent, net and 
gross rates for any one measure are identical. For negatives, the following 
measures are used: 
Type II error rate = ( E + G + J )/(E + G + H + J) 
Detection rate = ( H ) / ( E + G + H + J) 
Task refusal rate = ( F ) / ( E + F + G + H + J) 
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Discussant's Response to 
Third Party Confirmation Requests: A New Approach 
Utilizing an Expanded Field 
William C. Dent 
Elmer Fox, Westheimer & C o . 
Being a commentator on a paper at a symposium such as Audi t ing Sym­
posium I V at the University of Kansas is an interesting and challenging oppor­
tunity. A commentator can be censorious, neutral, or supportive. Being neutral 
is not much fun. One can usually find a basis for the posture of a censor, but 
I believe one should not attempt to be censorious unless there is a basis for such 
a position, and I find none i n this paper. Therefore, my overall comments on 
D r . Sorkin's paper w i l l be supportive. 
I find the paper to be creative and innovative—an interesting and fascinating 
study. Sorkin's objective of increasing the reliability of the confirmation process 
is admirable, and I am pleased that he recognizes the cost/benefit relationship 
i n his paper. Too often in accounting research the cost/benefit relationship 
is ignored. 
Sorkin makes the statement, "If reliability can be increased, then the auditor 
w i l l be able to perform the audit task more effectively and efficiently." In a 
period of rising audit costs there are few who would disagree with the concept 
of more effective and efficient auditing. The question then is: Does the expanded 
field confirmation request provide more reliability to the third party confirmation 
process? D r . Sorkin's research suggests that the third party confirmation process 
is made more reliable through the use of the expanded field, but more research 
may be necessary as discussed later. 
Sorkin makes one statement in the paper that basically I do not agree w i t h : 
"The auditor relies upon evidence to evaluate the accuracy of an entity's 
books . . . " I would contend that the auditor relies upon evidence to corroborate 
the representations made i n the financial statements to support the auditor's 
opinion thereon. If the auditor intends to rely on internal accounting controls, 
the auditor must study and evaluate and test compliance wi th those controls. In 
testing compliance, the auditor w i l l gather evidence that the controls are operating 
and therefore can be relied on to produce accounting records that have no ma­
terial misstatement in them. The type of testing performed in D r . Sorkin's study, 
while not described as such, appears to be a form of attribute sampling to test 
compliance with accounting controls surrounding receivables and revenue. 
O n another point, i n my opinion it was unfortunate that both the populations 
sampled involved individuals. One population really should have been com­
mercial accounts. Further research might show a substantial difference i n results 
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with commercial accounts. Also, clients with commercial accounts might be 
more likely to object to the expanded field confirmation request i n that it could 
imply that the client is not sure of the balance to be confirmed. 
The statement that a nonresponse to a negative request is a confirmation is 
questionable. There must be consideration of the recipient who tosses the con­
firmation i n the wastebasket without any further thought—a possibility that 
exists with all types of negative confirmations. 
Was it significant that the "large h i g h " errors on positive confirmations had 
significantly higher response rates even though the Type II error rate was high? 
W h y ? Was the respondent attempting to select a balance more favorable to 
him? W e don't know. This area needs further research. It was also noted 
that the Type II error rate decreased as error increased. W h y ? Materiality? 
We don't know. 
In conclusion, the approach is innovative and forward thinking. However, 
research is needed involving commercial accounts receivable of different sized 
companies. Once this research has been performed and evaluated, more definitive 
conclusions can be drawn about expanded field third party confirmation requests. 
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Has the Accounting Profession Lost Control of Its Destiny? 
D. R. Carmichael* 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
No man of woman born, coward or 
brave can shun his destiny. 
— H o m e r 
W h e n H o w a r d Stettler asked me to write about whether the accounting 
profession has lost control of its destiny I accepted because I was interested i n 
the answer. L i k e many others who are essentially in the business of putting 
words on paper, I don't know what I believe until I write it. However, the 
answer proved more elusive than I anticipated. 
In a sense, no man controls his destiny. In this sense, the question is loaded 
because the idea of a destiny presumes predetermination. According to Webster's, 
destiny means either something to which a person or thing is destined or a 
predetermined course of events often held to be a resistless power or agency. 
Synonyms are fortune and fate. However, I think the question contemplates a 
related word—destination. The relevant questions are: Where are we going 
and who's in charge of the trip? 
H o w D o We K n o w Where We're Going? 
A logical starting point would seem to be a prediction of where the ac­
counting profession is headed. However, man has not been too successful i n 
predicting. Most predictions are merely extrapolations of present trends. W e 
cannot know what future accidents, catastrophes, or personalities may alter those 
trends. A s a result, predictions often tell us more about the present than the 
future. For example, consider these predictions from the year 1876.1 
• Poor penmanship and writer's cramp no longer impede personal cor­
respondence thanks to the advent of the home linotype. 
• Malodorous footwear w i l l never again upset social gatherings or com­
munity affairs as gentlemen of the next century sport pasteurized 
spats and gaiters. 
• Gone are the days of the "Three R's . " Boys and girls of the future 
must now be drilled i n the "Five R's"—Reading, Wr i t ing , Trans-
*The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Brian Zell of the AICPA staff and 
to point out that the opinions expressed are the author's views and do not necessarily repre-
sent the views of the AICPA or other members of its staff. 
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mitting, Receiving, and Arithmetic—as Morse's code replaces the 
alphabet. 
• Housewives and domestics are no longer confronted with the every­
day dangers of flying porcelain shards and glass splinters as beautiful 
and unbreakable vulcanized dishes grace the finest tables. 
• The w i n d may blow and the hail may fall, but Americans of the future 
are comfortable and secure i n their prefabricated, mailorder, cast iron 
outbuildings. 
Predictors of 1899 were no more successful.2 This is how they expected events 
to unfold. 
1923—Steam powered Victrolas bring culture to a l l ! 
1963—100 mile-an-hour express trains whisk passengers from coast to 
coast i n complete comfort! 
1975—Price of next day mail service from N e w Y o r k to Washington 
reduced to ½¢! 
One could go on and on citing predictions of future developments, such as 
the bank-by-wireless craze of the Twenties, that have somehow gone awry. So, 
rather than trying to predict the destination of the accounting profession, I w i l l 
try to identify the trends that seem to be guiding the accounting profession in 
a particular direction. 
The Accounting Profession i n the Age of Consumerism 
N o t long ago accountants were looked on with derision, if at al l . The 
Hol lywood image of accountants was typified by the likes of Frankl in Pangborn 
and A r n o l d Stang. Accountants were the butt of several jokes. 3 Efforts to raise 
the public's awareness of accountants were largely unsuccessful. W h o can 
remember that W o r l d W a r II slogan, "Pencils for Peace"? 
Those days are gone. Accountants have been thrust into the public lime­
light. Hardly a month goes by that a major newspaper or magazine does not 
mention accountants. The accounting profession is under the scrutiny of both 
houses of Congress and the Federal Trade Commission. In colleges and univer­
sities across the country, eager students in record numbers have been signing 
up for accounting courses, wi th the apparent approval of their parents. What is 
it about accounting that caused this boom i n popularity? In a word, accounting 
acquired "glamour." 
Glamour has its price, however. The increase in public awareness of in­
dependent auditors (as one segment of accounting) has sometimes caused em­
barrassment and has brought independent auditors in contact with the forces 
of consumerism. 
Consumerism, of course, is not a new phenomenon. One author notes, 
"For centuries religious and social philosophers classified the businessman as a 
quasi c r imina l . " 4 However, recently the cause of consumerism has been trans­
lated into legislative proposals, such as the recently defeated proposal for a 
Consumer Protection Agency, which have been scarce since the N e w Deal legis­
lation of the 1930's. 
Consumerism w i l l have its ups and downs, but the movement w i l l have 
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a long-term effect on all institutions i n our society. N o w that public attention is 
focused on the social function that independent auditors perform, the accounting 
profession is bound to be affected by current social trends. 
The Tortuous Fruits of Consumerism 
Consumerism has had a profound influence on the courts. The current 
theory of torts seems to be that when someone is injured, someone else is to 
blame. The associated factor of "bad l u c k " is not defined in Black's Law 
Dictionary; however, one author has observed: 
T w o attitudes characteristic of our affluent society have exerted increas­
ing pressure upon tort and compensation law. The first is intolerance 
of bad luck, to the extent that its victims are thought not only to need 
but to deserve compensation. The second is a belief that where the 
technology to prevent accidents or cure or prevent disease exists, it 
should be used. 5 
The clearest indication of this trend is i n the area of product liability. N o t 
long ago, product liability was based on concepts of warranties and negligence, 
and the rules for determining breach of warranty or negligence were relatively 
specific. Sometimes, however, the burden of meeting those specific tests pre­
vented injured parties from collecting damages. Some courts found this offensive 
to social justice. They felt injured parties could and should be compensated by 
the market place, and the concept of strict liability has gained considerable favor. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines strict liability as— 
Liability without fault. Case is one of "strict l iabil i ty" when neither 
care nor negligence, neither good nor bad faith, neither knowledge nor 
ignorance w i l l save the defendant. 
Cost spreading is the theory behind strict liability. Manufacturers w i l l be 
liable for damages caused by their products; the burden of damages can be 
spread among manufacturers by insurance; and the cost, i n turn, can be passed 
on to consumers i n general through higher prices. For example, this theory was 
applied to the auditor's liability i n the Rusch Factors case: 
W h y should an innocent party be forced to carry the weighty burden 
of an accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more 
easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting 
profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against risk on to its 
customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming 
publ ic? 6 
However, the theory of product liability is a questionable analogy for the 
practice of independent auditing. Product liability has generally applied to sales 
of goods resulting i n physical harm. Public accounting involves the sale of a 
professional service that rarely has resulted i n physical harm. Nevertheless, this 
distinction has not been impenetrable to those bent on recovering damages. 
The distinctions between the sale of a good and the sale of a service, be­
tween a professional service and a nonprofessional service, between physical 
harm and economic harm are not discrete, and, if these subjective boundaries 
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seem to lead to inequities, the courts may disregard them. For example, the 
distinction between goods and services has been challenged as follows: 
Certainly there is no triumph of logic i n the present state of the law 
under which a patient injured by a defective instrument used i n surgery 
performed on h i m may be unable to employ strict liability, while a 
person purchasing an article at the hospital gift shop is able to hold the 
hospital strictly liable. 7 
The physical harm test has been disregarded in several cases, most notably Union 
Oil Co. v. Oppen, which involved fishermen's claims for lost profits arising 
from a negligent o i l spil l . The court substituted a test of "reasonable foreseeabil-
i ty " for determining compensation for economic losses.8 
Negligence is No Excuse 
The Hochfelder decision put a damper on some of the more adventurous 
interpretations of the auditor's liability under the SEC's Rule 10b-5; for example, 
the highly subjective "flexible standard" applied i n White v. Abrams. Some 
saw the Hochfelder decision as affirming the traditional common law principles 
of f raud. 9 But others have seen Hochfelder as taking away the right of investors 
to recovery, and they have suggested that the Hochfelder decision be overturned 
by legislation. The report of the Metcalf subcommittee stated: 
The subcommittee believes that independent auditors of publicly owned 
corporations should be liable for their negligence to private parties who 
suffer damages as a result. 1 0 
Also, the American L a w Institute's proposal to restate the securities laws is 
expected to be presented to Congress i n the near future. The provisions of the 
A L I ' s securities code on liability seem to be based more on a study of past and 
present regulations rather than any fundamental rethinking of the auditor's role 
i n securities markets. 1 1 If Congress does take up this project, modification of 
the effect of the Hochfelder decision is likely. 
Negligence Blurs Culpability and Care 
T o compound the difficulties, the concept of negligence is being altered i n 
the courts. Negligence i n professional services has usually been defined i n terms 
of the standards or customs of the profession. T o practicing professionals, this 
would seem a reasonable basis for evaluating the adequacy of performance, both 
during the engagement and i n hindsight. Some courts, however, disregard 
professional standards i n determining liability. 
In accounting, the most notable decision disregarding professional standards 
is Herzfeld, where the court stated: 
M u c h has been said by the parties about generally accepted accounting 
principles and the proper way for an accountant to report real estate 
transactions. W e think this misses the point. O u r inquiry is properly 
focused not on whether L K H & H ' s report satisfies esoteric accounting 
norms, comprehensible only to initiate, but whether the report fairly 
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presents the true financial position . . . to the untutored eye of an 
ordinary investor. 1 2 
The Herzfeld decision has a counterpart i n the medical profession i n Helling 
v. Carey. In that case, the Supreme Court of Washington held an ophthalmologist 
negligent for fail ing to test a patient for glaucoma even though there was un-
controverted testimony that the custom was to not test patients such as the 
plaintiff because at his age the disease rarely appears. In finding the doctor 
negligent, the court indicated that the glaucoma test was harmless, reliable, and 
inexpensive; however, one commentator noted: 
None of these assumptions may be accurate. The test is not always a 
reliable indicator of the presence of glaucoma, and it may cause injury 
to the eye. A n d it is inexpensive only when viewed i n isolation. T h e 
test for glaucoma is only one of what is no doubt a large number of 
diagnostic tests which the medical profession does not administer unless 
special circumstances indicate that they should be . 1 3 
One can imagine the risks auditors would face if they were held liable for 
omitting uncustomary but inexpensive audit tests. 
The Helling v. Carey decision apparently caused considerable outrage, and 
the State of Washington overturned the ruling by legislation. Apparently, the 
prospect of lawyers and judges establishing appropriate medical practice was 
unsatisfactory. Accounting may be viewed differently. Many accounting con­
cepts, such as income, have counterparts in everyday life, and it is difficult for 
nonaccountants to understand why financial statements should be so complex. 
If professional standards are disregarded as a basis for determining liability, 
what standard is to be applied? One author speculates: 
Careful attention might well be given the view . . . that strict liability, 
even to professions, might be imposed where the recipient's reasonable 
expectations as to quality of service are not met, causing h i m detriment. 1 4 
Determining "reasonableness" i n an accounting case may be highly subjective. 
Several factors make judicial determinations of reasonableness difficult: 
(1) the evaluation of a particular defendant's conduct may require an 
unusually complex, highly technical analysis; (2) the parties may be 
in a special relationship which must be taken into account by modifying 
the duties each owes to the other; and (3) practical considerations may 
compel courts to place limits upon the extent of potential liability for 
certain types of conduct. 1 5 
Each of these factors can apply and has applied to audit engagements. 
If reasonableness becomes an unworkable standard, it too may be eliminated. 
One author states: 
Eventually, of course, all references to reasonableness may be removed 
from tort law, and liability may be strictly imposed merely on the basis 
of causation, with no fault standard, no required deviation from a 
n o r m . 1 6 
I 'm sure he d id not intend to imply that all reasonableness would be removed 
from tort law, but that is the inference of another observer: 
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W e are rapidly approaching the day when liability w i l l be determined 
routinely on a case by case, "under all the circumstances" basis, wi th 
decision makers (other juries) guided only by the broadest of general 
principles. W h e n that day arrives, the retreat from the rules of law 
w i l l be complete, principled decision w i l l have been replaced with de­
cision by w h i m , and the common law of negligence w i l l have been de­
generated into an unjustifiably inefficient, thinly disguised lottery. 1 7 
W h e n the chaos of such a judicial system has become apparent, nonjudicial 
solutions w i l l have to be considered. That k i n d of situation has given us no-fault 
auto insurance, which seems unsatisfactory to just about everyone. Similar 
solutions have been proposed for other types of malpractice liability. 
Charting a Course against the Current 
I do not mean to project a dismal or catastrophic view of the future of legal 
liability. The accounting profession has survived past changes and w i l l survive 
future changes even though litigation may become more vexatious and torts 
become more tortuous. 
If the profession is not to be swept away with the current change in legal 
liability, perhaps we should worry less about what liability has been or w i l l be 
and more about what it should be. 
Although the court i n Hochfelder did not address the question of whether 
a reckless disregard of the truth constitutes intentional conduct, it does not 
seem unreasonable that independent auditors should be held liable to third 
parties for such recklessness. 
Accountants who gullibly accept transparently fishy explanations from 
their clients of an obviously suspicious transaction are liable under 
10b-5, no matter what their mental state. 1 8 
Current research on the effect of information on the securities markets seems 
to indicate that for the general investor, reliance on the financial statements may 
not be a relevant prerequisite to recovery. According to one's interpretation, 
financial statements are not, cannot, or should not be used in any direct way 
i n making investment decisions. However, based on an analysis of the efficient 
market hypothesis, Anderson concludes that an auditor perhaps should be liable 
to a narrow class of investors. 1 9 
The extent to which the auditor's liability has developed on a case-by-case 
basis is indicative of the lack of a clear conception in the law of the auditor's 
responsibilities. Auditors and the public would benefit i f more specific standards 
of conduct were established before the fact. Independent auditors need some 
confidence that the appropriateness of their conduct can be measured in advance 
of making difficult audit judgments. 
What is needed is a thorough reexamination of the role and responsibilities 
of professionals under the securities laws. First, the role of experts should be 
examined more closely. Under the securities laws, five groups are subject to 
liability: (1) issuers, (2) directors, (3) corporate executives, (4) experts, and 
(5) underwriters. A n expert is anyone whose profession gives authority to a 
statement made by h i m . However, as the administration of the securities laws 
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has developed, the independent auditor and, to a much lesser extent, the securities 
lawyer have been the experts subjected to liability. Today, the security analyst, 
the portfolio manager, and the investment advisor play as significant a role i n 
the securities markets as the independent auditor and the securities lawyer, but 
this role remains largely unrecognized i n the established framework for allocating 
liability. 
Also desirable would be recognition by securities laws of the need for a 
rational connection between the fault of an expert and recoverable losses. This 
subject has been approached simplistically as a choice between requiring an i n ­
vestor to prove reliance on an expert's work and eliminating the reliance require­
ment because the expert's work is presumably reflected i n the market price. 
This dichotomy ignores the social effect of removing all the burden from the 
investor of demonstrating a l ink between market price and the expert's work. 
The result is that experts, primarily independent auditors, have sometimes been 
cast as insurers against the investment risk of loss. 
Nearly any major securities loss opens the auditor's performance to second 
guessing and hindsight. Thus, before Hochfelder, plaintiff's counsel had only 
to create a material issue of fact as to an omission or a statement that turned out, 
with hindsight, to have been imprecise to subject an independent auditor to 
potential liability. 
Securities are not the same as products intended for immediate consumption. 
Securities are purchased to be held at risk with the expectation of future gain, 
but the potential of future loss. A system that causes experts to reimburse losses 
but not share i n any gain is unreasonable unless the expert's culpability i n the 
loss is clearly demonstrated. A negligence standard that amounts to strict liability 
for professional services, inappropriately makes the auditor an insurer of in­
vestment risk. 
Further, the legislative pressure for a negligence standard makes develop­
ment of an equitable alternative imperative. What I suggest is that culpability 
be measured by a recklessness standard and that performance be measured by 
professional standards. T o be acceptable, this framework would require stringent 
adherence to the public interest in the development of standards. Professional 
standards should be subjected to a rigorous "reasonableness" test in the develop­
ment process rather than subjecting performance to such a test with hindsight 
and i n disregard of professional standards. 
Standards—Who's i n Charge Anyway? 
What can the accounting profession do if other courts go along wi th the 
thinking of the Herzfeld decision and disregard professional standards i n favor 
of a reasonableness approach? 
One thing that can be done is to keep a watchful eye on court decisions 
and adapt professional standards accordingly. For example, the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities recommended that the auditor evaluate the "cumulative 
effect of management's judgment i n the presentation of financial statements." 
The Commission stated: 
This is the only position consistent with the views expressed by regu-
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latory agencies and the courts that auditors have an obligation to go 
beyond determining technical compliance with specific accounting 
principles and to evaluate the overall presentation of earnings and 
financial position in the financial statements. 2 0 
The responsiveness of professional standards to litigation goes back at least to 
the first A I C P A auditing pronouncement S A P N o . 1 (October 1939), " E x ­
tensions of A u d i t i n g Procedure," which resulted from the McKesson & Robbins 
case. Being in the position of playing catch-up is not, however, satisfactory. 
Another possibility which has been discussed much in certain circles is to 
have the government set standards. Some, including Representative Moss, have 
argued that the S E C should directly set accounting and auditing standards. The 
reasoning behind this position is that the S E C was given authority to set 
standards by the securities acts, and that authority should be exercised. Perhaps 
the courts would be less inclined to find fault wi th federal regulations than w i t h 
professional standards. However, regulations have several disadvantages com­
pared to professional standards. Searching for loopholes is unfortunately a 
practice that is fostered by detailed regulation. For this reason, and several 
others, professions have traditionally been expected to set their own standards. 
This subject has been considered at length by the Commission on Auditors ' 
Responsibilities and I won't repeat that discussion here except to note the large 
role already played by the S E C i n standard setting. 
The S E C has been far from idle i n the area of accounting and auditing 
standards. It has many and none-too-subtle ways of communicating its positions 
to the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the A u d i t i n g Standards Ex­
ecutive Committee. The report of the Commission on Auditors ' Responsibilities 
chronicles the actions by the S E C i n the development of auditing standards on 
the review of interim information. 2 1 More recently, the SEC's disapproval 
stopped short the proposal to eliminate the auditor's qualified opinion on 
uncertainties. 
The S E C has been adept at handling political pressure and exercising 
selectivity in directing the setting of accounting and auditing standards. A t the 
moment, however, the S E C is facing a serious test wi th the accounting standards 
on o i l and gas. It has held hearings to determine if the F A S B has made the 
correct choice from among alternative accounting principles. The oi l and gas 
standards have also sparked a new-found interest i n accounting standards by the 
Department of Energy, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Justice Depart­
ment. There is the danger that political pressure may cause the S E C or Congress 
to endorse alternative accounting principles for similar circumstances. A s un­
desirable as that would be from the standpoint of improving accounting 
standards, it still amounts to no more than selective overriding of the standard 
setting process for accounting and not a takeover. 
However, there is a much greater danger that the auditing standard setting 
process w i l l be swept up in a more general takeover of the regulation of auditing 
practice. 
Unbridled Regulation 
Prospects for the regulation of the public accounting profession are fluid 
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at the moment. Representative Moss has indicated he may introduce legislation 
i n this Congress, but it is uncertain how much support such a measure would 
have. Pressure has been placed on the S E C to increase its oversight of the ac­
counting profession, and the Commission w i l l be reporting to Congress this July 
on the extent of the A I C P A ' s progress in self-regulation. 
Recently, Senator Eagleton sent a questionnaire to each of the national 
accounting firms, the C A S B , the F A S B , the A I C P A , and the S E C . Senator 
Eagleton is the chairman of the subcommittee that has assumed the responsi­
bilities of Senator Metcalf's subcommittee since his untimely death. The re­
quest to the A I C P A has over fifty questions on the A I C P A ' s progress on the 
recommendations made by the Metcalf subcommittee. 
Fol lowing the SEC's report i n July, new hearings may be held i n both 
houses of Congress to evaluate the need for federal legislation to regulate the 
accounting profession. 
Consumers, for whose benefit such regulation is proposed, are ill-defined. 
As far as the effect of accounting data is concerned, we are all consumers. Since 
the consumer movement has no well developed goals, no unified organization, 
and no program of action, future developments may depend largely on historical 
accident. If another Penn Central or Equity Funding surfaces, support for 
federal regulation could crystallize quickly. 
James Q . Wilson described several scenarios by which regulation is initiated. 
It is interesting to compare his description of the process to recent events af­
fecting the accounting profession. Wilson offers the following description of 
the process when the benefits of regulation are diffuse and the costs of regula­
tion are relatively concentrated, which seems to be the relevant reference for 
regulation of the accounting profession: 
Regulatory proposals emerging from this process are likely to have 
certain distinctive features. First, i n order to ensure vital publicity and 
develop political momentum in the competition for attention i n and 
around Congress, the bills w i l l focus attention on an " e v i l , " personified 
if possible i n a corporation, industry, or victim. Second the proposal 
w i l l be "strong"—that is, there w i l l be little incentive i n the develop­
mental process to accommodate conflicting interests and thus little in ­
centive to find a politically acceptable formula which al l affected parties 
can live wi th . ( T o compromise the proposal would be to sacrifice the 
capacity of the bil l to mobilize support by its moralistic appeal.) T h i r d , 
though few substantive bargains w i l l be struck, many procedural ones 
w i l l , especially ones that recognize the central structural fact of the 
American Congress—namely, that it is a federal institution based on 
state and district representation. Concessions w i l l often be made to 
recognize existing state programs or to provide incentives for states to 
develop new programs. Finally, the proposed solutions to the prob­
lematic business practice w i l l be shaped as much by the political process 
by which the proposal is generated as by an analysis of the problem 
itself. 2 2 
The first step has happened. The shortcomings of independent auditors 
have been chronicled i n recent Congressional hearings and reports. Emphasis 
has been placed on a few spectacular corporate failures and the more widespread 
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illegal payments problem. Little attention has been given to the cost effectiveness 
of audits extensive enough to seriously reduce these problems. Bob Cratchitt has 
become M r . Scrooge. 
It is doubtful that many members of Congress are now greatly concerned 
about the regulation of the accounting profession. W h e n the securities acts were 
enacted i n 1933 and 1934, Congress showed little familiarity wi th and less interest 
i n the profession. This condition has carried over somewhat into the present. 
For example, consider this exchange i n the House of Representatives concerning 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: 
Rep. 1: W i l l the gentleman please explain briefly the changes that the 
Senate suggested. 
Rep. 2: The Senate added a provision which would have required 
U.S . corporations which file wi th the S E C to keep accurate 
books and records, and so forth, and we accepted that. W e 
made two minor changes that had to go with it, that had to 
satisfy the accountants. There was some question about some 
of the things that they were perturbed about. W e removed 
those and the section that had to do with that. Then we took 
section 2 of the Senate b i l l , the complete section, which ex­
panded the disclosure requirements presently applicable to 
investors i n equity securities, particularly as those require­
ments affect the disclosure of foreign investments in the United 
States. Those are the principal changes. 
Rep. 1: I thank the gentleman. 2 3 
Federal regulation of the accounting profession might have appeal to some 
auditors. For example, i n the extreme case of a corps of federal auditors, some 
practicing auditors might be attracted by less overtime, better pensions, and 
increased job security. Also, as a federal employee, an auditor would generally 
be immune to litigation. 
Perhaps the greater danger is not that auditors would suffer under federal 
regulation, but that auditors might come to like and depend on regulation. 
Such an occurrence is not unheard of; i t has happened to varying extents i n the 
trucking industry, television broadcasting, and the merchant marine. It is 
sometimes hard to tell who is regulating whom. 
Recently there has been considerable discussion concerning what some see 
as a trend toward two tiers in the profession—firms with S E C registered clients 
and firms without S E C registered clients. If there is such a trend, ft is because 
of the more extensive regulation of S E C registrants. This arises both from 
direct regulation by the S E C and from pressure on the profession to establish 
more stringent standards suitable for S E C registrants. Federal regulation of the 
profession could exacerbate this trend, and more extensive regulations for S E C 
registrants have a habit of carrying over to audits of private companies. One 
author describes the effects of increasing regulation on the availability of services: 
A related consequence of business " reform" is the elimination of poor 
man's goods. The second-hand items, the economy models, the stripped-
down items are almost always the ones which turn out to be unsafe 
(or at least uninspected), or which fall short of some arbitrary standard 
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of this or that costly desideratum. The Model T and the Volkswagen 
fall under suspicion, but the market is made safe for Cadillacs, armored 
cars, and Sherman tanks . 2 4 
This danger has been recognized i n discussions of federal regulation of 
the accounting profession, but there are no substantive guarantees that federal 
regulation w i l l not inflict needless costs on smaller C P A firms and their clients. 
However, it is well to remember Wilson's analysis that the legislative solu­
tion w i l l be shaped as much by the political process as by an analysis of the 
problem to be resolved. The introduction to the report of the Metcalf subcom­
mittee suggests the criteria against which the need for legislation w i l l be tested. 
There are two basic tenets i n today's environment that seem necessary 
for government and business leaders to follow if they are to regain 
public confidence. The first is avoidance of real or apparent conflicts 
of interest i n the performance of their duties. The second is a policy of 
openness which permits the public to satisfy itself that leaders i n our 
society are acting properly. Government officials have taken substantial 
steps to implement these two basic tenets. Business leaders are moving 
i n that direction, and it is i n this light that independent auditors 
w i l l be judged. 2 5 
For the accounting profession these two tenets can be translated into the 
following tests. 
• Reinforce the independence of the audit function by imposing mean­
ingful restrictions on the scope of management services and by re­
structuring the relationship of auditors and managements by inter­
posing an independent audit committee. 
• Improving the setting of professional standards and the enforcement 
of those standards by opening the process to public scrutiny and by 
increasing responsiveness to the public interest. 
Efforts are being made by the accounting profession to achieve these goals, but 
the evaluation of progress is clearly in the political arena. 
W e l l , Where A r e We Going? 
M y mission was to provide an answer to H o w a r d Stettler's searching ques­
t ion: Has the accounting profession lost control of its destiny? I took this to 
mean: Where is the accounting profession going and who is i n charge of the 
trip? M y answer focuses on three primary indicators of the status of the ac­
counting profession: 
• The legal liability of independent auditors. 
• The authority to set professional standards. 
• The extent of federal regulation of the accounting profession. 
A n y one of these indicators would require more than a short paper for thorough 
analysis. However, I hope my analysis is sufficient to point to an answer to the 
basic question. 
The accounting profession does not control its status i n any of the three 
areas. Control is shared with the courts, the S E C , Congress, and the undercurrent 
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of consumerism i n society. Thus, the ability of the accounting profession to 
influence its destination i n all three areas depends on its ability to convince those 
with whom it shares control that it can be trusted to act in the public interest. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Has the Accounting Profession Lost Control of Its Destiny? 
K. S. Gunning 
Thome Riddell & Co. 
I deem it a privilege to be invited to your country to offer my views on 
the paper presented to you by such a distinguished member of our profession, 
and one, to boot, whose career has sprung from the fruitful wellsprings of 
academia. 
Accordingly, I felt it incumbent on me to commence my remarks, as Doug 
did his paper, with some stirring and prophetic quotation from Homer or 
someone of equal relevance, having to do with destiny, or self-control, or 
professionalism. 
After diligent search, I felt that I, standing here as a foreigner from the 
north, could do no better than to read to you the words that Representative 
H i r a m Bell of Ohio said of my native land to your U.S . House of Representatives 
on January 10, 1853: 
But, sir, there is a country and there is a people competent for self-
government, that are prepared to take upon themselves the responsibilities 
of free men, and which we may find for our interest to receive among 
us—I mean peaceably—and allow them to become a part and parcel of 
this country, and I care not how soon. I refer, M r . Chairman, to the 
whole British possessions upon the north, containing an area of two 
millions, two hundred and fifty-two thousand, three hundred and ninety-
five square miles. That is something worth looking at . . . The ac­
complishment of that object peacefully w i l l strengthen this Union , and 
add to its power and influence. The annexation of that territory to this 
U n i o n (to use terms of gentlemen) Destiny has ordained, and it w i l l ere 
long take place. 
A s Doug observed, man has not always been too successful i n peering into 
the future, and I certainly don't intend to offer any comment on H i r a m Bell's 
vision, even after 125 years; especially with what's going on in our country 
right now! 
Anyway, enough of nothing, and let us consider Doug's most interesting 
and thoughtful paper. 
There's been a great deal of ink spilled lately on the general theme of this 
paper—some i n sorrow, some in anger, a lot i n error. But little of the outpouring 
has considered our collective "destiny"—and, like D o u g I think, I had a bit of 
trouble wi th the question posed. It's perhaps a bit like the old "have you 
stopped beating your wife yet?" angle—and maybe its better to answer "I never 
d i d " than get nailed for a simple yes or no. 
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Doug, I thought, was pretty agile in that regard, rephrasing the question 
wi th fine editorial license to read "Where are we going and who's in charge 
of the t r i p ? " 
The Role of the Accounting Profession 
Personally I very much doubt that the accounting profession ever had 
control of its destiny i n the first place. I subscribe to the views of the Cohen 
Commission re-echoed by our Adams Committee report in Canada and repeated 
by many, that the accounting arm of our profession has a primary responsibility 
for the preparation of realistic, meaningful and consistent financial reports to 
enable sensible decision making by others. The auditing arm fills the role of 
an independent and expert intermediary offering a reasonable degree of assurance 
to readers of those reports that they are free from error, omission, or bias. 
Fundamentally, that's what I take to be the role of the accounting profes­
sion, broadly speaking, and that's what I would call its destiny. If you like, 
that's where we are going, and if we don't like that particular destination, well , 
we had better get off the train at the next stop, because that's where the tracks 
seem to lead. 
O u r profession should recognize, however, that this role is no God-given 
right. W e happen to fill a key function in the capital formation process of our 
free enterprise system, a system which still seeks (with less and less success as 
the years go by) to operate as far as is possible without direct government inter­
vention. But if we prove ourselves unable to command the respect and confidence 
of society, obviously our profession w i l l no longer serve a useful purpose and 
our destiny w i l l be the dustbin. T h e "accountants report" that inappropriately 
graced the cover of a national business magazine in March 1977 had more 
significance than just as a bad joke. 
The voices that sound these critical sentiments are today heard loud and 
clear. In this age of consumerism and the rights of the little man, when profit 
becomes a dirty word, when successful businessmen are categorized as " w e l l 
manicured hoodlums," it is not surprising to find outspoken critics of the pro­
fession building a political or academic career based on that thesis. But these 
shrill voices are not new; nor is the burden of their song. Consider George 
Bernard Shaw's often quoted condemnation of the professions as a "conspiracy 
against the laity." It is little wonder that today accountants face hostile and 
militant critics who loudly call for government takeover of the responsibilities 
which have been left to our profession. 
A Common Problem 
Doug's paper infers but does not develop the fact that our profession is far 
from alone in this problem. The medical profession has been subject to mounting 
public criticism and gradual government takeover for years and in many 
countries. The National Society of Professional Engineers was held, i n a 
unanimous U . S . Supreme Court ruling last month, to have violated federal 
anti-trust law through their ban on competitive price bidding. Even the lawyers 
themselves, the draftsmen of the rules of the game, had their m i n i m u m fee 
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schedules outlawed in the U . S . A . i n 1975. W i t h these changes, observed the 
Wall Street Journal recently, " . . . the distinction between professions and 
businesses that engage i n anti-competitive behaviour has become almost 
imperceptible." 
N o r is the situation unique in the U . S . A . , which I note is the sole con­
sideration of Doug's paper. In the United K i n g d o m , chartered accountants 
have for centuries been one of the hallmarks of respectability. Today, just as 
a small sampling, three separate English chartered accountants, knights or lords 
al l , act as chairmen respectively of the Association of British Chambers of 
Commerce, the Royal Commission on the Legal Profession and Legal Services, 
and the Review Board for Government Contracts. The British accounting pro­
fession has over the past century and more gained a position of social respect 
and prestige unmatched certainly i n N o r t h America and probably anywhere else. 
A n d yet suddenly i n the past few years it finds itself i n a most unaccustomed 
position of division, distrust and even derision. It too has been rocked by audit 
failures; criticized for lack of independence, standards, and failure to enforce 
standards or uncover fraud; badly split through a successful revolt of the mem­
bership, led by two small practitioners, against the imposition of a current cost 
accounting standard. Professor Eddie Stamp, the stormy petrel of the U . K . 
profession, derides its posture on foreign currency translation as being "reminis­
cent of that of the donkey who starved to death because of his inability to choose 
between two bales of hay," and describes the British profession's development 
of auditing standards as the crowning ineptitude of its catalogue of failure. 
(Makes M r . Briloff sound a bit tame, right?) But in fairness to Professor 
Stamp, and i n contrast to M r . Briloff, Eddie Stamp is a staunch supporter for 
self-control of the profession, and ends his article ( in the Financial Times of 
December 14, 1977) with a ringing call (and I quote) ". . . for the profession 
to put its house in order quickly—before the case for government regulation 
becomes unanswerable." 
The Situation in Canada 
In Canada, for whatever interest it may be to you, we somehow seem to 
have retained a reasonable degree of public confidence and escaped the wrath 
of public criticism. A s an example, our C I C A recommendations have been in­
corporated by regulation into law and securities regulation. Of course, we've 
had our audit failures—Atlantic Acceptance, after all , was one of the pioneers 
in that field. O u r massive frauds and well-known questionable payments ac­
tivities by government agencies and in the private sector take second place to 
virtually no one. So a year ago, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
set up the Adams Committee to recommend further study and action (just as 
Eddie Stamp has urged in Britain) to react i n advance of public calls for regula­
tion of the profession. Many of you have probably seen the report, which took 
up the entire A p r i l issue of the C A Magazine. But you've probably not heard 
any of the press furor that followed. W h y not? Because there was none, that's 
why. The entire body of press reaction to that report published to date consists 
of twenty-one newspaper articles—from sea to shining sea. Are we disappointed 
at that reaction? Y o u can bet your damn boots we're not. W e have the chance 
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i n Canada, I believe, for whatever reason, if we react sensibly and responsibly, 
to preserve our position of relative respect (and I stress that word relative) and 
to hold the reasonable confidence of government and securities regulators which 
we now appear to have. 
But I have perhaps strayed too long and too far from Doug's paper. I do so 
though with only slight apology, since I believe it is important to assess the 
position of the American accounting profession i n a somewhat broader context 
than Doug has described. 
Who's i n Charge? 
So back to the task—"where are we going, and who's i n charge of the t r i p ? " 
I have already discussed the destiny (which I translate as "role") of the profes­
sion, which I take to be the "where are we going" part of Doug's double-
barreled question. The second part—"who's i n charge"—he addresses in the 
context of the right to set the rules for the profession. H e answers, realistically 
I think, i n his last paragraph, "The accounting profession does not control its 
status . . . , " but rather shares it wi th " . . . the courts, the S E C , Congress, and 
the undercurrent of consumerism i n society." Let's consider the question of 
"who's i n charge" first, against the sound of the prominent voices that speak 
on the topic, and secondly, i n the light of the response by the American profes­
sion to date. Final ly, and without adding to the list of timeless predictions 
which D o u g so entertainingly catalogued for us, let's assess i n the cold light of 
day the present chances of approval of the steps taken by the profession to date. 
First, just listen for a moment to some widely varying voices: 
D r . John C . Burton (former chief accountant, SEC—February 1, 1978) 
. . . i n the final analysis, I believe that the A I C P A system as a whole 
must be characterized as insufficient. Its insufficiency does not result 
primarily from the unwillingness of the accounting profession to de­
sign an effective system but rather from the inadequacy of its authority 
to do so. In summary, i t is my view that a formal self-regulatory ap­
proach is one which offers both public protection and institutional 
stability for the accounting profession. 
Report of the Commission on Auditors ' Responsibilities (1978) 
It does not appear that a comprehensive federal mechanism for regu­
lating the profession would be superior to the present system; nor is a 
complex restructuring of the profession required. 
E l i Mason, C . P . A . (January, 1978) 
M r . Chairman, I urge that the congress of the United States enact legis­
lation which would provide for registration of public accountants to 
practice before the S E C . 
O f course, it has been stated that anyone can join the S E C C o m ­
panies Practice Section, but M r . Chairman, who wants to play the game 
if no one w i l l ever throw you the ball? 
Harvey Kapnick , C . P . A . (May 24, 1977) 
It must be recognized that the profession has a critical responsibility 
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not to delay further but to take immediate corrective actions. If we 
do not abdicate our responsibility, but instead welcome it, there w i l l 
be no reason or justification for more government intervention. 
A l a n Brost, C . P . A . (January, 1978) 
It seems ironic that the very attacks on the dominant power of the B i g 
Eight in the A I C P A have triggered a response by that organization 
which can only make them more dominant in this crucial area of 
audit practice. 
A I C P A Report of Progress (January 30, 1978) 
Perhaps never before has a profession i n so short a time adopted so 
ambitious a program to improve its performance, police itself, report 
on its conduct to the public and submit itself to public scrutiny. 
. . . if these (changes) are insufficient, that w i l l quickly become ap­
parent. Congress can then act in the light of this experience. 
Abraham J . Briloff, C . P . A . (December, 1977) 
Except for occasional platitudinous nods, the Institute has chosen to 
ignore the most serious transgressions on the part of its members . . . 
. . . the profession has, i n many ways, taken on the attributes of the 
major corporations it is supposed to a u d i t . . . 
Sub-committee on Reports, Accounting and Management (Metcalf Committee— 
November, 1977) 
Subcommittee members prefer that the profession itself achieve re­
forms i n cooperation with the S E C . 
The amount of time for achieving reforms is not unlimited. There­
fore, the subcommittee expects the accounting profession and the S E C 
to act in a timely manner to implement the policy goals in this report. 
H a r o l d Wil l iams (March 3, 1978) 
W e believe the accounting profession should have a reasonable op­
portunity to achieve effective regulation on its own. 
It would be premature to over-ride the profession's efforts at this 
time. 
W e believe that self-regulation, if it can be made to work, is pref­
erable to direct governmental regulation. 
The A I C P A must instill in the Public and in Congress confidence 
that it is an independent, professional organization—not a trade as­
sociation in the sense of being a promoter of the financial interests of 
its members and not a lobbying arm for its members corporate clients. 
Representative John E . Moss (March 3, 1978) 
. . . the Chair is both disappointed and dissatisfied with the self-regu­
latory program of the A I C P A . 
Whether or not the accounting profession is ultimately regulated 
might very well depend not so much on the adequacy or inadequacy 
of the present A I C P A program, but on the willingness of the S E C to 
exercise its authority. 
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(February 25, 1978) 
A harmful result of the high degree of concentration among the large 
firms is the bitterness displayed at our recent hearings between the large 
and small firms. The divisive allegations and cross-allegations which 
permeated our hearings surely take a toll on the public's perception of 
the profession, (and) jeopardizes the effort at self-reform . . . 
M y concerns about the A I C P A program center on the control of 
S E C Section's Executive Committee by the largest 16 accounting firms, 
the effectiveness of the peer review procedure, and the composition and 
effect of the Public Oversight Board. 
Y o u may have heard, as I have, that with the passing of Senator 
Metcalf and John Moss not seeking re-election, legislative proposals 
regulating accountants w i l l never become law. Don't bet on it! 
A . E . MacKay (May 3, 1978) 
Government regulation of the accounting profession gives government 
a further wedge into business and is unacceptable. W e must retain 
the respect of the American people and convince them and their rep­
resentatives in Congress that we accountants are able to discharge our 
responsibilities without regulation by the government. 
Finally, one voice from the Canadian scene: T h e H o n . Bette Stephenson, M.D. , 
Minister of Labour, Province of Ontario (February, 1977) 
Self-government and professionalism are symbiotic of inter-twined 
mutually supportive concepts. The role of the profession is a demon­
stration that the principles of free enterprise, effectively combined with 
dedicated service to the public, can be a bulwark against the ever 
present danger of growing state control. It is up to government—and 
the professions too—to demonstrate strong opposition to the thinly 
veiled collectivist route to state control. 
The profession—like any institution—can drift away from those 
it is designed to serve, into isolation. When this happens, the public 
sees the professional not as an ally but as an adversary. The public 
must recognize that your primary concern is the public interest and 
that you are striving to fulfil l your responsibility to them. 
Gentlemen, all of those voices are prominent in one way or another in 
influencing the decision as to the way in which our profession is to be conducted 
and controlled i n the future. Who's i n charge of the trip? 
W e l l , Doug's paper refers to the prospects of what he terms "unbridled" 
regulation as being " f l u i d . " N o w exactly what that means I'm not sure, but if 
it means that the prospects are uncertain then I am in ful l agreement. A s I hear 
these voices, and please bear in mind that I hear them from some distance and 
am certainly less up to date and far less intimately involved with the problem 
(which may be either an advantage or a disadvantage), I judge the prospects 
of regulatory legislation to be entirely uncertain at present, but highly likely to 
be resolved one way or the other in the coming months. 
A s I see it, there are four possible events (three of which are addressed i n 
Doug's paper), the occurrence of any of which could trigger legislation to 
regulate the accounting profession. 
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• First, the S E C could become dissatisfied with the progress of the 
profession in achieving its goal of meaningful self-regulation. 
W h i l e Haro ld Wil l iams has indicated repeatedly a preference for 
self regulation by the profession, he obviously w i l l expect stiff standards 
to be self-imposed. Further, as has been heard from several other 
prominent voices, and as D o u g has pointed out in his paper, the 
S E C may be under strong political pressure to take regulatory action 
soon after their July hearings. 
• Secondly, then, the politicians could become dissatisfied with the stance 
of the S E C vis-à-vis the profession's progress. Senator Moss' speech 
i n California i n February, from which I quoted earlier, does seem 
to foreshadow some big storm clouds on the horizon, shaping up 
quickly. If you have not read that speech, you wi l l find it interesting. 
Senator Eagleton also obviously knows on which side his ballots are 
buttered. Doug's assessment as to the likelihood of congressional 
support for either or both of these crusaders, should it come to legis­
lation, is obviously far more acute than mine, and would be of interest. 
• Thirdly , as D o u g noted i n his paper, "If another Penn Central or 
Equity F u n d i n g surfaces, support for federal regulation could crystal­
lize quickly . " Perhaps something less than another such massive 
corporate failure might even provoke such action. I would suspect 
that any other highly visible combined fraud and alleged audit failure 
might have the same effect. 
• Fourthly, there is the lawsuit challenging the A I C P A move to sections. 
It would obviously be imprudent if not impossible for a vice president 
of the A I C P A to write on this matter while it is before the courts, 
and on this basis its omission from Doug's excellent paper is fully 
understandable. However, as a mere observer on the sidelines I can 
neither ignore the matter nor prejudice the parties to the action by 
my comments. 
In my view, it is apparent from some of the speeches and papers 
which I have quoted here that a successful court challenge to the 
validity of the A I C P A action in providing for two separate practice 
sections would be a serious blow indeed to the accounting profession 
—possibly even a fatal one—in its attempt to demonstrate its wi l l ing­
ness and ability to regulate its own affairs i n the public interest. I 
cannot assess the likelihood of the outcome of the action. I can 
only note the potential of its effects. 
One year ago I wrote a review of the Cohen Commission's Report of 
Tentative Conclusions for the Canadian Institute's C A Magazine entitled " A 
Profession at the Crossroads." I concluded that article by observing that: 
. . . no less than the independent auditor's real usefulness i n our free 
enterprise system is being questioned. It's not the Cohen Commission 
that is asking the question . . . It's being asked by lawyers, senators, 
investment analysts, members of parliament, bankers, judges, the person 
on the street, and by sometime soon, the profession had better start 
coming up with some answers. " B i g Brother" w i l l provide them soon 
enough if it doesn't. 
If I were writ ing that article today I would continue to entitle it " A Pro-
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fession at the Crossroads." A short year later, we're still there. The American 
accounting profession has certainly come up with some fast and far reaching 
answers. But whether " B i g Brother" is satisfied that they are the right ones is, 
at this moment, to my view, hanging in the balance. 
A s I said at the beginning, it is not my place to make another of those 
immortal predictions of the future, but merely to serve for you as discussant on 
a most important and timely paper. I have to apologize, I suppose, for the 
gradual decline of humour i n my paper. Funny thing, I noticed the same thing 
i n Doug's. Perhaps its just not a great subject for laughs. 
A s a visitor from a foreign country, I am also quite conscious of what can 
happen when one's neighbours intrude on one's domestic concerns. But, H o w a r d , 
you asked me, after all , if not to intrude, at least to comment. In doing so, I 
have tried to bring the broader perspective which is usually provided by a more 
distant vantage point. 
In closing, may I observe that the destiny of the U.S . accounting profession 
w i l l profoundly affect that of your fellow professionals throughout the free world. 
Speaking as one of them, I sincerely hope, whoever turns out to be in charge 
of the trip, that the A I C P A w i l l continue to attract the support and confidence 
of the American public and of the elected government which is so necessary to 
fulf i l l its destiny. 
Thank you, M r . Chairman, for the honour of the invitation; and gentlemen, 
for the courtesy of your attention. 
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The Role of Auditing Theory in Education and Practice 
Robert E. Hamilton 
University of Minnesota 
Audi t activities are receiving increased public attention and scrutiny. W i t h 
public institutions increasingly being the subject of auditors' activities and with 
public disclosure occurring of the financial and operating results of large C P A 
firms, there is an increasing demand for explanations of the auditor's role i n 
our society. The expansion of audit activities performed by governmental, in ­
ternal, and external auditors likewise has not gone unnoticed. N e w audit pro­
cedures, new forms of audit organization, and new institutional arrangements 
have been rapidly introduced without a simultaneous infusion of explanations 
which are grounded i n theory. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the nature of a theory of auditing 
which would improve the underpinnings for explanations of audit activities 
and to identify specific linkages between improvements in theory and difficult 
problems in auditing education and practice. A theory of auditing can help i m ­
prove our understanding of the role for auditing in society and thus improve 
the ability of society's members to design institutional structures and to take 
actions which lead to desired outcomes. 
A u d i t i n g is a term associated with activities having specified characteristics. 
A n auditing theory should describe these activities and their particular con­
figurations and intensities. It should explain using differing relative amounts 
of substantive and compliance testing and differences in the amount of resources 
used to audit a public versus a private entity. These two matters are but illus­
trative of a larger set which is concerned wi th describing why observed auditing 
activities are what they are. If this view of auditing theory appears limited, 
there is an additional discussion of auditing theory i n a subsequent section of 
this paper which should expand the horizon. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized in the following way. 
A discussion and review of developments i n auditing theory is presented along 
with a description of the characteristics appropriate for an auditing theory. The 
two subsequent sections contain a more specific discussion and development of 
ways in which auditing theory can impact education and practice. T h e final 
section is a prospective on future developments in auditing theory. 
Where are W e i n A u d i t i n g Theory? 
Before a role for auditing theory can be identified there exists the steps of 
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identifying where we are i n auditing theory. If it is found that no auditing 
theory exists then there is extreme difficulty i n an identification of the role for 
theory. A t that point the process turns to identifying a role for an auditing 
theory if only there were one like the theory under consideration. If the existing 
theory is so underdeveloped that it is difficult to show its value, then the issue 
is one of identifying the characteristics of a theory which would likely be of 
value. The second view is the one that obtains for much of what follows, yet the 
prospective indicates some reasons why such a theory can be and is likely to 
be produced. 
L o o k i n g to a closely related discipline for support revealed that there exists 
The Theory of Finance (Fama and Mil ler , 1972*). The claim is that "The theory 
of finance is concerned with how individuals and firms allocate resources through 
time. In particular, it seeks to explain how solutions to the problems faced in 
allocating resources through time are facilitated by the existence of capital 
markets, . . . and of firms . . . " If the view of auditing theorists is consistent 
with these finance theorists then it could be expected that the theory of auditing 
would seek to explain how solutions to problems faced i n allocating resources 
through time are facilitated by the existence of auditors, audit firms, and auditing 
institutions. Whi le it may not be the final word on the subject of the theory of 
auditing, the preceding description provides a sufficient starting point. In a 
simple form, the theory of auditing would explain the auditing activities in the 
world around us. The theory may not provide explanations as precise as may 
be desired, e.g., why some auditors wear vests and others do not. The theory 
may not tell auditors what they should do in every conceivable situation, and at 
the beginning the predictions of the theory may be surprising and the reasons 
may be counter-intuitive. Only through significant exposure to the reasoning 
and by continued testing and refinement of the theory can it be subjected to 
evaluation by individuals who may accept or reject the theory. More is reported 
on these points in the next section of this paper. For the moment, the focus is 
on the review of existing developments in auditing theory. 
N o lengthy history is provided as there are numerous reports on the history 
of developments in auditing which are more complete than is possible within 
the scope of this paper. The additional consideration that there should be con­
tinued improvements i n theory suggests that a review of history would wisely 
begin as late as possible so as to avoid a lot of changes which are not applicable. 
O u r review of auditing theory w i l l begin with the publication of The Philosophy 
of Auditing (Mautz and Sharaf) and conclude with recent working papers. 
A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts ( A S O B A C , 1972) is the second major 
audit theory publication during this time period. Numerous papers have de­
veloped and studied major elements of an auditing theory, but none are as com­
plete as the two cited works. 
In The Philosophy of Auditing it is stated that: 
It is our contention that there is a theory of auditing, that there 
exist a number of basic assumptions and a body of integrated ideas, the 
*See "References" at the conclusion of this paper for this and all other references 
similarly cited. 
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understanding of which w i l l be of direct assistance in the development 
and practice of the art of auditing. (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961, p. 1.) 
The authors' development proceeds from eight tentative postulates to the descrip­
tion of five auditing concepts: evidence, due audit care, fair presentation, in ­
dependence, and ethical conduct. The process of conceptualizing i n ASOBAC, 
(p. 16), on the other hand, " . . . ends with a normative description and the 
pragmatic benefits may not be immediately apparent." H o w does either of these 
two works provide a basis for a theory of auditing? T h e first is represented 
as the philosophy of auditing and therefore it seems inappropriate to consider 
it as an auditing theory. In ASOBAC (p. 16) there is a representation that 
" T h i s study is an attempt to contribute to the development of a theory of audit­
i n g " and therefore it seems inappropriate to consider it to be a completed auditing 
theory. If the characteristics of a theory are present in either of these works, 
there has been sufficient time to refine and test the theory. What has been the 
recent history? 
Both of these works have been widely quoted and cited in subsequent re­
ports on studies of auditing so that a broad exposure to the ideas and conclusions 
contained i n both ASOBAC and The Philosophy of Auditing appears to have 
resulted. Have these works led to tests of their ideas and conclusions? I am 
unaware of any reported empirical test i n auditing which has directly used the 
ideas and conclusions in these works as a means to theoretically support the 
tested hypotheses. Instead most, if not all , of the auditing research which uses 
observations of audit or audit-related activities has formulated hypotheses i n 
an ad hoc manner. Consider, for example, Warren's (1975) test of the uniformity 
of auditing standards. In this case, there were a number of hypotheses, each 
one of which would provide an hypothesis that the incidence of qualified 
opinions would be uniform across C P A firms. T w o of the hypotheses were 
competition among C P A firms and uniformity i n application of auditing 
standards. Furthermore, it was assumed that there was no selection process 
taking place so that audit conditions were considered to be randomly distributed 
throughout the firms being studied. None of these necessary theoretical under­
pinnings come from the existing theories of auditing. 
The point here is not to single out the Warren study for criticism. Instead, 
the study is presented to provide an example, among many others, where it can 
be seen that auditing theory has not been directly beneficial i n providing the­
oretical support for a tested hypothesis. It is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however, to demonstrate that existing research has not used the existing theoretical 
structure in auditing for underpinnings. The issue here is whether it can be 
used, not that there is no current use. 
Refinements of Existing Theory 
In the second area of questioning, i.e., has the existing theory led to 
further refinements, there is also a lack of direct connections. One area that has 
received considerable attention is the theory of evidence (Kissinger, 1977; Toba, 
1975) as it has been further refined and logically examined from the beginnings 
of the concept of evidence as presented in The Philosophy of Auditing. ASOBAC 
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has been extended by W i l l (1974) to consider the environment which feeds into 
and is fed by the audit process. Yet neither of these areas has spawned under­
pinnings for empirical research. The further refinements i n the theory of evi­
dence lack specific relationships to the way in which particular levels of reliability 
are determined and thus have a significant ambiguity which precludes testing. 
The systems approach presented i n W i l l (1974) adds the consideration of i m ­
portant environmental variables but does not provide for an operational specifica­
tion sufficient for testing. W h i l e the preceding remarks may appear critical of 
auditing theory developments and testing, there is room for an interpretation 
that the existing work is exploratory, and significant verifiable results are possible, 
but a long way off. Before turning to a discussion of the properties of a theory 
of auditing, the following remark made in The Philosophy of Auditing (p. 65) 
is worthy of consideration: 
. . . . conceptual models, even without empirical support, can be ex­
tremely effective i n the development of theory. Th is fact is important to 
us because we find the development of mathematical models, except 
possibly the most simple type, to be inapplicable i n auditing at this stage 
of development. 
Whether this statement would be different if it had been written i n 1978 instead 
of i n 1961 is of interest. Is there reason to believe that movement away from 
procedures effective i n developing theory to those effective for testing and vali­
dating theories has taken place? Is auditing research still i n the exploratory stage 
where existing research has the direction of future research activities as its goals, 
or is auditing research providing some knowledge about the world around us? 
In the final section on prospectives for auditing theory the more recent develop­
ments w i l l be described. A look at the properties for a theory of auditing and its 
value is next considered. 
Properties of a Theory of A u d i t i n g 
One general problem impeding the development and acceptance of auditing 
theory is its residence in the social sciences. Numerous arguments have been 
recorded to suggest that social science theory is different and more difficult to 
produce than is theory in the physical sciences. After a physical scientist presents 
the theory for behavior of a type of molecule and shows it to be supported by 
observation, there is not generally an outcry raised by molecules to reveal their 
thoughts that they really do not behave as the model says they do. Yet, if we 
look to the social sciences, we often find that this situation applies. Whether the 
difference in the social sciences is supportive or detractive for theory development 
is an open question. I suggest, however, that the developments i n the physical 
sciences would have been slower if protesting atoms had caused the attention 
of researchers to focus on detailed idiosyncracies of their behavior. In attempts 
to explain the finest detail, there is often a lost concentration on more general 
and likely more readily explainable phenomena. It is merely an issue of first 
things first. 
What qualities should an auditing theory have? It is obvious that the 
answer depends on the context i n which the theory is to be used. In a sense, 
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the production of auditing theory is like the production of technologies for use 
i n converting the factors of production into consumer goods. The desirability 
of qualities for an auditing theory then depends on what products it w i l l produce 
and how the products are valued. A u d i t i n g education and audit practice are 
examined later as to their use of the products of auditing theory. A t this point, a 
general examination of the properties of a theory of auditing is briefly conducted. 
A theory of auditing which facilitates comparison with other competing 
and complementary theories, which is presented so as to make validation possible 
and which provides results of interest to auditing educators and practitioners 
would be a significant addition to the current state of auditing theory. The 
existing theoretical base i n auditing appears not to satisfy these constraints. Use 
of a loose conceptualizing approach has hindered comparison and made validation 
difficult. If one looks at Toba's theory of audit evidence, its explicit develop­
ment did facilitate the response by Kissinger which has provided a clearer and 
more cogent relationship between the theory of evidence and auditors' reporting 
alternatives. Yet there is still a way to see if the theory of evidence explains the 
actual reporting behavior of auditors. The reason is that the theory of evidence 
has developed i n isolation of the institutional arrangements which reward and 
penalize auditors, clients, and others. It is much closer to a description of one 
way i n which an auditor may use evidence, and if the other alternatives are as 
explicitly developed, then there is the possibility of testing to see which theory 
best explains the way in which auditors behave. The question of how they 
should behave is then an issue i n the design of the institutional arrangements. 
If a theory of auditing is to be forthcoming it should include a systematic 
consideration of the major elements i n the practice of auditing: the institutional 
structure, the market for audited information, the characteristics of agents doing 
auditing, being audited, and using audited information, and consider the avail­
able auditing technology. What would be the details for the components of an 
auditing theory? A simple statement is that it would explain the demand for 
and the supply of auditors. Such a theory would permit an analysis of the effects 
on the supply of auditing of changing institutional arrangements, of expanding 
the subject matter of auditing, and of new technologies for producing audits. 
A Simplified V i e w of A u d i t i n g Theory 
A t a min imum, the theory should provide a way to characterize the pre­
viously mentioned items and to identify the effects due to their interacting. In 
this regard, consider the following simplified view of auditing theory: If there 
exists a government to enforce contracts, and due to differences i n wealth endow­
ments, inter. alia., individual agents i n an economy find it advantageous to put 
their wealth i n the charge of others, then contracts which reward performance 
may be based on numbers reported by the manager. If the owner of the wealth 
does not have a way to ensure the compliance of the reports with the contractual 
provisions or if the manager does not have a way to convince the owner of this, 
then certain contracts may not take place. If an auditor is incorporated into 
the arrangement to ascertain compliance and if the auditor is motivated to do 
so because of associated rewards and penalties, then valuable contracts could be 
formed and all w i l l be better off. The preceding is a brief and terse explanation 
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of how a theory of auditing may be developed. The theory would include the 
technology available to the auditor and the way i n which the information being 
audited affects the wealth of the owner and manager. This simple setting is 
more clearly developed and extended elsewhere (Hamil ton, 1975; Magee, 1977). 
The essential characteristic of this approach is to rely heavily upon the tools 
of economic analysis to provide an explanation of this economic phenomenon— 
auditing activity. It should not be that the economic analysis is accepted solely 
on the basis of its rigor, but also on its relevance i n rigorously explaining auditing 
activities. T o provide details on how a theory with these characteristics would 
assist educators and practitioners, the next two major sections of this paper w i l l 
provide a description of major issues that may be explained. 
Assistance to A u d i t i n g Education 
O n one hand, the area of auditing education may benefit more from psycho­
logical theories of learning which say something about the production of educa­
tion of any type. Yet a careful description of the nature of the learning require­
ments for auditing is necessary to make valid applications of the theories of 
learning. It is in this realm that auditing theory should be helpful. If, for 
example, one is trying to help students understand how to make decisions about 
the use of compliance and substantive tests, how does auditing theory help? 
D o sufficiently unambiguous definitions exist to permit an observer, armed wi th 
the definitions, to categorize actual audit activities into these two types of tests? 
C a n auditing theory demonstrate why it is important to make this choice? 
F r o m an economic standpoint, these tests are two different inputs for the pro­
duction of an audit. It appears that standard analysis would lead to a simple 
view of the production possibilities set and explain why the tests should be made 
a certain way. If students have an understanding of economic analysis from 
prerequisite courses, then it would be an appropriate language for conveying 
an audit issue to students. 
One advantage i n having a theory of auditing is that it can provide a struc­
ture for course content. A n overall view—the theory—can be outlined and then 
developed i n detail. The critical points of the theory can guide the time alloca­
tions for courses and the detailed interrelationships among the theory's elements 
can help to avoid misinterpretations based on considering only part of the prob­
lem. For example, the choice of penalty structure for auditors may be considered 
as a factor i n determining what is a reasonable amount of assurance. Then it 
is possible to say that within this penalty structure the auditor w i l l disclaim if 
he cannot obtain enough assurance. Understanding this relationship provides 
insights into how the auditor (or a coalition of auditors) would respond to a 
proposal which eliminates the option of reporting a disclaimer. 
A concern for time allocation to various coverages in an auditing course 
could be aided by a theory of auditing which identifies the major determinants 
of the auditor's decision process and how they are affected by changes in the 
environment. Those critical points of influence on audit decisions could be 
given sufficient time to assure that they are well understood, with the more 
sensitive variables studied in depth. A u d i t choice variables of a more technological 
character, e.g. electronic data processing and statistical sampling techniques, 
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could then become topics of much more detailed and specialized courses. 
A second advantage is that a theory of auditing should quickly highlight 
the differences in subject matter and environment for the different types of 
auditing, e.g. internal, external, and governmental. F r o m this, then, a common 
core of knowledge could be identified and specialized aspects of these differ­
ent areas recognized and covered in courses which detail the specialized environ­
mental features and how audit decisions are affected thereby. 
A third advantage which stems from having a theory of auditing is that 
it enables a systematic interpretation of evidence produced by researchers such 
that it can be communicated to students. W h e n a student leaves an auditing 
class, does the student know what researchers have found as descriptions of audit 
activities? A theory of auditing which structures the learning process would 
more readily permit an integration of research findings into the classroom. 
For example, if auditing theory can describe the effect of audit penalties on audit 
decisions, then alternative sampling approaches can be described in terms of the 
effect of the approach on the auditor's likelihood of having penalties imposed 
upon h i m . W h e n alternative confirmation techniques are discussed, as in Pro­
fessor Sorkin's paper that is included i n the proceedings of this symposium, then 
evidence about the reliability and costs of using different approaches can be con­
veyed to students within the theoretical structure. A major point to be empha­
sized here is that as a theory of auditing is systematically developed, then re­
searchers' results w i l l be related to the theory and this w i l l hasten the introduction 
of those results into the classroom. 
A fourth educational advantage derived from auditing theory is that it 
provides a rather complete, compact, and precise view of auditing which then 
enables a clear focus on the elements which explain why audit activities are what 
they are. The emphasis here is on providing an explanation which can serve as 
an aid to identifying and convincing students why activities which may at first 
seem counterintuitive are not necessarily so. The theory takes simple and familiar 
constructs and shows how they lead to the results. Errors of intuition may be 
uncovered and/or errors i n the theory may surface. If the theory of audits is 
too simple, this advantage may be lost. M y guess is that when a theory of audit­
ing is developed it w i l l be valuable in permitting a communication of the com­
plexities of the factors which determine audit activities. Conversely, it w i l l be 
difficult to comprehend some of the more important complexities in the absence 
of a theory of auditing. 
Addit ional Advantages Related to Education 
T w o remaining advantages deserve attention. Other, less direct, effects 
may also be of importance in education. First, it is likely that a rather general 
theory which involves general phenomena w i l l be at the base of a theory of 
auditing and that the communication and understanding of this theory w i l l be 
of importance to a general business student audience. The economics of con­
tracting and the attendant moral hazard and information asymmetry issues ap­
pear to be affected by auditing mechanisms. W i t h a generic structure of the 
problem there is the possibility that much of this general theory can be covered 
i n an introductory course with external auditing, internal auditing and govern-
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mental auditing as special cases within the theory of auditing. Jensen and 
Meckl ing (1976) report on a theory of agency which considers the incentives 
for monitoring and bonding activities of managers. It is a preliminary start on 
what might be the foundation of a theory of auditing. The theory then should 
be capable eventually of explaining the conditions which result i n auditing ac­
tivities being done i n different ways within different organizational settings. 
Just as micro-economics provides explanations about the production decisions of 
firms under different conditions, a theory of auditing would explain the effects 
on auditing activities that result from different conditions in the environment. 
In "The Role of Securities i n the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing," 
A r r o w (1964) provides an explanation as to the reason why securities are intro­
duced into a society. W i t h i n the study of auditing, it would seem that, at a 
minimum, a theory of auditing should show why an economy w i l l be better off 
if auditors can provide their services. Yet, there is currently no well detailed 
exposition of this matter, and a theory of auditing which does so w i l l provide 
a basis for a body of knowledge of wide applicability. Many activities in society 
involve contracting which critically depends on costly verification or observation 
mechanisms. Radner (1968) has shown that without mutual observation of 
states, there is little to suggest that claims on those states w i l l be traded. A t issue 
is the simultaneous consideration of the costs to verify states of the world and 
the value from being able to contract and exchange resource claims. Audit- l ike 
activities are a significant resource-consuming process of state verification which 
is assumed in most models of resource allocation mechanisms. A n understanding 
of the nature of these activities is essential to understanding why one mechanism 
is preferred to another. 
The second effect of having a theory of auditing which indirectly affects 
education is identified with research i n auditing. W i t h a theory, there should 
be clearer focus on the major unsolved issues and an easier identification of un­
tested claims so that researchers can more readily identify interesting problems. 
By making it easier to do research in auditing, the supply of high quality research 
should increase (possibly along wi th the supply of low quality research as well) 
and should enhance the flow of knowledge about the world of auditing to the 
student of auditing. 
There are many advantages of a theory of auditing for audit education. 
Each is dependent upon that theory to generate a complete, compact, and con­
sistent story about auditing activities. When a theory of auditing comes into 
existence, there w i l l be a change i n the approach for viewing many aspects of 
auditing. A Statement on A u d i t i n g Standards w i l l not be the subject of direct 
theoretical validation. Instead, there w i l l be a concern for identifying the factors 
which explain why the actions described i n the statement are consistent with 
the theory of auditing and for evaluating the effect of the statement on the supply 
and demand for audits. 
Effect on A u d i t i n g Practice 
A recent view of accounting theory production has been that it creates a 
product aimed at "the market for excuses" (Watts and Zimmerman, 1977). A 
similar possibility exists for auditing theory. W h e n there are changes in the 
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"rules of the game" which reallocate resources, then there is an incentive for 
providing "theory" to support the allocation which favors one group. A n 
affected group seeks the "theory" that w i l l support a resulting allocation that w i l l 
be i n their favor. 
T o understand the incentives for buying excuses it is necessary to have a 
theory to explain how the activities of the world would change as the "rules of 
the game" are changed. This type of theory is not of the excusing type but of 
the explaining variety. This theory would explain which groups w i l l buy which 
excuses. A theory of auditing would, i n general, seek to explain why auditing 
is a preferred social activity, and in the process identify the specific nature of 
the effects of introducing auditing as these effects relate to resource allocations 
and production plans. 
In audit practice, there are at least four aspects of choice problems concerned 
with auditing: the individual auditor, the C P A f irm, the auditing profession, 
and the social choice mechanism. A theory of auditing would seek to explain 
how these choice problems are resolved. For example, at the individual auditor 
level there are numerous problems of choice that are dependent upon an indi­
vidual's position i n the firm. One of the more important types of individual 
auditor activities is concerned with characterizing different client settings and 
selecting from among alternative ways of obtaining evidence. A t this level of 
choice, there is essentially a production technology problem. The assistance 
would come in the form of a theory which identified the major distinct charac­
teristics of clients and related them to their effects on the cost and reliability of 
alternative types of evidence. 
A t the individual choice level, it would be expected that the theory of 
auditing would identify the advantages of using both local (or individual) 
auditor knowledge and the advantages of using specialists i n other types of 
knowledge to aid in the acquisition of evidence. A t the individual auditor level, 
the theory would be heavily embedded i n the technology of evidence collection. 
Evaluation of the evidence and choosing specific forms of evidence would likely 
be subject to significant influences from elsewhere. 
In a C P A firm wherein there is a sharing of risks, there would be benefit 
to including a theory of risk sharing to assist i n explaining how firms are or­
ganized. D o monetary incentives to auditors improve the risk sharing, or are 
quality control reviews and admonitions more effective? Are the clients i n the 
C P A firm's portfolio of clients consistent with the firm's members' attitudes to­
ward risk? Recent advances i n team theory, syndicate theory and other areas 
provide a structure for evaluating this type of firm policy. A n understanding 
of portfolio theory can provide the basis for examining the effects of client mix 
on audit risk, although this is a difficult application since the major step involves 
characterizing audit risks i n the portfolio context. Obvious advantages from 
specialization also influence the solution to the client mix problem. The charac­
teristics (or attributes) of individual auditors within the C P A firm are another 
dimension which is the subject of a firm's recruiting and training policies. The 
structure and size of C P A firms make them a rather interesting and unique 
object for research. 
A t the professional level there is a choice problem concerning the activities 
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of the profession and its ability to serve its constituency. Essentially, coalition 
actions are taken, and they should likely be i n the best interests of the coalitions. 
When they are not, there is an increasing likelihood that the coalition w i l l splinter, 
as has been the recent experience of the A I C P A with respect to a revision i n its 
structure to recognize two different types of practice. Professional activities i n ­
clude other functions such as the efficient production and dissemination of spe­
cialized knowledge. These activities are also capable of analysis in economic 
terms. W h e n the total professional fund is unequally provided by members and 
the services are unevenly valued, there is a concern for the stability of the coalition. 
A theory of auditing can assist the profession i n at least one other way. 
W i t h the profession serving to represent its members' activities to others, there 
is an advantage stemming from having a tested theory which explains what 
goes on i n the profession. A well constructed and tested descriptive theory of 
concentration within the C P A industry would have been very useful i n the re­
cent Metcalf hearings. Extensive economic studies of concentration have been 
done for other industries. W h y has such a study not been done for C P A s ? 
One problem is a lack of data, and one advantage of a professional association is 
that it can give anonymity to individual data and at the same time report sig­
nificant research results. 
The social or governmental aspect of decision making is characterized by 
its large, heterogeneous constituency. A s government regulations are promul­
gated, the effects of complying with these "rules of the game" are pervasive i n 
their potential impact. A t this level, the major analytic difficulties stem from the 
problems associated wi th the construction of a social choice function. O n the 
other hand, empirical problems surface i n the difficulties associated with the 
development of interpretive models for economy-wide phenomena. Yet, the in ­
dividual or group of individuals that set the "rules of the game" act as i f they 
have made a choice among the alternatives. It would appear that there is room 
for descriptive models i n an auditing theory and that these models would pro­
vide for a tested theory which explains the effects of alternatives but does not 
provide rules for choice. 
A warning is provided to close this discussion of auditing practice. There 
have been significant developments i n auditing research, yet if the earlier re­
marks are correct one can expect that there has not been a very rigorous logical 
validation and testing of the claims. A t the individual auditor or firm level of 
choice, there is then a danger i n using existing theory to design policies when 
the theory is not well grounded, verified, and supported. Is it not more reasonable 
to rely on intuition and experience than to shift to untested and possibly invalid 
theories as a guide for policy making? 
The last ten years in accounting research have witnessed a problem i n the 
use of theoretical structure. A s the efficient market research developed, the 
emphasis has been on a continued testing and validation of the theory i n that 
there was concern as to the conclusions that the delayed receipt of a set of 
financial statements did not impact share prices. Instead of viewing this as a 
model which did not explain why accounting is a pervasive activity it was, at 
times, viewed as heresy. After ten years of pursuing a non-explanation, there 
is an increasing tendency to look elsewhere for explanations. Ross (1977) and 
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Beaver (1978) provide details on this point. In fact, understanding other uses 
of accounting numbers such as for compensation contracts, bond indenture pro­
visions and industry regulatory provisions may be likely explanations for the 
activities taking place i n accounting and auditing, and these are not inconsistent 
wi th the efficient market results. Hakansson (1977) provides a clear and de­
tailed picture of the comparative advantages of accounting information over 
other types of information i n a market setting. H e concludes with the following 
remark (p. 414): 
However, the crucial point is that what is to be defined as a sig­
nificant event and the amount of auditor involvement that is desirable 
must be the result of data collection, analysis and calculation. N o one 
is i n a position to spell out convincingly i n detail what is significant 
enough to be disclosed immediately and what the auditor's role should 
be without engaging in . . . cost-benefit analysis. 
The cost-benefit analysis suggested is that which looks at the effects on resource 
allocations and considers the comparative advantage of alternative information 
producers. 
A Prospective on Auditing Theory 
A reader of the proceedings of Audi t ing Symposium I (Stettler, 1972) may 
believe that the change in approach over the intervening years has been to now 
have a paper on "Toward a Theory of A u d i t i n g " as distinct from a paper on 
" T o w a r d a Philosophy of A u d i t i n g " (Mautz, 1972). Is there anything new here, 
or is this merely an unadvertised and well-developed "Columbus Complex" re­
flecting "Academic Amnesia" (Carmichael, 1976, p. 5)? The change to theory 
is to emphasize the requirements for testing and validation. As stated in Mautz 
(1972, p. 85) the archaic definitions of philosophy included reasoned science 
and the sciences as formerly studied i n the universities. O n the other hand, 
included was the non-archaic definition that philosophy is knowledge of the gen­
eral laws that furnish the rational explanation of anything. This last definition 
is consistent with part, but not all , of the requirements for a theory. 
This point is addressed by Mario Bunge (1967, p. 23) when he states: 
In particular, no synthetic formula follows from analytic formulas 
and no analytic formulas follow from synthetic ones; the mathematician 
cannot infer anything about the world on the strength of his mathe­
matical knowledge alone and, likewise, the physicist can establish no 
mathematical theorem on the basis of his factual knowledge. 
A n d , on science, Bunge (p. 29) states that: 
What science claims is ( i ) to be truer than any non-scientific model 
of the world, ( i i ) to be able to test such a truth claim, ( i i i ) to be able 
to discover its own shortcomings, and (iv) to be able to correct its own 
shortcomings, i.e., to build more and more adequate partial mappings 
of the patterns of the world. 
In essence, the advantage of theory or science is that it is tested with observations 
from the world around us. Alternative and conflicting theories can be tried in 
105 
the courts of data. Prior to testing, the communication of the logic is presumed 
to have taken place and to have been verified by others. The logic of the efficient 
markets research has been the subject of scrutiny and it has been tested. In the 
process, it has shown where accounting information is not very useful or valuable. 
Considerable theoretical modeling and testing must likewise be done to show 
how auditing is of value and the reasons why. Although solid results may be 
decades away, it is not implied that the goal should not be pursued. 
Questions raised within a philosophy of auditing are recast within a theory 
of auditing. For what and to whom auditors are responsible depends on answers 
to questions about the value of auditing and the technology to supply audits. 
Once a description of the demand for and supply of auditing is forthcoming, 
individuals can decide whether to produce audits and whether to pay the price 
for audits. This simplification of the problem to one of demand and supply 
analysis may appear to be extreme reductionism. O n the other hand, a descriptive 
understanding of the world around us would appear to be a prerequisite to 
policy making questions. 
Someone looking to the recorded auditing research should notice that a 
complete, logically and empirically defensible theory that explains the auditor's 
existence i n an economy is not present. Yet the same person may observe 
auditors conducting audits, research reports describing what auditors are and 
should be doing, and economic explanations of the functioning of an economy. 
One might reasonably expect that with a wealth of research into the activities 
of auditors and into descriptions of an economy wi th uncertainty, that the two 
could be brought together wi th valuable results. Can the described auditor ac­
tivities be shown to enhance the economy's utilization of resources? C a n the 
change i n the functioning of the economy with the introduction of auditors be 
evaluated i n terms of social or private benefits? What motivations exist that 
cause an individual to engage an auditor? These and other interesting questions 
can be resolved only if the auditor is modeled into the economy in a direct way. 
Earlier sections of this paper have omitted many specific references and 
descriptions of existing research i n this area. Hamil ton (1978) provides a more 
complete set of references and explanations and is available upon request. The 
scope for this paper was too broad to permit the detailed explanations and refer­
ences, but this is not to say that they are unimportant to the theme contained 
herein. Recent developments along the lines suggested in this paper are excel­
lently summarized and communicated in N g (1978). Thus, the focus in this 
paper has been on explaining some roles for a theory of auditing. 
Where are we i n auditing theory? What activities in society are viewed 
as auditing? H o w can these activities benefit from having a well developed 
theory of auditing? The preceding questions served as a frame for this paper 
on the role of auditing theory. 
What can one expect from a paper such as this? Describing the current state 
of auditing theory not only involves a given bibliographical set, but also involves 
a view as to the meaning of theory. Interpersonal differences i n assessing the 
state of auditing theory may be induced by either one or both of these elements. 
Identifying the practice of auditing is obviously a definitional problem and estab­
lishing the "goodness" of one definition over another ultimately rests i n estab-
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lishing the usefulness of the definition as a means for improving our under­
standing of auditing, improving auditing itself, and improving the world around 
us. W i t h the personalistic nature of the first item, the measurement difficulties 
associated with the second and the impossibilities for constructing social welfare 
measures for the third, there is reason to believe that a rigorous proof defending 
the definition's usefulness could not be provided herein. 
Demonstrating the impact of a well developed auditing theory on education 
and practice is likewise exceedingly equivocal. Anyone who has tried to defend 
a basic research proposal knows that the process is difficult and that the argu­
ments are generally insufficient for showing that the project should be funded. 
Yet, funded basic research projects provide a means for informed betting on 
knowledge changes on the part of the researcher and the funding agency. A s i n 
any area, some bets are won, others are lost. 
I have developed a description of my betting positions and an explanation 
of my reasons for taking these positions. I am sure that opening a market for 
these bets would generate a significant amount of betting. I hope that future 
developments i n auditing theory are such that al l of our bets can eventually be 
settled. Actions taken by C P A firms, auditors, congressional committees, regu­
latory agencies and others can also be viewed as falling wi th in a betting frame­
work wherein the individuals who take the actions are placing their individual 
welfare on the line. 
Concluding Observations 
The preceding sections of this paper have detailed why an auditing theory 
does not appear to exist and how such a theory would be of value to auditing 
educators and practitioners. Most basic to the viewpoint expressed here is that 
the necessary conditions for a solution to all auditing problems have not been 
established i n a theoretical structure which is shown to be consistent wi th the 
data from the world around us. These conditions are necessary for resolving 
auditing problems such as choices among confirmation formats or analytic audit­
ing approaches. A solution to these two problems, for example, requires either 
that the value of auditing be established (a welfare economics viewpoint) or 
that the auditor's penalty/reward structure be known (a microeconomic view­
point). W i t h i n a setting where auditing is a valued activity, the penalty/reward 
structure should be derived from the explanation of the demand for and supply 
of auditing. 
Individuals seeking resolution of auditing problems, whether the problems 
be governmental, internal, or external w i l l demand that other conditions be 
established for the variety of problems addressed. If auditing is an area of 
specialization, then the necessary conditions w i l l explain why auditing is dis­
tinguished from other activities. Yet the conditions w i l l be only necessary, and 
by no means sufficient, for resolving most of the interesting auditing problems. 
A s noted earlier, it is an issue of priorities and the suggestion here is similar to 
suggesting that climatic and geographic conditions are necessary conditions 
which must be established before one proceeds to identify the specifics of the 
problem of choosing a particular type of house and life style which is best for 
the individual involved. 
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Discussant's Response to 
The Role of Auditing Theory in Education and Practice 
R. K. Mautz 
Ernst & Ernst 
Bob Hamil ton and I approach the nature, purpose, and usefulness of audit­
ing theory so differently that after reading his paper I thought it best to give 
h i m a call so we might get better acquainted. A s I suspected, we had met 
earlier, but I still knew very little about Bob's background and experience. 
Interestingly enough, we have similar educational and experience histories. Both 
of us have commitments to and have spent considerable time i n academic work; 
both of us have had practical audit experience. The major difference is that I 
have been at both of these for a considerably longer time than has Bob. T o 
which one of us that is an advantage or disadvantage, you must decide. 
Given those similar backgrounds, why is it that we should have such dif­
ferent interests, that we should approach auditing theory in such disparate ways? 
O u r conversation suggested that Bob is not at all troubled by our differences. 
O n the contrary, he expresses himself as thinking our differences may have use­
fulness, at least for the purposes of this symposium, i n encouraging discussion. 
So let me note i n more detail the nature of our major differences and then try 
to explain why I think they exist. 
Different Approaches to A u d i t i n g Theory 
Bob takes a broad view of auditing theory. H e calls for a theory that ex­
plains the role of auditing in our economy, what it does, why the economy 
encourages it, what impact auditing has on the economy, why auditing exists 
at al l , and the conditions of that existence. H e writes: 
. . . a theory of auditing should show why an economy w i l l be better 
off if auditors can provide their services. 
H e is also greatly interested i n the supply and demand for audits and notes: 
Audit- l ike activities are a significant resource-consuming process of state 
verification which is assumed i n most models of resource allocation 
mechanisms. A n understanding of the nature of these activities is es­
sential to understanding why one mechanism is preferred to another. 
Thus he seems to be more concerned with the functioning of the economy, 
with how and why the economy allocates some part of its resources to auditing, 
and with what the economy receives i n return, than with how auditors allocate 
their resources, spend their time, or face their problems. 
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Consistent with this, he recommends an approach to the study of auditing 
theory that uses the tools of economic analysis to explain how the economy 
allocates resources to auditing. A t one point we f ind : 
The essential characteristic of this approach is to rely heavily upon the 
tools of economic analysis to provide an explanation of this economic 
phenomenon—auditing activity. 
A n d at another point: 
What would be the details for the components of an auditing theory? 
A simple statement is that it would explain the demand for and the 
supply of auditors. Such a theory would permit an analysis of the effects 
on the supply of auditing of changing institutional arrangements, of 
expanding the subject matter of auditing, and of new technologies for 
producing audits. 
Bob also calls for a theory that: 
. . . should include a systematic consideration of the major elements in 
the practice of auditing: the institutional structure, the market for 
audited information, the characteristics of agents doing auditing, being 
audited, and using audited information, and consider the available 
auditing technology. 
The Purpose of A u d i t i n g Theory 
This is the scope of a theory of auditing in his terms, but what is its purpose? 
For Bob, a requirement of theory is that it provide a basis for testing hypotheses. 
Presumed theoretical writ ing that does not do so fails to earn the appellation of 
"theory." H e expresses concern that existing auditing theory has not been 
directly beneficial for the theoretical support of tested hypotheses. Because those 
items he recognizes as early attempts at auditing theory formulation have not 
"spawned underpinnings for empirical research" he relegates them to a non-
theory sort of l imbo. H e notes with approval, however, a trend, or at least a 
tendency, i n more recent writings on auditing theory to emphasize "the require­
ments for testing and validation," but also that auditing theory w i l l not be com­
plete as long as it possesses "ambiguity which precludes testing" and until it 
can "facilitate comparison with competing and complementary theories so as to 
make validation possible." 
This is an ambitious program. Bob is himself impressed, and desires us 
to be concerned, by the fact that we lack a complete theory of auditing. H e w i l l 
be satisfied with nothing less than a theory that fully explains the auditing 
activities of the world around us—everything from the justification of auditing 
as an economic phenomenon down to the level of why and how the amount of 
resources used to audit a public company may differ from those used to audit 
a private entity. The rewards and penalty system for auditors must fit into 
auditing theory as part of the explanation of why and what auditors do. A l l 
of this must be developed in such form that it lends itself to empirical verifica­
tion and is both predictive and testable. The theory must be one that 
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. . . identifies the major determinants of the auditor's decision process 
and how they are affected by changes in the auditor's environment. 
Bob visualizes a wide range of uses for auditing theory highly beneficial 
to education, practice, and research. But there are dangers as well . H e points 
out the possibility that some interested parties might wish to advance the cause 
of those theories which would result in resources being allocated i n their favor. 
H e fears also that policy decisions w i l l be made within accounting firms on the 
basis of theory that is not well grounded, verified, and tested, and he believes 
that the profession suffered i n its testimony before recent Congressional hearings 
i n not having "a well constructed and tested descriptive theory of concentration 
within the C P A industry." 
A Different Approach 
In contrast, my own approach to auditing theory, if I dare even to use that 
term, is at a different level. M y interest is in the individual auditor, his responsi­
bilities and obligations, i n how he goes about acquiring sufficient evidential 
matter on which to formulate and defend, if necessary, his audit judgment. Bob 
Hamil ton and I have significantly different notions of theory. H i s appears to 
be one that requires provision for the establishment and testing of hypotheses 
on some empirical basis, and without this testing he feels there is a question 
whether the term "theory" is warranted. 
N o doubt my views have been affected by my early training. I recall Pro­
fessor Littleton describing theory quite simply as the reasoning that explains 
practice. Good practice is supported by good theory; bad practice is explained 
by bad theory. In Littleton's view, a constant interplay should exist between 
theory and practice so that each is tested against the other. Those theories that 
do not work well i n practice should be reexamined. Those practices that lack 
logic or rational support likewise require reconsideration. Gradually, as each 
is tested against the other, both theory and practice are improved. 
T o the best of my knowledge, Professor Littleton never engaged i n what 
is now termed empirical research, so he was not inhibited by requirements to 
support his conclusions with formulae and statistical interpretation. H e had, 
however, spent a good deal of time in studying the rules of logic as well as in 
keeping abreast of current developments, and he urged that we be scientific in 
our development of theory, although he was quick to point out that accounting 
was not itself a science in any strict sense of that term. 
Accepting Professor Littleton's notion that theory is the reasoning behind 
practice, my own interest in auditing theory has been directed toward what an 
auditor does, how he does it, and how he might do it better. Is this empirical? 
W e l l , certainly it is if empiricism is l inked with experience as my dictionary says. 
M y background and experience at both the staff auditor level and more recently 
at a somewhat more exalted rank provide an empirical foundation on which I 
rely heavily. 
Professor Hamil ton (you can tell the going is getting heavier by my use 
of his formal title) offers the gratuitous comment that: 
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. . . the theory of evidence has developed i n isolation of the institutional 
arrangements which reward and penalize auditors, clients, and others. 
H e offers no proof or even an adequate explanation of that statement. 
Because he had at that point made reference in his paper to some totally academic 
discussions of audit evidential matter and of the relationship of such evidential 
matter to audit opinions, he may have meant to confine his comment to those 
papers. If he meant to include some of the earlier work on evidence, whether 
i n The Philosophy of Auditing or elsewhere, he is quite i n error. It would be 
an almost impossible task for a practicing auditor with any significant experience 
to write on the subject of evidential matter and at the same time ignore such 
institutional arrangements as the S E C , the courts, plaintiff bar, competitive fee 
structures, staff classifications, his own audit firm's organization, and the l ike. 
If, as the dictionary states, empiricism has to do with experience, practitioners 
are well equipped to test hypotheses. 
A n Empir ical View of Theory 
Professor Hamil ton pronounces: 
Once a description of the demand for and supply of auditing is forth­
coming, individuals can decide whether to produce audits and whether 
to pay the price for audits. 
Without the benefits of the extensive theory that he seeks, my own empirical 
observation is that a great many people and corporations have already decided 
that they are wi l l ing to pay the price for audits, and that thousands of auditors 
are eager to produce such audits. Without any visible concern for Professor 
Hamilton's desired theory, these people make just such decisions as he alludes to. 
H o w do they do it? 
Those of us who now participate in such activities have a pretty good idea 
of how and why such decisions are made. T o seek to develop and test hypotheses 
on such matters strikes us as less useful than would be the same amount of effort 
directed to a different set of questions. 
A s a "brief and terse (these are his words) explanation of how a theory 
of auditing may be developed" Professor Hamil ton offers the fol lowing: 
If there exists a government to enforce contracts, and due to differences 
i n wealth endowments, inter. alia., individual agents i n an economy 
find it advantageous to put their wealth i n the charge of others, then 
contracts which reward performance may be based on numbers recorded 
by the manager. If the owner of the wealth does not have a way to 
ensure the compliance of the reports with the contractual provisions or 
if the manager does not have a way to convince the owner of this, then 
certain contracts may not take place. If an auditor is incorporated into 
the arrangement to ascertain compliance and if the auditor is motivated 
to do so because of associated rewards and penalties, then valuable con­
tracts could be formed and all w i l l be better off. 
What a marvelous grasp of the obvious! What does such glorification of 
that which is readily apparent really accomplish? Can't we accept the fact that 
in a market economy based on credit, auditors have a usefulness, and because 
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ours is a litigious environment they have every reason to be effective and efficient? 
Seeking overblown language to cloak the mundane is not likely to help either 
present or future auditors to serve more efficiently. 
W e need attention to practical issues that permit an auditor to survive and 
to serve effectively within an already institutionalized environment. Theorizing 
about those institutions and about the nature of that environment on such a 
high level is unlikely to provide much help to the auditor who must learn to 
respond and react to an S E C influenced by chief accountants as different as 
Andrew Barr and John Burton, to audit committees stimulated by increasing 
directors' responsibilities, and to governmental proposals for more control over 
audit activities. Broad scale theories of a global nature are unlikely to take into 
account personality differences which can be incredibly important i n terms of 
cost and responsibility. Such theories exist at a level remote from the problems 
of the day, problems of litigation, of reproposals, of increased fee competition, 
and of personal performance under trying conditions. 
I can see little benefit to the profession or to our economy, and certainly 
none in the immediate future, from the k i n d of theorizing that Professor 
Hamil ton proposes. 
In discussing the advantages of a theory of auditing for educational purposes, 
for example, Professor Hamil ton writes: 
A concern for time allocation to various coverages in an auditing course 
could be aided by a theory of auditing which identifies the major deter­
minants of the auditor's decision process and how they are affected by 
changes i n the environment. Those critical points of influence on audit 
decisions could be given sufficient time to assure that they are well 
understood, with the more sensitive variables studied in depth. 
N o w those are beautiful words, but for the life of me I don't know what 
they mean or how to apply them in developing an auditing course. M y major 
concern as an auditing teacher is wi th helping students behave on the job i n 
such a way that they can analyze the audit risk, identify the representations in 
the financial statements, gather and evaluate relevant evidential matter, reach a 
defensible judgment on the validity of the financial statement representations, 
and, during all of this, have a working awareness of their responsibilities as 
professional auditors. 
I would much rather give them an understanding of audit evidence, the 
extent to which it can be relied on, the dangers in relying on less than the best 
evidence, and the cost of obtaining various types of evidence, than to have them 
theorize about how changes in the environment affect major determinants of the 
auditor's decision process. 
Note where Professor Hamilton's approach is intended to lead us. H e states: 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the nature of a theory of 
auditing which would improve the underpinnings for explanations of 
audit activities and to identify specific linkages between improvements 
in theory and difficult problems in auditing education and practice. 
A theory of auditing can help improve our understanding of the role for 
auditing in society and thus improve the ability of society's members 
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to design institutional structures and to take action which leads to de­
sired outcomes. 
A u d i t i n g is a term associated wi th activities having specified char­
acteristics. A n auditing theory should describe those activities and their 
particular configurations and intensities. 
A Vote for Pragmatism 
If we carry on wi th that paragraph and wi th subsequent statements, we find 
that Bob has a view of the theory of auditing so comprehensive i n scope that it 
far escapes my imagination. Indeed, I know of no activity of man for which 
a "complete, compact, and consistent story" exists in the scope and extent of 
detail which he proposes for auditing. N o r does Professor Hamil ton propose 
such a theory. H e just thinks that one could and should be developed. A n d i n 
the last pages of his paper, wi th commendable caution, he offers some reasons 
why he could not have been expected to provide one. 
So where does all this leave us? The difference between Bob and me and 
the way i n which we define, think about, and propose auditing theory reflects 
a classic contrast of approaches. The macro approach which he prefers is at best 
a long-term possibility for progress. The micro approach that I choose offers 
immediate possibilities for improvement in auditing education and practice. 
M y goal for auditing theory lies in the near term improvement of the profession, 
of education for it, and of its research efforts. I feel a strong need for improve­
ment that w i l l give us candidates better qualified to practice auditing in today's 
environment, to strengthen the profession's service to the economy now. 
I have not even a casual interest in putting the profession under a microscope 
for intellectual examination to discover what motivates whom or why, and 
how various interests respond to various stimuli. I am only remotely interested 
i n that great day i n the future when Professor Hamilton's global theory may 
finally be tested and found complete. 
One of the reasons I find myself so much concerned about our differences 
is that the increasing gap between education and the practice of accounting and 
auditing, whether in industry, the C P A profession, or government, bodes i l l for 
the future of both. More and more I find that the interest that academics have 
in accounting and auditing theory and practice has little relevance to the prac­
titioner's problems. W e have few forums to bring practitioners and academics 
together, and when we do, the results typically are something of a Mexican 
standoff. 
In two paragraphs near the end of his discourse—paragraphs which I must 
confess are not completely clear to me—Bob places his bet on the development 
of the k i n d of theory he has described i n his paper. H e concludes: 
Actions taken by C P A firms, auditors, congressional committees, reg­
ulatory agencies and others can also be viewed as falling wi th in a 
betting framework wherein the individuals who take the actions are 
placing their individual welfare on the line. 
Practicing auditors put their welfare on the line every day i n ways that 
few full-time academics are able to appreciate. Most practitioners would wel-
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come help i n reducing the odds they face. I find it disappointing that capable 
members of the academic community make their bets i n such a way that any 
possible payoff is so far i n the future as to be discountable to near zero i n terms 
of today's needs. 
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Resolving the Auditor Liability Problem—An Appraisal of 
Some Alternatives 
Richard H . Murray 
Touche Ross & C o . 
Decades before others were discussing the problem of auditors' liability, 
indeed years before many of us were born, M r . Justice Cardozo masterfully 
defined the problem i n the Landmark case of Ultramares vs., Touche (then 
Touche, N i v e n & C o . ) : 
The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to 
make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract 
to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling. . . . T o 
creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate, 
the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there 
was notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer d id not 
intend to keep it to himself. . . . A different question develops when 
we ask whether they owed a duty to these to make it without negligence. 
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure 
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may 
expose accountants to a liability i n an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business 
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether 
a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these 
consequences. (Emphasis added, 255 N . Y . 170, 174 N.E.441) (1931) 
As a result of these concerns, the Ultramares decision held that, while 
auditors could be liable to their clients for simple negligence, they would have 
to be guilty of a considerably higher degree of fault in order to be liable i n 
damages to third parties. 
Post-Ultramares Developments 
While the Supreme Courts of most States quickly followed the lead of 
Ultramares i n cases involving claims against auditors, the first forty years after 
that decision saw a number of developments that ran counter to the Cardozo 
concern for avoiding destructive risks to the accounting profession: 
• The Federal Securities Laws enacted i n 1933 and 1934, contain specific 
provisions permitting the purchasers of corporate securities to recover 
damages from auditors for something akin to negligence. However, 
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those provisions were limited to specific claims, such as purchasers at 
an initial offering of securities (Section 11 of the 1933 A c t ) , or pur­
chasers relying upon documents filed with the S E C (Section 18 of 
the 1934 A c t ) . The Federal Laws were silent with respect to liability 
from market transactions generally, leaving the impression that the 
standards of the Ultramares decision were acceptable to the Congress 
and were intended to control all securities liabilities not specifically 
defined by the '33 and '34 Acts. 
• Beginning about twenty years ago, however, the Federal Courts began 
to engraft upon the Securities Laws the concept of implied rights of 
recovery for general trading activity i n corporate securities. This 
trend, focusing principally upon Rule 10(b) of the 1934 Act , and the 
Commission's related Rule 10(b)5, was a major piece of social legisla­
tion through judicial fiat. The extent of the philosophical change 
brought by the development of 10(b)5 liabilities is manifest in the 
fact that these new rights of action emerged wi th lower standards of 
liability (negligence or less) than the established standards of Ultra-
mares, and with none of the conditions or limitations upon liability 
(statute of limitations, statutory defenses, etc.,) which Congress had 
provided for the specific remedies in Section 11 and Section 18. 
• The past fifteen years have seen certain erosions of the Ultramares 
principle i n proceedings under common law and state law traditions, 
as well . Under the theory that more is always better in the case of 
plaintiff's rights of recovery, the American L a w Institute promulgated 
changes in its semi authoritative Restatement of Torts. The resulting 
expansion of the liability of auditors (and, for that matter, of attorneys, 
and for many other participants i n securities transactions) was charac­
terized by one court in 1968: "The wisdom of the decision in Ultra-
mares has been doubted . . . and this court shares the doubt. W h y 
should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden 
of an accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more 
easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the Accounting 
profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk on to 
its customers, who can in turn pass the cost on to the entire consuming 
public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary 
techniques of the Accounting profession?" (Rusch Factors, Inc., v. 
Levin , 284 F . Supp. 85) (1968) 
By the 1970's it was quite legitimate to question whether the Ultramares 
decision and the Cardozo fear of undue exposure was passe. Perhaps the fear 
expressed so many years before was overstated; at least, there had been no major 
disastrous judgments entered against accountants. Moreover, there seemed to 
be little sympathy or concern for the plight of an accounting profession which 
had prospered during the ensuing years. 
The Litigious Era 
Time and circumstances were, however, catching up with those who saw 
public benefit behind every suit against an accounting firm. The explosion of 
claims against accountants during the late 60's and early 70's was noted in 
many quarters (see, for example, Earle, "Accountants on T r i a l in a Theatre of 
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the A b s u r d " Fortune, May 1972, and Liggio, "Accountants' C i v i l Liabi l i ty : 
Through the Looking Glass and Other Impossible Th ings" A B A Lit igation 
Magazine, Volume 1). Although the voices of concern came initially from 
within the profession, the reality of the crisis caused by the number of claims, 
size of the recoveries sought, and the frustrations and expense of defending class 
action procedures were ultimately recognized by the U . S . Supreme Court. The 
first warning was struck in Blue Chip Stamps vs., Manor Drug Stores, (421 
U.S . 723) (1975): 
There has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule 
10(b)5 represents a danger of vexatiousness different i n degree and i n 
k i n d from that which accompanies litigation in general. . . . W e believe 
that the concern expressed for the danger of vexatious litigation which 
could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 
10(b)5 is founded in something more substantial than the common 
complaint of the many defendants who would prefer avoiding law suits 
entirely to either settling them or trying them. These concerns have two 
largely separate grounds. The first of these concerns is that in the field 
of Federal Securities Laws governing disclosure of information even a 
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of 
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of proportion to 
its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from 
being resolved against h i m by dismissal or summary judgment. 
Pursuing this theme, the A I C P A Amicus Brief i n the Hochfelder case a few 
months later urged the court to recognize: 
D u r i n g their pendence, the charges leveled against a f i rm of Certified 
Public Accountants constitute a cloud on their professional reputation 
and a threat to their professional standing. The in terrorem effect of 
the pendency of even the more meritricious litigation provides a settle­
ment value i n such law suits having no relationship to the quantitative 
size or qualitative merit of the claim. 
The capstone of this development was the Supreme Court's decision i n 
Ernst & Ernst vs., Hochfelder, (425 U.S . 185) (1976). The Court noted the 
absurd contrast between the obvious language and purposes of the Federal 
Securities Acts and the uncontained potential for liability that had developed 
under the judiciary's creation of the 10(b)5 phenomena. A s a result, the Court 
held that civi l damage claims under the implied liability sections of the Federal 
Securities Acts could only be awarded upon proof that the accountant involved 
had been guilty of scienter, a knowing intent to violate the law. 
Most recently the N e w York Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principles of 
its earlier Ultramares decision, with only slight extensions of auditor liability, 
in the case of White vs., Guarente decided just last December. 
Cardozo's Fears Realized 
Thus, the theoretical concern expressed by Cardozo has come ful l circle. 
Ironically, graphic proof of the accuracy of Cardozo's fears did not mature until 
1977 when a California State Court jury rendered its decision in the U.S . 
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Financial Litigation. That verdict against Touche Ross of more than 27 mil l ion 
dollars results from a pattern of facts which clearly manifests the worst of the 
Cardozo fears: 
• The plaintiffs consisted of twenty four banks and insurance companies 
i n the U.S . and abroad who purchased notes privately placed by U.S . 
Financial without any registration proceedings or other advance indi­
cations that would give any warning that they would be relying upon 
financial statements at the time those statements were rendered. 
• The majority of plaintiff institutions made their investment decision 
on the basis of intermediary recommendations without obtaining or 
examining the financial statements which contained numerous foot­
notes disclosures creating doubt about the quality of the earnings 
reported. 
• The plaintiffs' losses on these notes resulted from a decline i n the 
general health and market value of real estate development firms 
like U.S . Financial, and in part from a pervasive scheme of fraud 
perpetrated by company management i n collusion with numerous 
third parties including officers of the company's principal com­
mercial bank. 
• Touche Ross was charged only with negligence in the conduct of 
its audits for 1970 and 1971; the plaintiffs specifically disclaimed any 
suggestion that Touche was guilty of either intentional or reckless 
conduct. 
• The jury, which cumulatively possessed no educational degrees be­
yond high school, was required to reach a verdict after nine months 
of trial which produced over 18 thousand pages of transcript and 
hundreds of exhibits arising from the numerous and complex issues. 
• The jury concluded, within the first hour of deliberations, that Touche 
Ross had been negligent and that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled 
to ful l reimbursement of all their losses plus pre-judgment interest.* 
It is clear that the past two years have seen both a judicial endorsement of 
the concerns originally expressed by Cardozo, and a manifestation of those fears 
in action. 
A Broader Problem? 
The recognition that the risk of civi l damage recoveries constitutes a major 
problem for the accounting profession is, however, only a start towards defining 
the problem. The more significant issue is the need to determine whether this 
phenomenon also constitutes a problem for broader national interests. A recent 
report by the Sub-Committee on Reports, Accounting and Management, of the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (The Metcalf Committee) opined 
that " . . . potential legal liability for negligence is the most effective mechanism 
for assuring that independent auditors performed their public responsibility 
*The verdict has been appealed on a number of grounds, including our belief that the 
Ultramares standards should prevail in California to prevent such an investor recovery for 
simple negligence. We also believe that negligence by Touche Ross was not established at the 
trial. The case will be appealed on that ground as well. 
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competently and diligently." Whi le that is clearly the conclusion which the 
Committee's staff had hoped the Committee would reach, I don't believe that 
any of the testimony or written submissions submitted to the Committee in the 
course of its investigation gave any credence to that conclusion. Rather, the 
events of recent years have given credence to the position articulated by former 
S E C Commissioner A l Summer: 
The S E C is not unconcerned with the danger of excessive financial 
loss, for we recognize that an indigent profession, or one blighted wi th 
financial adversity, w i l l need to reduce its exposure and thereby lessen 
protection afforded investors. 
A Two-Fold Issue 
The issue thus presented is essentially two fold: Has the risk of liability 
stimulated improved performance by the accounting profession, and A r e the 
burdens of this risk more detrimental to the public interest than any such 
benefits? The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (the Cohen Commis­
sion) directly addressed the issue i n a staff study conducted by Professor Henry 
Jaenicke of Frankl in and Marshall College, later separately published as (Re­
search Study N o . 1 of the A I C P A ) , The Effect of Litigation on Independent 
Auditors. 
In that study, Jaenicke notes that the Accounting profession has been 
much more active in the past decade in developing accounting principles and 
auditing standards, and i n recognizing new ways in which it can serve the 
public. H e concludes that the principal reason for this activism is the fear of 
civi l liability. Professor Jaenicke acknowledges that his conclusion is based 
principally on the fact that both trends (professional activism and the litigation 
explosion) occurred at about the same time. That the latter has influenced the 
former seems unassailable; that fear is the primary motivation of professional 
service, however, seems to strain the available facts and rejects any recognition 
of the profession's own sense of responsibility and self-initiated goals. I suggest 
that the accounting profession has demonstrated more rapid acclimation to con­
temporary challenges and public needs than has any other institutional component 
of the social and commercial scene, including the American Bar, the business 
community and perhaps Congress itself. 
The dispute over what motivates professional improvements and how 
successful accountants have been in this regard is beyond the scope of this 
paper. A more meaningful question for present attention is: assuming that fear 
of liability has some salutary effect on the profession's concept of public responsi­
bility, is more always better, or have we reached (or perhaps passed) the optimum 
balance between the benefits and the detriments of that fear. I do not suggest 
that the Accounting profession or any major firm within it w i l l be destroyed by 
the burdens of litigation. Rather, I am concerned that fear of excessive liability 
w i l l deter the profession from serving the public as broadly and as effectively 
as it could. 
This concern has been expressed with increasing frequency in recent years, 
such as the observation of Russell E . Palmer that: 
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The Accounting profession may . . . be showing some reluctance to 
extend itself into new areas. In connection with two recent contro­
versies—Reporting on Interim Financial Statements and Reporting on 
Forecasts—the profession chose to debate and discuss rather than ac­
tively experiment. True, there are some difficult technical issues in each 
of these areas, but I am concerned that we may be using the conceptual 
questions to shield us from possible additional exposure to liability. 
("It's T i m e to Stop T a l k i n g , " Journal of Accountancy, October, 1975) 
The effect of such reluctance was noted by Mautz and Sharaf in their 1961 
monograph published by the American Accounting Association: 
First, the auditor appears to be renouncing his right to an area i n 
which he has competence and i n which he can be of service; Second, 
as a professional group auditors are in effect refusing to provide an ef­
fective service to the business community; T h i r d , auditors are empha­
sizing to clients and to the world at large their unwillingness to accept 
responsibility, to provide a difficult but useful service, to attempt to cope 
on even a small scale with an evil force that blights business life in no 
unsubstantial degree. (The Philosophy of Audi t ing) 
Future Directions 
I believe the available evidence demonstrates that the profession has reached 
the optimum level of reaction to litigation pressures and now faces the prospect 
of retrenchment from responsibility as a rational response to the escalation of 
such risks. N o w that the profession has firmly internalized the sense of public 
responsibility newly imposed upon it during the present generation, further i m ­
provement i n the quality and diligence of performance w i l l depend on the pro­
fession's ability to recruit and retain the most competent people and our ability 
to foster courage and responsibility i n their actions. The continuance and escala­
tion of exposure to civi l liabilities places both of these goals i n jeopardy, particu­
larly as contrasted with the opportunities in the business world that are not so 
infected with risk. 
It is a common phenomenon of 20th Century U . S . social and political his­
tory for valuable and necessary trends to first reach and then exceed the resolu­
tion of the original needs. This tendency has often required legislative reform 
to seek a healthier permanent balance. This has been the case with the develop­
ment of unionism, the assertion of constitutional rights of criminal defendants, 
and numerous other economic and social issues. I suggest that we are at such 
a turning point i n the process by which the phenomenon of risk has been used 
to enroll the accounting profession in an expanding public service capacity. 
I submit that the accounting profession has reached a stage of maturity in these 
new responsibilities that can be threatened and eroded by the continuation and 
escalation of those risks. 
Possible Solutions Considered 
A recognition that the risks of litigation constitute an undue burden upon 
the public as well as the accounting profession requires us to examine some pos­
sible solutions. W e should turn first to a popular misconception—that insurance 
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provides all the protection the profession requires. T h e S E C and many pro­
tagonists of plaintiffs' rights profess that accounting firms can insure themselves 
against the risks of liability and pass the cost of such insurance on to their clients. 
This belief that the accounting profession is simply a conduit for spreading the 
risk to the business community and therefore to the ultimate consumer underlies 
the thinking of virtually all of the commentators who promote the concept of 
civil damage recoveries against auditors. I consider the proposition to be i l l 
founded for a number of reasons: 
• The continued availability of adequate levels of insurance coverage 
for the accounting profession i n this country is subject to considerable 
doubt. A s recently as the early 1970's coverage for the profession was 
available from numerous insurance companies who competed for our 
business in both price and benefits. Today only a handful of companies 
continue to provide coverage for accountants, and only with massive 
premium increases, sharp increases i n coverage restrictions, and man­
datory deductibles that render us substantially self insured. For ex­
ample, the B i g 8 has experienced a several hundred percent increase 
in premiums, for barely more than 50 percent of the total coverage 
once available, and a m i n i m u m 5 mil l ion dollar annual deductible, all 
i n the past three years. A n d we are lucky; smaller firms continue to 
struggle with the availability of coverage of any k i n d . 
• It is a fiction to believe that an accounting firm can directly pass on 
the entire cost of its litigation expense and insurance premiums i n the 
form of higher fees. The profession in the U.S. , particularly the na­
tional firms, are highly competitive and the profession as a whole is 
subject to demands by the business community for economizing i n 
professional services. A s a result, it is far more likely that the cost 
of litigation w i l l be absorbed in depressed personal incomes, or more 
regrettably from the public's viewpoint, in less recruiting, training 
and self improvement. 
• The public gets little benefit from the overall cost of litigation. A s 
Jaenicke points out, no more than one third of total damage awards 
ever finds its way into the public pocket, which is hardly productive 
to society as a whole. Other forms of insurance protection such as 
auto liability, personal health and accident, etc., are designed to achieve 
a preponderance of public recoveries as opposed to handling costs. 
I believe the estimate of one third public recoveries in the securities 
field to be unrealistically high (the subject is presently being studied 
by the Department of Justice) and even if accurate it hardly seems to 
justify the burdens imposed by the process. I am indebted to Henry 
H i l l , now retired from Price Waterhouse & Co. , for the observations 
that present class action litigation is mindful of the ancient practice of 
according justice by cutting off the ear of the malefactor and awarding 
it to the injured party. W e differ only i n that he does not refer to the 
making of ear amputations highly profitable to the lawyers who per­
form them. 
A n Alternative to Insurance 
If insurance is a non-solution to the liability problem, where can we look 
for more hopeful solutions? The Cohen Commission, despite its conclusion 
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that some risk is good for the profession and the public, endorses the American 
L a w Institute's proposal to l imit the amount of potential liability recoverable 
under the Federal Securities Act . That proposal, which is part of the A L I ' s sug­
gested recodification of the Federal Securities Laws, would l imit recoveries to 
the greater of one percent of the auditing firm's annual revenues, or one mi l l ion 
dollars. The limitation would not apply, however, to liabilities resulting from 
financial statement misrepresentations i n which the auditor had actual knowledge 
of fraud. The A L I explains this proposal as a balancing of the benefits and 
detriments of litigation risks: 
There must me some maximum . . . to prevent the possibility of utterly 
outlandish recoveries from material but nevertheless relatively insub­
stantial lapses. . . . The other side of the coin is that, unless the potential 
liability is high enough to attract able lawyers who are wi l l ing to under­
take class actions on a contingency basis there may not be any practical 
enforcement. . . . " (Reporter's Comments on Tentative Draft Number 
T w o , 1973) 
The A L I code has been in preparation for nearly a decade and has bene­
fited from an extraordinary amount of public and professional attention. A s you 
might expect, the proposed liability l imit has enjoyed the active support of the 
accounting profession. Unfortunately, despite all the effort and expertise behind 
it, I doubt that the proposed code w i l l fly through Congress without considerable 
political reshaping. If the recent active interest in the accounting profession by 
some Congressmen and staff members has a broad public constituency (which is 
an issue for another day) then the liability limitation could be in for tough 
sledding. 
Other Considerations 
Without regard to the fate of this A L I proposal, three other goals available 
to Congress and the courts alike, are worthy of consideration. The first deals 
with the standard for justifying liability of accountants. Specifically, I suggest 
the adoption of statutory or judicial standards akin to the principles of the 
Ultramares case: " A n y auditor or auditing can be held liable to its client for 
negligence, but should be liable to others (such as the investing public) only 
when guilty of criminal participation in that client's fraud or of a knowing failure 
to exercise its professional responsibilities. "Such a standard, which closely re­
sembles the Supreme Court's definition of scienter in Hochfelder, would not 
absolve auditors from serious professional failings. Rather, it would minimize 
the risk of being treated as an indemnitor of market losses in the guise of hind­
sight determinations of negligence. 
Second, the profession's own standards of conduct should be recognized as 
adequate defenses to charges of malpractice. Certain commentators and a hand­
ful of cases have suggested that judges and juries can ignore compliance with 
generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing stand­
ards if, with hindsight, they determine that the financial statements should have 
been differently presented. But if the profession is to be continually subjected 
to fear of liability as a stimulus towards effective performance, the profession 
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must have some confidence that effective performance can be measured i n ad­
vance of the difficult professional judgments it is required to make. Without 
the structure of G A A S and G A A P to rely upon, fear is more likely to produce 
the irrational results of guessing against the views of a judge or a jury than 
useful efforts to comply with established professional rules. Stated differently, 
if G A A S and G A A P are to apply only at the time judgments are made by an 
auditor and not at the time the judgments are made by a judge or jury, then 
there is no way that the accounting profession can convert its fear of liability into 
any meaningful form of public protection. 
T h i r d , in order to recover damages from accountants, plaintiffs should be 
required to establish a clear line between their losses and the misrepresentations 
alleged to have occurred i n financial statements. Courts have been increasingly 
w i l l i n g to ignore the traditional need for proof of reliance and causation i n 
order to facilitate recoveries by large classes of plaintiffs. The fiction used to 
cover this erosion of standards is the claim that financial statements can be as­
sumed to have an effect upon the market price of widely traded stocks, and that 
proof of individual investment decisions is unnecessary. Whi le this fiction 
greatly aids class action plaintiffs, it also serves to obliterate the effect of any 
other causes of plaintiff's loss, such as general market decline, industry-wide 
difficulty, or mismanagement of corporate affairs. W h e n these intervening causes 
of loss are, in effect, defined out of existence the accountants (and other de­
fendants in securities cases) are converted to insurers of all market losses when 
there has been financial statement error, even if the error had little effect on the 
value of securities. 
These three proposals are, of course, more complex than suggested by my 
comments, and they require careful scrutiny of possible negative effects. But 
each seems to be a limited and manageable objective within the present legal 
structure, and each offers attractive ways of containing the auditor liability 
problem. 
A F i n a l Observation 
None of the foregoing proposals, including the statutory limitation on 
liability, is intended to detract from the accounting profession's own obligation 
to contain its exposure through the careful and skil l ful rendering of services. 
But quality controls and professional responsibilities are already highly developed 
within the profession and the burdens of litigation continue to grow. I submit 
that the profession, and the public it serves, deserve a careful analysis and 
adoption of those measures which produce a realistic balance of responsibility 
and risk. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Resolving the Auditor Liability Problem—An Appraisal of 
Some Alternatives 
Paul Gonson 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Printing of this volume was delayed while awaiting the arrival of Gonson's 
typed copy of his remarks delivered at the symposium. Regrettably, the typed 
record has still not arrived, and I was forced to conclude that printing should 
proceed without inclusion of Gonson's remarks. 
—Editor 
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8 
Observations on the State of Shareholder Participation in 
Corporate Governance 
Barbara Leventhal 
Securities and Exchange Commission* 
I was very pleased to receive Professor Stettler's invitation to speak to you 
tonight about corporate governance. The subject is a timely and fascinating 
one, with more serious implications for the accounting profession than are 
generally recognized. In an obvious sense, there is a direct relationship between 
the structure and composition of corporate boards and the ability of auditors to 
maintain their independence. This relationship has been acknowledged by 
Congress, the Commission, and the profession. It is well established, as was 
noted by the Commission on Auditors ' Responsibilities last January, that "[t]he 
board of directors, with outside members and an audit committee when ap­
propriate, is the best vehicle for achieving and maintaining balance in the rela­
tionship between the independent auditor and management." More recently, 
the A I C P A has demonstrated its agreement with this proposition by consider­
ing whether there is a need for independent audit committees as a condition 
for an independent audit. 
Other Calls for Reform 
Less obvious perhaps but equally significant is the direct parallel between 
the issues facing the accounting profession and those facing the corporate com­
munity. In both cases perceived problems and a decline i n public confidence 
have given rise to Congressional concern and calls for reform. Radical but 
similar solutions, such as federal licensing of accountants and federal chartering 
of companies have been suggested. The question which must be answered i n 
both cases is not whether change must come but how it w i l l come—and whether 
the solutions w i l l be supplied by the private sector or whether they w i l l be 
imposed by government. 
In recent months, there has been an incredible amount of activity i n the 
field of corporate governance. In addition to the Commission's re-examination 
of its rules relating to shareholder communications, shareholder participa-
* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility 
for any private publications by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's 
colleagues on the staff of the Commission. 
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tion i n the corporate electoral process, and corporate governance generally, corpo­
rate accountability projects have been announced by the F T C and the Department 
of Commerce. Fol lowing hearings held last summer by the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies, Senator 
Metzenbaum has appointed an advisory committee to make recommendations 
relating to the need for federal m i n i m u m standards legislation. A working 
group of that committee is scheduled to report back to Senator Metzenbaum 
within the next six weeks. In the private sector, the American Bar Association, 
the American L a w Institute, the Business Roundtable, the American Assembly 
and other organizations have undertaken a variety of corporate governance 
projects. Rarely does a week go by without an article appearing i n some major 
publication on this subject. Graduate students are gathering on my doorstep i n 
droves for assistance i n researching their corporate governance theses, and if 
that were not evidence enough of a national movement, several weeks ago the 
N e w Y o r k Times published an editorial calling for the word "governance" to 
be stricken from the English language because of its pretentiousness and overuse. 
Dissatisfaction with Corporate Governance 
W h i l e the scope and focus of the various corporate governance projects 
differ, the projects all reflect a certain uneasiness or dissatisfaction with the 
way i n which large modern corporations function. This dissatisfaction is not 
economic, for it is widely acknowledged even by critics that the corporate 
sector has performed well i n providing goods, services, jobs and investment 
returns. Rather, there is a public perception that corporations have become vast 
aggregations of unchecked political and economic power wi th the capacity to 
do grave harm to society. Recent events, including widespread illegal conduct, 
mistreatment of consumers and shareholders, self-dealing, and misuse of corporate 
funds for personal gain have led many divergent groups to conclude that a 
problem exists and that the time has come to re-examine the checks and balances, 
internal and external, that regulate corporate conduct and to reconsider the 
basic questions about the role and responsibilities of the corporations in society. 
A s the staff member in charge of the Commission's corporate governance 
hearings, I have spent a substantial portion of the last year immersed i n gov­
ernance questions. 
It is from this background that I draw the following comments on the status 
of that proceeding and offer you some personal observations. 
The Hearings on Corporate Governance 
In a release issued last A p r i l , the Commission announced its intention to 
re-examine its rules relating to shareholder communications, shareholder par­
ticipation i n the corporate electoral process, and corporate governance generally. 
The decision to undertake this study was based on the fact that recent events, 
such as the numerous corporate disclosures concerning questionable and illegal 
payments, had served to focus public attention on the subject of corporate ac­
countability and raised questions about the adequacy of existing checks and 
balances related to corporate management. These events underscored the con-
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cerns expressed many years ago by Berle and Means that the theoretical corporate 
governance model is a myth i n the context of a large publicly held corporation. 
They asserted that directors who are chosen by management do not effectively 
monitor management conduct, and furthermore, since elections of directors 
are most often mere ratifications of management's slates, directors are not 
answerable to shareholders through the electoral process. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission was granted a broad Congres­
sional mandate under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to make 
rules i n connection with the solicitation of proxies which are necessary or ap­
propriate i n the public interest or for the protection of investors for the purpose 
of assuring fair corporate suffrage. Relative to this mandate, the Commission 
was concerned that existing regulations might not provide shareholders adequate 
opportunities to participate meaningfully i n corporate governance or the corporate 
electoral process. T h e Commission noted that shareholders generally receive 
limited information about certain significant corporate policies and practices on 
matters not submitted to shareholders for their approval, and that shareholders 
have limited access to corporate proxy machinery. Election contests are rarely 
feasible because of the huge expenses involved, and the right to make nomina­
tions at annual meetings is of little practical significance, since at that point 
proxies have already been received by management and the number of share­
holders attending an annual meeting typically is small. Despite the breadth of 
the Commission's existing authority, it recognized that a number of questions, 
such as the fundamental question of how corporations can best be made more 
responsive to their shareholders and the public at large, transcended the proxy 
rules in significance and that some methods of obtaining greater accountability 
could not be achieved within the present statutory framework. Comments there­
fore were requested on the desirability of Commission support for federal legis­
lation, such as a b i l l establishing m i n i m u m federal standards of corporate 
conduct and shareholders' rights. 
The preliminary stages of the re-examination consisted of a request for 
public comments and the holding of public hearings on a variety of issues 
relating to corporate governance and corporate responsibility. Whi le too numer­
ous to mention in detail here, these issues fell into three categories— 
• The adequacy of existing avenues of communication between share­
holder and corporations, and particularly, whether shareholders should 
be provided with more information than is now available with re­
spect to socially significant matters affecting their corporations. Also 
involved was whether Rule 14a-8 regarding shareholder proposals, 
should be amended to further facilitate the presentation of shareholder 
views and concerns i n the corporate proxy materials. 
• The role of the shareholders in the corporate electoral process and 
whether the Commission should amend its proxy rules to provide 
shareholders access to corporate proxy materials for the purpose of 
nominating persons of their choice to serve on the board of directors. 
• Whether additional disclosure relevant to an assessment of the quality 
and integrity of management should be required, such as information 
relating to the existence and composition of corporate nominating 
committees, the existence of business and personal relationships be-
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tween nominees or their affiliates and the board, time spent on cor­
porate affairs by incumbents, directors resignations and reasons there­
for, and more detailed or comprehensive disclosure of management 
remuneration and transactions. 
Related questions, such as the appropriate role of the self-regulatory or­
ganizations i n improving corporate governance through revisions of their listing 
requirements, the perceived costs and benefits of various changes, and the need 
for revisions in the format of proxy cards were also considered. 
Public Hearings Response 
The response of the public to the Commission's request for input was en­
couraging. In total, more than three hundred persons and organizations in­
cluding corporations, business associations, government officials, public interest 
and religious groups, law firms, bar associations, financial analysts, academics, 
accountants, and individuals submitted written comments or testified during 
the five weeks of public hearings. So voluminous were the materials offered to 
the Commission, in fact, that the staff spent the winter fighting through masses 
of paper, attempting to draw some conclusions from the array of comments and 
proposals presented. 
W h i l e the paper war is not quite over, we are beginning to see the light at 
the end of the tunnel. Shortly, the staff intends to present a concept paper to 
the Commission and seek authorization to develop a number of rule proposals 
for publication. The staff is also preparing an extensive report for publication 
which w i l l present, i n excruciating detail, a summary of the information con­
tained i n the record of this proceeding along with staff analysis and recom­
mendations concerning the various issues under study. 
Emerging Trends 
Although our final tally has not been completed, a few general trends have 
emerged from the record. First, while a number of commentators believe that 
the present system is working well and that corporations are fulfi l l ing their eco­
nomic functions in a satisfactory manner, there is a growing recognition that 
the old notion that corporate responsibility is limited to returning a profit is 
obsolete, and that new accountability mechanisms are necessary. There is also 
an increasing awareness that regardless of the adequacy of existing checks and 
balances or the degree to which corporate accountability has broken down, there 
is a public perception that problems exist amid a decreasing level of confidence 
i n corporations by shareholders and consumers. This lack of confidence has 
obvious implications for the ability of companies to raise capital in the future. 
Second, although there is a widely held perception that both individual and 
institutional investors are passive "creditors" of a company more interested i n 
that company's income stream than in playing an active ownership role in cor­
porate affairs, it is clear that these investors are becoming increasingly concerned 
with certain corporate policies and expressing growing frustration about their 
inability to influence management decisions. Whi le major financial institutions 
are still somewhat squeamish about using their voting power to influence man-
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agement decisions, individual shareholders, universities, church groups and 
pension funds are showing less hesitation to politicize the corporate electoral 
process. 
T h i r d , there is clearly growing, although by no means unanimous, support 
for a number of proposals designed to give shareholders more information in 
proxy statements and to provide them with added opportunities to participate 
in the corporate electoral process. 
Boards of Directors as a Focal Point 
Although a large number of proposals were made regarding ways in which 
corporate accountability could be improved, and it would be simplistic to suggest 
that any one of them was supported by the majority of commentators, we did 
encounter substantial support for the notion that the key to improved corporate 
governance is the evolution of stronger, more independent boards of directors. 
Various means to strengthen boards were suggested, including the creation of 
increased opportunities for shareholder input into the electoral process, the adop­
tion of S E C disclosure requirements which would stimulate structural changes, 
encouraging the voluntary establishment of nominating committees and the 
inclusions of more independent, nonaffiliated outsiders on the board, and the 
enactment of legislation specifying the fiduciary obligations of directors and 
officers and providing certain shareholder rights, redressable i n federal court. 
A more drastic legislative solution, involving federal chartering of corporations, 
also was advocated by a small number of witnesses. However, the concept of 
establishing constituency boards, an integral part of federal chartering, proved 
to be extremely unpopular. 
N o t surprisingly, the business community expressed a strong preference for 
voluntary action i n lieu of the more heavy-handed approaches, citing i n support 
of this position, the many encouraging developments and innovations which 
have been adopted by companies i n recent years, such as the establishment of 
audit and other standing committees, the inclusion of more outsiders on the 
board, voluntary disclosure, and improved shareholder communication programs. 
Other more skeptical witnesses suggested that these so-called voluntary changes 
have occurred only i n response to governmental prodding, and that reliance on 
voluntarism would not result i n meaningful reform. 
W h i l e it is clear that there is no one answer to the numerous issues which 
have been raised, my own view is that the commentators who stressed the i m ­
portance of the role of the board of directors i n monitoring corporate conduct 
and improving corporate accountability are correct. The evolution of stronger, 
more independent boards wi th a broader understanding of the long term social 
and economic responsibilities of the modern corporation and an ability to truly 
represent the shareholders, monitor management performance, and approve 
major policies would appear to be the most effective means of making corporations 
more accountable. Moreover, whether or not one agrees with the recent sugges­
tion of Chairman Wil l iams that boards be composed entirely of independent 
outsiders with the exception of the chief executive officer and that the C E O not 
serve as chairman of the board, it seems to me to be indisputable that independent 
directors, who are neither employees of the corporation nor providers of profes-
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sional or business services, are more able to ask the probing questions that must 
be asked of management. Given adequate compensation, adequate information, 
and an adequate understanding of their responsibilities, such boards should be 
well equipped to perform their function. 
A u d i t committees composed entirely of independent directors with direct 
access to the outside and internal auditors and prescribed duties covering all 
facets of the audit process obviously are desirable, although as was demonstrated 
in the National Telephone Case, the existence of an audit committee is meaning­
less absent an understanding of committee responsibilities and procedures to 
perform them. I look forward with interest to the A I C P A ' s recommendations 
in this regard. Similarly, nominating committees which do not include any 
management directors should strengthen the effectiveness of boards by reducing 
the indebtedness felt by nominees to the C E O and expanding the universe of 
candidates from which board members are chosen. Compensation committees 
are yet another promising accountability tool, if properly constituted. Taken 
together, the effect of these structural reforms should be to restore, at least i n 
part, the validity of the theoretical model of corporate governance under which 
management is answerable to the board. 
These propositions are of course i n no way novel. They are widely espoused 
by large segments of the business community and government. Recently a no 
less radical publication than Business Week called for the election of genuine 
shareholder representatives as board members i n place of the crony system which 
now prevails. The only real question is how reforms w i l l be achieved. 
Effecting Needed Reforms 
O n this point, it is clear that the easiest and quickest method of effecting 
change either would be for each corporation to adopt structural reforms volun­
tarily and immediately or for Congress to mandate such change. I do not believe 
the former is likely to happen, and the latter, while conceivable at some point 
i n the future, has a number of serious disadvantages, including the stifling effect 
it is likely to have on innovation and experimentation. Somewhere between these 
two extremes I believe that a number of interesting possibilities exist. 
It seems to me that there are several alternatives available to the S E C 
within its existing statutory authority which would foster an environment of 
greater accountability. The adoption of disclosure requirements which provide 
more information about the quality of management and the structure, composi­
tion, and functions of the board and its committees would serve to encourage 
improvements i n corporate governance and would provide investors with infor­
mation vital to an assessment of management. O f particular importance, i n my 
view, is expanded information about the business and personal relationships 
between board members or nominees and the corporation; information about com­
mittees and about director resignations and the reasons therefore; and disclosure 
about directors fees, indemnification arrangements, and an indication of the 
number of meetings attended. Changes i n the listing requirements of self 
regulatory organizations also seem to warrant further attention. Additionally, 
the continued articulation of directors' responsibilities, both through reports of 
investigation and the issuance of "white papers" or guidelines could be fruitful. 
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Similarly, some expansion of the role of shareholders in the corporate electoral 
process, such as the adoption of a rule permitting shareholder nominations in 
corporate proxy materials, i n my view, would provide a safety valve for expres­
sions of deep-seated dissatisfaction with management performance. Despite the 
fact that such a procedure would not affect board composition or the outcome 
of corporate elections i n the majority of cases, it could increase the chances of 
including true shareholder representatives on boards which have not been re­
sponsive to investor concerns, particularly where institutional holders are stimu­
lated to use their voting power. 
These proposals would not cause any drastic changes nor are they meant to. 
Instead, it is to be hoped that the alternative I have described would provide a 
stimulus for evolution of better governance procedures and a heightened level 
of awareness among corporate leaders of the responsibilities which the public 
expects them to meet. 
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